MANAWATU DAILY TIMES TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1918. IS IT A TRAP?

Manawatu Times, Volume XL, Issue 13949, 30 July 1918, Page 4

MANAWATU DAILY TIMES TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1918. IS IT A TRAP?

The military v liter of the “Post,” commenting on th 0 situation on the West Front, says: Why the enemy llrst undertook a big retreat and then countermanded it is a subject of natural speculation, and some suggestions of conflicting opinions in the German command are made in to-day’s cables. The question is not one of much moment for us. The important thing is that the enemy’s behaviour throws a very important light upon the opinion ho holds of the Allied offensive power, and particularly of the Allies’ ability to perform that trapipng operation of which the cabled despatches have lately made so much. The Germans have taken what they consider to be the necessary steps to hold the jaws of the trap open, and now refuse to take any further notice of the tremendous danger which the correspondents have encouraged us to believe threatens the hundreds of thousands of enemy troops between the Marne and the Rheims-Soissons line. If they believed the trap was so dangerous as we have been assured it is, they would have retreated notwithstanding moral effect, for it is better to lose ground than to lose a great army. As it is, they are retiring, but it is in a slow and lighting fashion, and in obedience not to the Allied throat at Soissons, but uuder the direct pressure of the conflict in the Ourcq Valley and southward to the Marne. In other words, the Germans are prepared to accept some measure of tactical defeat at the hands of the troops with whom they arc in grips, but so far they refuse to recognise the strategical defeat which th c Allied Command tried to inflict upon them by the attacks on the flanks at Soissons and Rhoims. It is quite clear that the people best able to judge the soundness of this do- j cision are the Gormans themselves. They declare by their attitude and actions that the Allied trap, designed to capture the biggest mass «f Germans that has ever been in danger of such , a fati', has failed; and It must be ad- . mitted that unless some remarkable change, of which there is no present I sign, occurs, this will prove true. So I fur as thc battle* has gone, it wears all j the appearance of an Allied victory, of

winch, tho essence is that it has stopped a great German offensive and enforced hj considerable German retirement. Tint the great prize' of an army encircled and militarily destroyed is not in the present circumstances to bo looked for with any high hopes. If that prize is missed, there will be disappointment, but it will be due to the anticipations that have been encouraged. Had the trap not been so much boomed, the success that has so far attended the Allies’ efforts would have been regarded as great, especially in view of the strict defensive attitude and the great reverses that had marked the earlier events of this year’s lighting on our side. 'i'lie Allied counter-offensive has really had a much greater effect than is apparent on tho map. The enemy has. in fact, been forced to permit the enlargement of this success in one direction in order to decrease it in another. .For it is only by transferring to tho active front troops from other sectors (such as the Eastern Champagne, where tho French have made an important recovery), and a large number of reserve divisions which wore never intended to go there, that the. trap could be prevented from working. The remainder of the reserves, Germany's striking force jealously preserved for future offensives, has been reduced till it is doubtful if there is enough in hand for another big scheme to be attempted at its due date. The ,Foch offensive, then, may have not only wrecked an offensive that was in full swing; it may have postponed to a decisive extent the rest of ‘Gorin an program me.