TASK IN JAVA

Manawatu Standard, Volume LXV, Issue 306, 24 November 1945, Page 6

TASK IN JAVA

3.45 P.M. EDITION

“ BRITISH ATTITUDE CLEAR

INDONESIANS DISAPPOINTING. (N.Z. Press Association.— Copyright) (Rec. 1.35 p.m.) LONDON, Nov. 23. « “\Ve cannot desert the task ■ which General Mac Arthur has ■given us,”- said the. Foreign Secretary (Mr Bevin), speaking of Indonesia during tfie rioiise of Com--mons debate on foreign affairs ‘today. ‘‘We want to go in and dis*arm the Japanese. The sponer the Indonesians drop the fighting and £1) eg in the talking with both the ‘Dutch Government and us the “better it will be for their country. ’-“Our efforts to avoid bloodshed have, resulted in our being accused of, weakness. It is essential for the fulfilment of our military task to secure and maintain law and order and General Christison naturally has authority to use his forces for that purpose. AYe are in Java to wind up the war against Japan. Admiral Mountbatten is? carrying out the job allocated to him under General MacArthur’s surrender arrangements. 1 am bound to say that the conduct of all ranks in carrying out this arduous and dangerous task has been beyond praise. ‘‘We have no intention of being involved in any constitutional dispute and once our military objectives are attained and the civil Administration replaced on its feet we are resolved i to" withdraw our troops as quickly as possible. RESPONSIBILITY TO DUTCH. ‘‘lt must be remembered that the Netherlands Government stood by us when Japan attacked us,” he said. “I believe they were actually the first to declare war on Japan, and it was not their fault or that of the Netherlands East Indies that they were unable to- assume control, it is therefore quite clear that Britain has a definite agreement with them providing for the Butch Netherlands indies Government to assume as rapidly as practicable full responsibility for the administration of the Netherlands Indies territory.” -Mr Bevin. said Britain had had no indication that the forces in Java wo'uld be opposed, and she now faced a “ most diliicult and most intricate situation. It had been impossible for Britain to avoid involvement in political affairs in Java and the subsequent developments. It had been strongly stated in Holland that the delay in sending forces led to the present situation and Britain had been severely blamed for the delay. Britain also had been blamed for sending forces to!carry out the tasks allotted to her. Those who criticised clearly had no idea of the size of the problem confronting Britain when the war against Japan ceased. It was only on August 15. that Java, with the adjacent isiafids, was transferred to Seac, thus adding 55,000 square miles, more than 43-000,000 inhabitants, 50,000 Japanese troops and 25,000 Japanese civilians to Admiral Mountbatten’s responsibilities. SURRENDER DIFFICULTIES.

Mr Bevin said the Japanese surrender offer transformed . the whole position throughout a large area. Britain, instead of concentrating all her forces at successive strategic positions, had to disperse her manpower and transport as far as possible. They could not hope to occupy the whole area at once and had to be content to-occupy the key points with small forces when transport was available, pending the building up of greater forces. They were also obliged to place responsibility on the Japanese commanders to maintain law and order and to protect internees and prisoners of war. This arrangement broke down in Java. The National movement in Java was not a new thing, but the Japanese exploited and changed it and maintained control over it until the surrender. The Japanese on August 7 announced that approval had been given for Indonesian independence. Dr Soekarno on August 19 declared a republic. The British on arrival found the public services in the hands of this republic, Dutch officials still under detention and the Indonesians were armed with Japanese weapons. The British Government advised that negotiations should be started because it remembered that some of the greatest events in the Empire’s history had resulted from meetings with rebels, but the Indonesians had so far been extremely disappointing, both in discussion and their ability to keep control .