ARAB REBELS

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIX, Issue 36, 11 January 1939, Page 7

ARAB REBELS

ANTI-BRITISH ACTS. WAR OFFICE STATEMENT. POSITION CLARIFIED. (United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) ( British Official Wireless.) RUGBY. Jan. 9. The statement issued by the War Office on the measures taken by British troops in Palestine contains the following additional information, as proof that the allegations in foreign propaganda are baseless: — Practically every village in the country has at one time or another harboured or supported rebels and assisted in concealing their identity from the Government forces. While in many cases this was done from sympathy, in the remainder of eases the same result has been achieved by terrorists. For months now a relentless campaign of assassination has been waged against ad Arabs suspected of favouring the Government or of giving information against the rebels. Consequently villages where a majority of informants would be willing to assist the Government have been teirorisod by the rebel minority into aiding them. NO CO-OPERATION. There is no central co-operation or organisation of rebel bands. The general policy is more or les6 directed by the Grand Mufti and the Higher Arab Committee, but within Palestine the fighting leaders are practically independent in their own areas. Two of the principal leaders are Abdul Itahim el Haj Hahtmed, titular commander-in-chief who operates in Samara, and Aref Abdul Razzik, who commands rebel bands numerically almost as great in the same area. These two leaders a> on such had terms that on more than one occasion open hostilities have almost broken out between them. Tlieir relations with tho Grand Mufti are worth describing as they typify not only the complicated situation in Palestine hut also the two different faces displayed by the present rebellion, on the one hand, to the outside world, and to the unfortunate Arab population on the other In reference to the armed rebellion, the total number of permanent active rebels in the whole country does not exceed 1000 or 1500 men split up in small bodies under the command of various leaders. These men are rebels under arms, often operate in uniform and form the permanent nuclei of rebel gangs. These small parties are reinforced as required by temporary detachments of armed Fellahin (Arab peasants) from neighbouring villages.

Methods by which such reinforcements are obtained vary. In parts of the country where rebel sympathsisers and organisations are strong, definite village detachments with leaders and arms are in existence. Elsewhere villagers are pressed into service by permanent gangs for fixed periods and provided with arms. Elsewhere, again, no regular gangs exist., but small parties of rebel sympathisers combine by night for such activities as sniping and sabotage which has become a recognised and remunerative racket. At present the rebels aim as far as possible to avoid being brought to action by troops. Except when a gang is surprised under arms there is no organised fighting. Otherwise by day. both permanent and temporary rebels conceal their arms and uniforms and mingle indistinguishably with peaceful citizens.

Abdul Rahim is a man of good family and some education, and is a more honest and genuine patriot than the majority of the rebels. He has so far as possible within his rights endeavoured to conduct the campaign on decent lines, and lie dislikes intensely assassination and intimidation waged against all moderate Arabs who might oppose the Grand Mufti’s policy. He maintains an attitude of considerable independence to orders from the Grand Mufti, frequently refusing to carry them out when they offend his principles. REGARDED WITH SUSPICION. For this reason, and because Abdul Rahim formerly had moderate political connections, he is regarded with suspicion by the Grand Mufti, but is retained in his position, partly for bis not inconsiderable organising ability, but still more because bis known good character and high principles make him an admirable figurehead for external propaganda which seeks to represent ibe rebellion as a purely patriotic movement. Aref Abdul Razzik is a man of much lower integrity and less education than Rahim and is entirely unprincipled. Starting as a very minor leader a year ago, he achieved' his present position by a career of utter ruthlessness and implicit obedience to the Grand Mufti’s orders. Tn consequence lie enjoys the complete confidence of the rebel leaders outside Palestine and is their principal agent in the maintenance of the terrorist grip on the Arab population. Incidentally, be undoubtedly pockets a large “take-off from forced contributions to rebel funds, which Rahim does not do. Elsewhere there are practically no major rebel leaders, hilt there are various minor leaders almost completely independent who often have an open enmity with each other. In addition to' there being no standing armed force against which troops can act. there is no central organisation whose destruction would cause the rebellion to collapse. ANTI-REBEL ARABS. There are. moreover, definite signs that, a.s the grip of rebels on the countryside is weakened by military action, the position will he further complicated by the entrance on the scene of Arab anti-rebel -gangs who wish to take revenge on those who have supported the rebel terror. One such gang is alreadv active neor Jenin. In the urban areas there are two principal rcl>el elements —the more educated Effiendis class, which is engaged in organising supplies, finances and the general maintenance and administration of the gangs running the rebel courts and similar activities—and the lower class terrorist thugs who, by assassination, abduction and intimidation of all sorts, maintain a grip of terror on the town population a.s effective as that of the armed gangs on the villages. Though the Effeudis have in the main acted in administrative capacities. they have not gained any real! control as fighting leaders. In Jaffa,! 'Hdul Ra-zzini and the local leader, i Hassam Salameh, have their own agents working for them and extort- 1 ing money from the town with the result- that quarrels over the division of j the spoils and the allotment of vie-1 tims for fleecing are continuous. I