FOREIGN POLICY

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 232, 30 August 1938, Page 12

FOREIGN POLICY

ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN. Britain’s foreign policy was the subject of an address by Dr W. M. Smith, M.A., Pli. D. to the League of Nations Union in Palmerston North, last evening. Mr F. C. Campbell presided, and commented that the meagre attendance at such gatherings appeared to be in inverse ratio to their importance. Two principal features appeared to distinguish British foreign policy at present, said Dr Smith, the first being an attitude of appeasement, as was confirmed by the Italian agreement, which was to be followed by a similar pact with Germany. Appeasement did not seem to be working out successfully. Secondly, there was the refusal to give any guarantees or any commitments in international affairs. There was, no need for this. The dictators were not as strong as they might pretend, and particularly did this apply to Signor Mussolini. Even Herr Hitler had his difficulties. It'was estimated that 40 per cent of his tanks had broken down on the way to Vienna. Moreover, he could be made to climb down as had happened to Signor Mussolini "at the Nyon Conference. It was almost impossible to define British foreign policy, added Dr Smith. One of the reasons was the general desire of peace evident in British countries and the idea that they had been deceived on the last occasion. There was also the public distrust in diplomatic method in general, and yet no new diplomatic practice, either through the League or otherwise, had come about. Herr Hitler and General Franco were regarded by the English conservatives as men who “put the, working class in their place,” and there was a want of sympathy for democracies. Thus Britain wanted a more conservative Government in Franco so that there could be a Four Power Pact with Italy, France, Germany and England participating, but this, thought Dr Smith, would not eventuate. Lord Lothian, who was on his way to the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Sydney, had said that if we could avoid war in the next few years everything would be well. More definite statements were wanted before the problem could be solved. British policy to-day had failed, said Dr Smith, and there was a widespread tension which was without parallel. There was an arms race extraordinary in progress. The national income, which was likely to fall, would have to provide even more for armaments, and the British would find they would’ have to do without butter in preference to guns. The growth of armaments also heralded the restriction of civil liberty, which to-day had diminished compared with 1914. The apologists said all this was caused through policies pursued elsewhere, and that Britain was compelled to make a grim, but necessary, response. There was no doubt that the economic depression had been nrecipitated by the democracies. While Germany was struggling to keep out the more violent parties Britain, by her tariff policies and other measures, had made the position worse, and economic nationalism had helped to destroy the Disarmament Conference. It was wrong to argue that Britain had disarmed, said Dr. Smith, quoting in support a speech delivered in the House, of Commons. “What did not happen in 1931 is the reason for what is happening in Europe to-day,” he added. Herr Hitler wanted Czechoslovakia in i hurry partly for reasons of prestige and with Poland and Hungary he could have strangled the country financially, said Dr. Smith. However at last Britain had made a stand and had told Germany she would not staled for military action in Czechoslovakia. London was not bombed the next day, and this showed that a stand could be made without dire co “ se + < J"’; n ‘ Nevertheless, at the present time the danger of war was very real.