ABYSSINIA

Manawatu Standard, Volume LV, Issue 258, 28 September 1935, Page 2

ABYSSINIA

WHEN WILL ITALY ATTACK? Dr. John Melly, M.R.C.S., Director of Medical Services for the Government of Abyssinia, writes from Addis Ababa, under date, August 3, to the Sydney Morning Herald as follows : That Italy is determined to invade Abyssinia appears certain. But when will the fighting start ? Will Italy attack on the northern or southern frontier, or on both together ? What are her objectives, and will she reach them p On the Eritrea frontier the Italians must advance over a- series of precipitous tliickly-wooded mountains, building bridges as they go over endless vast ravines—a country wholly impracticable for mechanical warfare of any description. In the south they, must attack over sandy scrub, most of it exceedingly difficult for heavy transiiort, where water is scanty and the heat intense —a fever-stricken part of the country not relished even by tlie Ethiopian himself. BOTH FRONTIERS. Judging by the immense concentration of Italian troops and war material on both frontiers, it would appear that it is intended to attack from the north and south simultaneously. If this is so, fihting cannot begin till October, for the heavy rains in the north, which do not cease for another three months, make the movement of troops there almost impossible. .In the Ogaden country, on the other hand, the rains are earlier and lighter, and this—combined with the fact that in August the wells there are full of water —renders that month the best time for ail advance. It is possible that the troops in Eritrea are designed chiefly to divide the Ethiopian forces, and that the main attack may be launched from Italian Somaliland much sooner than is expected. Tlie Ethiopians are armed with modern rifles, and machine-guns, and will ultimately pub nearly 1,000,000 men in the field. Tlie “regulars” are trained by Belgian officers, and will be commanded by Ethiopian officers who have studied military strategy, and tactics under the Belgian Military Mission. Everything depends upon the tactics ! adopted by the Ethiopians, and it is likely that they will employ guerilla warfare almost exclusively. They will lie hidden by day, letting tlie Italians advance, even luring them on, and by night-—black-skinned and bare-footed —- they will creep into the enemy lines, cutting his communications, and fighting the liand-to-liand conflict at which the Ethiopian excels. They are probably the bravest and fiercest warriors in the world, and fighting in the dark and at close quarters, they will have many advantages over the Italians. Tlie Italian General is placing much of his confidence in the 1000 aeroplanes with which'he has insisted upon being supplied. But if the Ethiopians remain scattered, and under cover by day, there will he no targets either for bomb or machine gun. Nor will there be the transport essential to a European army for the aeroplanes to harry. The Abyssinian troops are nothing it not mobile. A handful of grain will feed a man for several days, and for a more substantial meal lie can kill the game with which the country abounds, and eat it as he likes it raw 1 On the other hand, should the Ethiopians make the mistake of massed attacks at the beginning of tlie campaign, they will quickly learn their lesson, for they are i>robably the most surprisingly intelligent and resourceful of all the black races. In the Ualual incident last December, when they found themselves faced with Italian armed cars, they soon ceased to waste their ammunition against the impenetrable steel. But they neither fled noi waited to be slaughtered. With amazing ingenuity they slipped away into the bush, rounded up a herd of wild cattle and stampeded these amongst the armoured cars. Covered bv the ensuing cloud of dust and sand tbej leaped upon the cars, firing their rifles through the gun apertures, . killed the occupants and took possession of the cars. GAS!

Against one weapon alone the Abyssinians are almost completely defenceless. Gas! And apparently Italy will have no scruples about its use. Gas bombs in vast quantities are I'cpoited to have been imported into Eritiea and Italian Somaliland. But though there are only a few gas-masks n Ethiopia, the mountainous nature or much of the country here again wdl aid the Ethiopian. In the iioitli, the heavy gas would quickly sink into tlie ravines and valleys, and become so localised by the broken nature of the ground as to become only a minm menace. Its use in parts of the Oga den however, might be devastatmgly effective, and this fact may influence General Graziani’s decision as to the front on which the main attack is to take place. r , The final Italian excuse for launching the invasion will probably be an alleged Ethiopian border raid. Whether such a raid ever takes place will be quite immaterial. In any case, it is an exceedingly easy thing to provoke at the opportune moment amongst tlie outlying tribes concerned. Indeed, .it is amazing that, despite the ever increasing provocation of Italian troops and armaments massing on both rrontiers, there have not been infinitely more and graver clitshes between them and tlie Ethiopian tribesmen That Italy hopes or intends to conquer the whole of Abyssinia, or even to reach Addis Ababa, the capital, in this campaign, is inconceivable. in the south she probably aims at rcacliiug Harrar and Dire-Daoua—a distance of nearly 300 miles from Italian Somaliland.'Not only is there said to be oil in that region—a commodity of which Italy is in such vital need—but the Italian troops would then be astride the raihvay, and in a good strategic position for an advance at some future date. In the north, tlie potentially wealthy province of Tigre lies alongside Eritrea, and if Italy succeeded in annexing this it might ultimately prove to he a valuable asset. But whatever her intentions, Italy is embarking upon a war oF aggression which cannot command the sympathy of anv right-thinking people, and which, if persevered with, must drain her resources in men and material to the utmost. For Ethiopia is a country offering every possible natural obstacle, both geological and climatic, to an invading army—a nation of magnificent; warriors determined to fight to tlie last man and woman for the independence which has been theirs from time immemorial.

Dr John Melly, M.R.C.S., graduated from Cambridge University in 1923, when lie entered St. Bartholomew’s, the great hospital and medical training institution in London. Shortly after this lie took a further course at Ann Arbor. Michigan. On returning to England he became interested in the prospect of combining medical instruction and missionary work in Abyssinia. He visited the country in 1931 and secured the Emperor’s approval. On returning to England he obtained very substantial financial backing from a number of private persons, among whom were several of the wealthiest Quaker families. A second visit to Abyssinia in 1933 convinced him of the impending national difficulties, and at the Emperor’s suggestion he agreed to organ-

ise' a complete, military and civilian medical service, his -sponsors making the proviso that assistance should be given to all in need of it, regardless of race. They further urged that this service should he designed to co-ord-inate the best interests of the country as well as furthering, knowledge of hygiene and Christian teaching. l)i Melly is now officially appointed Director of Medical Services for Abyssinia, and it is with authoritative knowledge of the country and the. prevailing conditions that he has written this article.