ETHIOPIAN TERRAIN

Manawatu Standard, Volume LV, Issue 233, 30 August 1935, Page 2

ETHIOPIAN TERRAIN

DIFFICULTY OF OPERATIONS. BRITISH GENERAL’S VIEWS. In the latest files of the London Morning Post, Major-General Sir Charles William Gwynn, K.C.8., C.M.G., D. 5.0., writes on the difficulties facing an Italian campaign in Abyssinia. Major-General Gwynn is a soldier of varied experience in the British Colonial Empire, as well as in the Great War. He was director of military art at Duntroon Military College in 1911-14. He received the C.M.G. in 1903 for his work in delimiting the frontier. Major-General Gwynn writes that if the various racial and religious sections of Abyssinia hold together in determined resistance, an immensely expensive and prolonged effort on the part of Italy will be required. At the moment the distrust and suspicion of foreign influences with which all sections in Abyssinia are imbued is directed specially against Italy to an extent that establishes an unusual degree of unity, and the people have a somewhat overweening belief in their prowess. Our own advance to Magdala and the initial Italian occupation of the Eritrean plateau would haye been impracticable but for Abyssinian disunity. Assuming that the Abyssinian and Galla inhabitants of the uplands would present a united front, what are the military factors affecting the problems of either side? Abyssinia would not suffer from shortage of man power, as she may have as many as a million potential fighting men, bravo and extremely active. But with a primitive supply service she could hardly expect to concentrate more than 100,000 at any one point, and that only for a short period, as her troops for the most part have to live on local produce. Any force that could be concentrated would be armed with rifles, for there are great numbers in the country, though nearly all of obsolete patterns, and generally in bad condition. The number of modern rifles and machine guns in the country is small. Ammunition supply ,is also very limited, and the Abyssinian is no marksman. Traditionally lie is an offensive fighter, and seeks decisive action, in which he aims at enveloping the enemy with rapidly moving swarms of men, using natural cover skilfully, and firing as they advance, till they can close on the enemy with their swords. PHYSICAL OBSTACLES. There are many points, of course, at which physical obstacles favour defensive action. The chief difficulty of the invader will be the protection of Ins ever-lengthening line of communication against guerrilla attacks. The great mobility of the Abyssimans, their numbers, and methods of fighting, combined with the difficulties of the country and the distribution of its iosources, lend themselves to such tactics. Looking at the problem from the Italian side, a rapid decisive campaign could hardly be expected. Deliberate advance by bounds, keeping pace with 'road and bridge construction, would seem inevitable. In view of distances to be traversed and obstacles to be overcome, operations might well extend over several dry seasons, and engineering works would need to be of a solid character to enable troops holding the ground gained to bo satisfactorily maintained during the rains. In the north, Italy would have the advantage of having a footing on the main plateau, and in an advance southwards much of the country would bo fairly easy and healthy. The route, however, is crossed by a number of considerable streams, which have cut deep, steep-sided ravines, and are torrents when it rains. Formidable engineering works would lie necessary to establish a road reliable for motor traffic at all seasons. The inhabitants of the country traversed would presumably be hostile, and all of it lying to the west of the advance forms an admirable base for Abyssinian forces. On the other hand, a comparatively short advance might givo Italy control over the fertile and valuable valley of the Upper Takkazze, an important asset in deliberate operations. From her Somali Colony, in the south, Italy would start from the lowland with the Harar plateau and the high ground which connects the Harar and Arussi plateaus in front of her. Their capture, placing her in a dominating position over the Hawasli valley and the Djibouti railway, would probably be her first objective. It would be a good season’s work to achieve it, and again much laborious road-making in broken country would be necessary. As most of the country to be traversed is inhabited by Somalis, protection of communications would probably be an easier matter than in the north. Except on the fertile Harar plateau, subsistence for large Abyssinian forces would be difficult, and serious resistance might not be encountered till the highland was reached. The possession of the Harar Province would provide a valuable base for further operation, and, as it is so much isolated from the main plateau, it could be securely held. AIR POWER.

As in the case of our re-occupation of the Sudan, Italy’s problem is the co-ordination of militarv and engineering effort; it bears little resemblance to that of Japan in Manchuria, or to our own in South Africa, where in each case the engineer had already paved the way. Air power, except as an auxiliary weapon, would not play an important part. There are few vulnerable targets, and an attempt to bring Abyssinia to terms by the use of air power ruthlessly would probably also serve only as an irritant. Nor are armoured vehicles likely to prove a decisive factor for, although the country in places is suitable for their use, it is intersected by numerous tank obstacles, which, combined with the Abyssinian capacity for rapid dispersion, would render tanks ineffective, except in the protection of communications.