SUPREME COURT

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIV, Issue 283, 27 October 1934, Page 2

SUPREME COURT

VERDICT AGAINST MOTORIST, FINE OF £IOO IMPOSED. After a retirement lasting an hour and a-half. the jury returned a verdict of guilty in tho case heard before Mr Justice Blair at the Supreme Court, yesterday, wherein Edward Saville Esdaile was charged with, on July 12, negligently driving a car and thereby causing the death of Miss Katherine Hardman. The proceedings were the outcome of a fatal collision which occurred at the intersection of Rangitikei and Featherston Streets. Mr H. R. Cooper (Crown solicitor) conducted the case for the prosecution, and Mr A M. Ongley appeared for accused. COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS.

In his address to the jury, Mr Ongley contended that the accident was not directly attributable to the pace acused was travelling at. Further, the onus was on the Crown to prove that accused had been negligent. Failing that being proved, accused . was entitled to the benefit of any doubt. Counsel pointed out, for the benefit of the jury, that it did not follow that the finding in a criminal action would be binding in respect to any civil action for damages which might follow. The evidence had shown that accused was a careful driver and, approaching the corner, he had carefully watched the cyclists, fearing that they were about to separate on the corner. Under the circumstances it had been most unfortunate that Hardman should have been in the other car and the latter, counsel contended, had really been tlie neg ligent party. . , . „, Counsel for the Crown maintained that accused had been guilty of failing 1 to give way to traffic from the right, had failed to keep a proper look-out, and had been travelling at an excessive pace. The Crown’s evidence on those points had not been challenged. If the evidence could be accepted as to the speed of the car, it was evident that accused had not been keeping a proper look-out, as he had failed to see the other car emerging from Featherston Street on his right and had not troubled to ease his speed when approaching the intersection. Counsel maintained that the Crown had proved all three points and that accused was guilty on all three, Counsel for the defence had stressed the action of Hardman, but Hardman had observed the regulations as laid down by law and he had had the right to presume that other motorists would do likewise. Counsel concluded his address by asking the jury to arrive at their decision on the broad facts which had been placed before them. The law had been broken and it was necessary to keep in check those who displayed a tendency to drive dangerously. . . His Honour, in summing up, saitl that a person might be driving along the road and fail to sound his horn at a corner. Unless that failure had been a contributory factor to an accident it could not be termed negligent. There was no allegation in the present case that Esdaile had not sounded his horn, and it did not play a part of importance. His Honour quoted a legal interpretation of the word “negligence,” showing that it was the duty of a motorist to so manage his car as to avoid damage to others. The ordinary test of care was wliat the every-day person would exercise. Some motorists were apt to drive faster in Rangitilcei Street than others, but the fact could not be used as an offset in the event of- an accident. Commenting upon criminal and civil negligence, His Honour pointed out that the same basis of care governed each, and a man was equally liable under criminal law as in civil law, although the one was heard as a result of damage to the person and the other to the property and not the person. Commenting upon the question of speed. His Honour stated that he believed in the rule that a motorist should never travel at a speed which would not permit of his pulling up in half the distance he could see when approaching an intersection. Other aspects of the case were traversed and the jury retired at 3.30 p.m. to return at 5 p.m. with a verdict of guilty. His Honour remarked that that lie did not propose to impose a term of imprisonment, although he would have to consider the question of disqualifying accused from driving a car. Counsel for accused stated that to disqualify accused from driving would be placing him out of business. His Honour: It does not disqualify from riding in a car, but merely from driving it Tlie Judge added that accused did not appear to appreciate the rules of the road. It seemed to him accused had been in a lot of trouble during his career as a motorist. Indeed, lie appeared to have been particularly unlucky. Counsel: He has been driving for 12 years and this is the first occasion on which he has faced a charge, while he has had only one small claim for damages. His Honour: These motor accidents give Judges a lot of worry. The law must be vindicated and the killing of a person by negligence is a very serious thing. Ido not see why the disqualification should not be imposed. Accused will be fined £IOO and disqualified from' holding a license for a period of 12 months from this date, while he is ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution, £29 2s. His Honour explained that he did not wish to he too hard on accused and he ordered that the amount be paid in equal instalments spread over 15 months, the first instalment to be made on or before November 26, adding that default in any instalment would be six months’ imprisonment.