SHAREMILKING CONTRACT.

Manawatu Standard, Volume L, Issue 195, 16 July 1930, Page 13

SHAREMILKING CONTRACT.

DISPUTE OVER CLAUSE. MAGISTRATE’S DECISION. (Special to “Standard.”) FEILDING, July 15. Reserved judgment was given by Mr R. M. Watson, S.M., in the Foilding Magistrate’s Court to-day in the case in which James Raymond Pask, ofßangiwahia, sharemilker (Mr D. C. Cullinane) proceeded against Frederick Charles Person, farmer, of Beaconsfield (Mr A. M. Ongley) for £24 15s, being the balance of moneys allegedly due for calves reared under the terms of a sharomilking contract.

“This is a somewhat extraordinary ease,” said His Worship. “Plaintiff and defendant for a number of . years had been entering into an agreement for milking on shares for a season, the solicitor who prepared the agreement acting for both parties, of whom plaintiff was the contractor or sharemilker and defendant the proprietor of tho farm and herd. In the spring of 1929 an agreement was accordingly prepared and signed b'y the parties. This agreement was very much on the lines of the agreements of previous years, but among other alterations was one whereby the value of the calves reared was based upon a fixed sum instead of upon a valuation as at March 15.

“Clause 12 of the 1929 agreement read as follows,” His Worship continued: “‘The contractor shall rear all calves which the proprietor shall decide to keep in a proper and careful manner; the calves to be fed on whole milk for two wmeks and then gradually reduced to all skim milk (no calf shall be weaned before four and a half months old); calf meal shall be prepared by the contractor and mixed with the skim milk as directed by the proprietor, the cost of such calf meal to pe borne by the parties, three-fifths by tho proprietor and two-fifths by the contractor; on March 15, 1930, the proprietor will pay to the contractor 25s for his two-fifths share of all calves reared and alive on this date.’ “It will be seen that the clause was altered after engrossment by the deletion of the words ‘for each calf reared’ and the insertion in lieu thereof of the words ‘for his two-fifths share of all calves reared and alive on March 15,’ ” His Worship continued. “Plaintiff and his wife say that when the agreement was executed by the plaintiff the alteration had not been made. This is contrary to the evidence of the solicitor who took the instructions and the solicitor’s clerk, who actually typed tho alteration into the engrossment, and in the circumstances I find myself unable to accept the plaintiff’s statement as proof. Assuming, therefore, that tho plaintiff knew of the alteration when le read over the agreement and signed it, it now becomes the duty of the Court to interpret the meaning of the alteration. In my opinion, the sentence as altered allows of one interpretation only, that is, that 25s is the total sum that plaintiff is to receive for his share of all calves reared and alive on March 15, 1930. This interpretation, however, is supported by neither party. Plaintiff claims 25s for each calf reared and it is not disputed that he reared thirty-three calves. Defendant contends that all he is bound to pay plaintiff is two-fifths of 255, or 10s, for each calf reared. Neither interpretation can be strictly read from the agreement, but, if either must, then plaintiff’s is in niy opinion much more likely to be tho true interpretation, If the words ‘all calves’ were inserted in error for ‘each calf,’ then plaintiff’s interpretation is correct. On the other hand, it is impossible to read defendant’s interpretation into the sentence without substantially reconstructing it. Moreover, defendant’s interpretation is based on an estimated valuation of the average value of each calf reared on March 15 as at £1 os; plaintiff’s on an estimated valuation of £3 2s 6d. The estimated valuation was in fact made by the parties before October, 1929, and on the amount of it, in my opinion, the honesty or otherwise of this claim depends. The amount of the claim is well within the quity and good conscience jurisdiction and 1 consider I should, and I do, employ section 100 of tho Magistrate’s Court Act to determine it, accepting such evidence as I consider will assist in an equitable decision. “Plaintiff said in evidence that the market value of these calves this year would be about 30s; last year calves wero £3 to £5 10s for different grades, according to quality. It is well known that between last year and this year there was a very considerable drop in the value of weaner calves, and I am prepared to accept plaintiff’s statement in this connection as being at any rate to a considerable extent correct. Whatever defendant’s instructions to his solicitor, I believe the parties themselves came to the arrangement that 25s was to be paid plaintiff in respect of each calf reared, and that plaintiff understood that arrangement was set out in clause 12.

“There is nothing, as the solicitor admitted, in this agreement tq the effect that plaintiff was to have two-fifths of the calves reared. I consider this amount fixed to be paid plaintiff must have been struck over the whole of the calves. Under clause 14, no amount is fixed in advance between the parties, the amount payable to plaintiff being determined by his proportion of the actual net selling price of all calves sold. That is quite a different position. I think it would be inequitable that plaintiff should be deprived of the 15s pier calf, for which ho claims, and I accordingly give judgment for tho amount of his claim with costs according to scale.”