Manawatu Evening Standard. FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 1927. RUSSIA, CHINA AND THE POWERS.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLVII, Issue 123, 22 April 1927, Page 6

Manawatu Evening Standard. FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 1927. RUSSIA, CHINA AND THE POWERS.

The reported rapprochement between Switzerland and Russia, while it indicates the possibility of the Soviet Government taking part in the Geneva conferences of the League of Nations, and to the possibility of Russia applying for admission to League membership, is conceivably an omen of good. At the same time it is possible to take the Soviet professions too seriously. During the now nearly ten years of its existence that Government has shown itself in such a sinister light and has so manifestly acted the part of an intriguer against the peace of other peoples, with its revolutionary and Communist propaganda, and has so repeatedly broken faith with those nations that have given it recognition, that very little trust can be placed in its professions. Russia to-day has probably the largest army of any nation in Europe, and she is said to have a large number of aircraft available for war purposes. The events in China have shown that her agents are intriguing there, and that much of the anti-British propaganda and hostility, which has caused so much trouble at Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai and in the Yang-tse-Kiang Valley generally, has been deliberately provoked by those agents. Despite the recent setback sustained by the Nationalists, Dr Chen remains in control of the Government of Southern China, and his attitude towards Great Britain, and the Powers generally, is far from conciliatory. That may be, and probably is, due to the transparent lack of unity between the Powers concerned, as shown in the presentation by the Government of Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Japan of five different notes to the Cantonese Government. While they appear to be almost identical in terms and each note demands reparations for the Nanking outrages, they invite, if not in actual terms, the policy Dr Chen is apparently pursuing—that is, a policy of bluff, and one that plays one Power against another. The Nanking outrages are so well authenticated that Dr Chen’s refusal to admit the responsibility of the Nationalists for the unprovoked attacks upon foreign citizens and the consulates in that city cannot be accepted, any more than his implied charges that the bombardment, by British warships of “defenceless Nanking,” was 'provocative of the trouble that actually occurred. It was only the fire of the warships that actually averted the massacre -of those foreign residents who had taken refuge on the heights above the city, and who were protected by the barrage the warships interposed between them and the Nationalists, who had looted the residences of the foreigners and maltreated the

imr.a es. Chen, although he has distil imed sympathy with Commu:ai im> appears to have accepted the | uidance of the Soviet, and to he playing the same game that Runs a has played in more subtle faslii >n in her crusade against so-oa led Imperialism and the Imperta ists. Unless the Powers take aoncerted action, however, it does not seein likely that Chen will ae brought to his bearings. His iroposal for the appointment of “in international commission to :*e rise unequal treaties and invest! fate the Nanking affair” and his ailure to agree to the dema:n a for reparation the Powers have made upon him, is symptoms ;is, and merely side-steps the issue ? raised, although his reply to he American Government see m ? to be of a more conciliatory chart cter than that sent to the Briti ih authorities, inasmuch as he p 'onuses to make good all daim ge to the American consulate at N inking, “whether or no such darn ge was caused by the Northern i sbels or others.” There is a dells titful touch about that reference to the “Northern rebels,” seein g that the so-called “rebels” were actually fighting Chen’s Soutuemers in defence of the Pekiig Government, and that “tie Nanking affair,” as it is lighi iy termed by Chen himself, took place when the Northern armi s were some hundreds of mile. away. The audacity of the impl ed change that these “rebels’ —a term that might be applied with equal force to the socali e l Nationalist armies—is only eqna led by Chen’s further implicate i that the personal injuries sustained by United States nations is were caused by the British and American bombardment, or alter latively by “Northern agents prov< cateurs.” The Chinese, like the 1 tussians, are past masters in the i rt of subterfuge and Chen’s repili s to the Powers appear to be al based on subterfuge. Where he if not actually accusative, he is 3( th hypocritical and mendacious . The London Daily Telegrap l hits the truth of the matter i r hen it says that “Chen’s reply would have been different if he in d been given an inkling that nor-i ompliance with the Powers’ denis ads would be followed by serio is penalties.” The situation is ui questionably serious, and it may take all the wit and ingenuity o British and American diplgmav.ii! ts to avoid an actual breach, whi c i will bring their naval and milit try forces into active hostility s with Chen’s Cantonese troop ?. From Peking comes a ray of lie 3e in the argreeinent reached by t] e representatives of the five Powi rs concerned. Their Minister; have agreed to make unanimon representations to their Governments that the reply is inadeq late, and “merely a prevaricator f manoeuvre intended to weal sn the Powers’ demands and ere it 3 dissension, and confuse the < uestion of reparations by refer* 3r ze to totally irrelevant incider t .” The trouble is that Preside? t Coolidge’s habit of temporising may cause him to allow the reprt 3entations of his Minister at Pel:i ig to pass unheeded. Isolated a ition and isolated representation? are not. likely to bring about a so ution of the trouble. That can i lone be effected by combined repri sentations and combined action.