Manawatu Evening Standard. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1926. SETTLING THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLVI, Issue 284, 1 November 1926, Page 6

Manawatu Evening Standard. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1926. SETTLING THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Certain American journals have been engaged lor many montiis past in an attempt to settle tne war guilt of tne jauropean nations concerned in tne great conflagration of 191 T-13. eminent History (tfle INew lorn Times magazine; nas liad historians mobilised, in tne somewnat vain task of whitewashing Germany and . to relieve that nation of tlie actual responsibility of initiating tne war, oblivious of tlie fact that otlier American historians, and notably Professor White, had conclusively shown as far back as 1917 flow, and by whom, the war was originated. Prom time to time new

“facts” are alleged to have been discovered and new documents unearthed, tending to show that Germany was more sinned against than sinning and that, when she “unsheathed her sword” it was under dire pressure and to safeguard herself against the wicked conspiracies of Trance, Russia and Great Britain. However, the latest issue of Current History administers a severe setback to the German apologists in the shape of an article contributed by liicnard Greliing, the autflor of “J’Accuse,” a work which received a good deal of attention during the earlier stages of the war, because of its direct impeachment of Germany as the arch war criminal, and because also its author fclaimed to be a German. An English translation of the book, wkicfl was first published in German at Lausanne in ALpril, 1915, with a preface by Dr Anton Suter, was published a few months later in London, New York and Toronto, It proved to be a formidable indictment of the rulers of Germany and showed conclusively that, from the beginning of the trouble between Austria and Serbia, “Sir Inward Grey, the English Foreign Minister, took the leading part in all efforts to preserve peace, and did everything within the power of man to prevent war.”/. As Sir Edward, now Yiscount Grey, hasl been since charged by certain of the mobilised historians already referred to,-with being one of the authors of the war, this statement from “J’Accuse 15 is particularly noteworthy. But the author of that now famous work, in his Current History article, taking recent disclosures from the Bavarian archives as a text, shows the irreconcilable attitude of the German General Staff, \ which was lucidly explained by its chief, Count von Moltke. As early as July 29, 1914, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin informed his Government that “the Minister of War, supported by the Chief of Staff, urgently desires

military measures such as the tense' military situation} and the threat of war demand. The Chief of the General Staff'... is. bending his entire influence to the end that the u,nusually favourable conditions be utilised for- an aggressive move. He points to the fact that France is at present in a position of military embarrassment; that Russia feels herself none too secure from a military standpoint; in addition the time of year is favourable, with the harvest in large part gathered and the year’s development completed.” The report of the General Staff- of July 27 was not included in the German publications, and Mr Greliing suggests as the reason for its exclusion that it stated “Paris completely quiet. Press unusually moderate.” When von Tirpitz gave warning of the danger of under-valuing the British army, it was von Moltke who contemptuously replied: “We ’will arrest them,” adding, “the more English the better.” The records show that, as'far back as 1909, Chief of the German General Staff expressed the opinion that - the moment was so favourable from a military viewpoint that he could not imagine a more . favourable one occurring in any conceivable space Months before the murders at. Serajevo the German General Staff was urging war “on grounds of military expediency alone.”

FIYE YEARS BACK. The Bavarian State documents, which Mr Greliing deals with, show that, as far back at 1909, the German General Staff was looking and even hoping for war. Correspondence between von Moltke and Conrad, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, recently published shows that the former wrote on January 21, 1909 : “I believe that, only the invasion of Serbia by Austria can result in an eventual active interference by Russia. This would be the casus foederis for Germany.” Writing again on February 29, 1909, von Moltke said that, even if the Russian Government opposed the war “it would be forced into the adoption of a Pan-Slavic movement of the Russian peoples if Austria invaded Serbia. Again, on September 14, 1909/ when the Bosnian crisis had been peacefully settled by what Moltke termed “the capitulation of Russia and Serbia,” he wrote regretfully of the opportunity thus lost.

Inc- this (he said) would have lain an : extremely' importarnt guarantee for-'-tlie successful carrying - through of . joint operations, if ■ the contingency of war had entered in, as to which we had come to an understtyMling. , vln these private communications- I may say openly that I, in. company with your Excellency, regret deeply that an opportunity has gone by without being utilised which may not soon present itself again under such benelicent circumstances. . . . However, Excellency, let us look hopefully toward the future.

From this it.would seem that the German General Staff had been planning what its Chief called the “great war” five years in advance, and to have regarded an Austrian invasion of Serbia as an indispensable preliminary. .It is surely more than a mere coincidence that events should have been so shaped as to suit this plan. On July 13, 1914, the Austrian military attache in Berlin telegraphed to Vienna

Moltko says that he wil] consider the situation critical if the AustroHungarian Monarchy does hot immediately mobilise against.' Russia. Through delivered declaration of Russia concerning ordered mobilisation, necessity arises of counter-measures by Austria-Hungary which would also be adduced from more open proofs. This has given occasion for a declaration of alliance by Germany. . . . Refuse renewed efforts by England to maintain peace.

But the Russian mobilisation declaration was not made until the following day and some hours before the order was issued von Moltke telegraphed to Conrad that Russian mobilisation had been carried through; that Hungary must carry out a similar fiiove against Russia immediately,” that “Germany will mobilise” and that Italy ’■ should be compelled “to declare alliance by offering compensations.” The Bavarian archives also disclosed a telephone conversation recorded between the Austrian Embassy and the Bavarian Foreign Office in which it was stated that English intervention was not expected “in influential circles in Berlin” and “the undoubtedly vigorous efforts of Grey for the preservation of peace would not check the course of events.” And, as we know; they did not. Mr Greliing has done good service in his analysis of the revelations thus-published and it is to be hoped that. the mischievous propaganda, which seeks to fasten the responsibility for the war upon England, France and Russia, will be now effectually quenched.