Manawatu Evening Standard. SATURDAY, NOV. 7, 1925. THE COST OF A STRIKE.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLV, Issue 287, 7 November 1925, Page 8

Manawatu Evening Standard. SATURDAY, NOV. 7, 1925. THE COST OF A STRIKE.

Ixtekkstixg facts arc forthcoming in connection with the action of the British Government in agreeing- to make a subsidy in aid of 1 lie miners’ wages so as to fill the gap between the existing wage level and that which the mine owners proposed. The subsidy is to be continued for nine months and, meanwhile, the British Government is making a full and impartial enquiry into the coal mine industry during the period of peace which it has obtained at the tax-payers’ expense. Noboby likes the subsidy, which may cost the tax-payers anything between ten and fifteen millions, but, had the threatened strike of miners occurred, it would have cost them between sixty and seventy millions, and at the end of it a real settlement would probably have been further oft than ever, owing to the bitter passions aroused by the conflict and not forgotten or forgiven. Assuming that the strike might have lasted thirteen weeks, as the strike did in 1921, Air Churchill put the cost to the tax-payers as follows : Loss in direct taxation (income tax, etc.) anything from twentyfive to fifty millions; loss in indirect taxation (tea, sugar, etc.,) three to four millions; extra cost of unemployment insurance payments, fifteen millions; maintenance or order and public services, ten millions; possible raising of a defence force, ten millions. In terms of taxation a strike would have swept away the sixpence reduction of income tax; the reduction of tea and sugar duties made in 1024; and have postponed the new pensions scheme by one or two years. In addition, there would have been a paralysis of industry, a big loss of trade, a great increase of unemployment, and a postponement of all measures of social reform, while the effect of the strike on trade and industry would, of course, have lasted long after the actual conflict had come to an end. Strikes in connection with the coal mining industry are of more frequent occurrence than strikes in any other industry. The coal strike in 1920, which lasted from October 15th to November 3rd, cost the State eight millions. The loss of value of the coal output amounted to £20,500,000, while the loss to miners in wages alone ran to between fourteen and

fifteen millions sterling, added to which some 950,000 workers in other industries were thrown out of employment. The coal strike of 1921 cost tiie State over thirtytwo millions. The estimated increase in unemployment pay was thirteen millions, and the decrease in the British export trade was estimated at between forty and fifty millions. There was, of .course, an enormous increase in unemployment in other industries. In the case of the coal strike of 1921 the British Government agreed to pay over a subsidy of ten millions sterling, as part of the terms of settlement. Thus, for a subsidy approximating to that which the Lloyd George Coalition Government offered after a strike, costing on a moderate estimate £200,000,000, the Baldwin Government avoided as costly a strike and provided a breathing space of nine months for a full and impartial enquiry into the whole problem of the coal industry. It was said that the Government only gave way to force and that because not only the miners, but the railway workers and the transport workers, were threatening to stop work and thus open up the path to a general revolutionary strike. It is quite true a strike was threatened in those industries, and the Government could have accepted the challenge. But the dispute was not a political one. That is to say it was not an attempt by the miners to secure some political change such as nationalisation by means of their industrial powers, instead of through the ballot box. It was a dispute respecting wages upon which the two parties had failed to come to an agreement, and both mine owners and mine workers were unable to give way, the former contending that it was impossible to continue the industry with wages on the existing basis, since their selling prices involved a loss after outgoings were paid. The miners, on the other hand, represented the dispute as an attempt unjustifiably to reduce their wages in many cases to below the pre-war level. The Government had to 'face, alternatively, a strike not confined to the miners but extended to railway men and transport workers, and probably becoming general and assuming a revolutionary aspect, or a subsidy for a period during which, by an impartial investigation, there would be a chance of the public getting at the facts and compelling a peaceful solution. The Government adopted file right course, and showed its wisdom in deciding to secure a breathing space, even at some financial loss to the State.