THE KING AND KAISER

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLV, Issue 59, 9 February 1925, Page 12

THE KING AND KAISER

VON TIRPITZ STATEMENTS . REFUTED. In October last the Memoirs of Admiral Von Tirpitz were published in English papers. Apparently these memoirs contained misleading and inaccurate statements as they prompted Lord Hardinge of Penshurst to communicate with the London Times and, with the consent of the British Foreign Office, to disclose the contents of his secret report to Sir Edward Grey (as he then was). Lord Hardinge (then Sir Charles) was the British diplomatic representative in Berlin in 1908 when His Majesty King Edward VII. visited the German Emperor at Cronberg on August 11 of that year. Lord Hardinge obviously foresaw that a war was inevitable and his report affords an interesting comparison with tho statements made by Admiral Von Tirpitz in his book. Tho following is Lord Hardinge's report to tho British Government at the time of the visit:— The King arrived at Cronberg at 9 a.m. on the morning of August 11, and was met at the station by the German Emperor and Prince and Princess Frederick Charles of Hesse.

Owing to Herr von Schon's illness, Herr von Jenisch was in attendance upon tho Emperor as representative of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The meeting between the King and the German Emperor, and the intercourse which took place between their Majesties, were of a. most cordial and friendly character, and could only serve to improve and cement the personal friendship between tho two Sovereigns. During the course of the morning the King had a long interview with the Emperor, in which every subject of interest to England and Germany was discussed between them, with tho exception of naval armaments, and mutual friendly assurances wore given on both skies. The King told mo that, although he touched on the question of naval expenditure, and mentioned that his Majesty's Government had given him a paper containing their views on the subject, tho Emperor neither asked to see the paper nor to know its contents, and the King therefore considered that it would be more tactful on his part not to force upon the Emperor a discussion which he seemed anxious to avoid. After the very lear statements made to me later in the day by the Emperor and Herr von Jenisch, there can be no doubt that the King exercised a wise discretion in not broaching to the Emperor a subject of which the discussion was evidently unpalatable to his Majesty, and which might possibly have spoilt the happy effect of the conversation which had taken place between them. The King availed himself of the opportunity to propose to the Emperor the appointment of Sir E. Goscheu as successor to Sir F. Lascelles, and the Emperor warmly welcomed the proposal, remarking that ho had always entertained a feeling of great respect for Lord Goschen, the Embassador s late brother, and that he was just the person whom he himself would have selected. He was anxious that the British Ambassador in Berlin should occupy the most prominent and an unassailable position in society, and that, as he knew Berlin society to be malicious, he was glad that Sir F. Cartwright's name had been withdrawn, though he had nothing to say against this distinguished diplomatist, whom he had known well and liked in the past, but had not met for several years.

THE TWO NAVIES. While smoking his cigar after luncheon, the Emperor did me the honour of calling me up to sepak to him. In the course of a conversation on the popularity of military service in Germany, which had become an ingrained principle in the education and development of the national character of the German people, owing to tho devastation and misery from which tho Germans had suffered during tho Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, uad tho Napoleonic campaigns, but from which tho British Isles had been happily spared, allusion was made to the relations existing between England and Germany, which the Emperor declared to be quite satisfactory, except for the evil results of the campaign of tho i Yellow Press in both countries.

I replied that I was sorry to bo unalbe to share the Emperor's opinion, since there could bo no concealment of the fact that a genuine apprehension was felt in England as to tho reasons and intention underlying the construction of a large German fleet. This preoccupation was being felt, not in England alone, but also in Europe, where happily it remained as the only element of unrest in the international situation. No cause for disagreement existed between England and Germany, and the diplomatic relations between tho two countries were perfectly friendly and natural, without the smallest cloud on the political horizon likely to cause anxiety in the future. The knowledge of these facts made it difficult for thoughtful people to reconcile the friendly assurances of the Emperor and German Government with the acceptance by tho German Parliament of the extensive naval programme, which could only be realised at considerable sacrifice on the part of the German people. The execution of tho German programme would necessarily entail a corresponding increase in our expenditur on naval armaments, since the naval supremacy of Great Britain had now become a cardinal principle of British policy, which no Government of whatever party could afford to ignore. Although nobody could have tho right to dictate to any Power a programme of naval construction, it had been fully realised in England that, if the present German programme is completed, the German navy will, in a few years'' time, bo in a superior position to the British Navy as regards the largest type of battleship, and British supremacy at sea would thus be endangered. Unless it were possible for some sort of friendly discussion to take place between the two Governments resulting in a modification or a slackening of the present rate of shipbuilding, it would be necessary for tho Government next year to submit to Parliament an extensivo shipbuilding programme and to explain how tho necessity for it has arisen. There could be no'doubt that Parliament would accept whatever burdons the Government might propose, but there could be no doubt that this naval rivalry between the two countries would embitter their relations to each other, and might in a few years' time lead to a very critical situation in the event of a serious, or even a trivial, dispute arising between the two countries.

The Emperor maintained that there was absolutely no cause for apprehension in England as to the German nava! programme, and that no sensible person in Germany had ever thought for a moment that the German fleet was intended for an attack upon England. The English fleet had in relation to other fleets already more than a two-

Power standard, since in 1909 there would bo 62 British first-class battleships to 24 German ships of tho same class. Tho relative proportion of ,tho two fleets in first and second-class onus? ers was also the same. He hud only to point out tho composition of the fleets of 300 ships of war which had taken "i part in the North Sea manoeuvres to show the absurdity of any comparison now or in the immediate future between tho relative strengths of tho German and British fleets. Ho therefore failed to see any reason for nervousness in England, or for any increase in tho British fleet on account of the German naval programme. This programme was not a now one; it had been passed by law: and it had become a point of national honour that it should be completed. No discussion with a foreign Government could be tolerated; such a proposal would be contrary to tho national dignity, and would give rise to internal troubles if the Government were to accept it. He would rather go to war than submit to such dictation.

THE GERMAN FIGURES. . I at once pointed out to the Emperor that, in suggesting a possible friendly discussion between the two Governments, there had been no question of dictation and that my words could hardly bear that interpretation, to which his Majesty assented. I said that I was at a loss to understand how his Majesty arrived at the figures of the relative strength of tho two navies in battleships in 1909, and could only assume that the 62 first-class battleships of the British fleet comprised every obsolete vessel that could bo found floating in British harbours and that had not been sold as scrap iron. Tho Emperor at once sent an aide-de-camp for a publication of this year by "Nauticus, giving the above figures, and presented me with a copy for my own edification and conviction. I told the Emperor that I wished very much that I could accept the figures of "Nauticus" as correct, and that I was quite sure that I could make the same statement as regards his Majesty's Government, who were genuinely anxious to be on tho best possible terms with Germany, and who would profoundly regret tho necessity ,' of devoting to naval construction funds which could be so much more profitably spent in measures of social reform. Never had there been a more pacific Government than that now in office in England, but they fully realised that no social reforms would bo profitable to the country if its security and existence were endangered. It must be remembered that if there were war between England and Germany, and the British fleet received a temporary reverse, the British shores would be open to invasion by the armies of the greatest military Power in the world and the country would be conquered. A large British fleet did not present the same danger to Germany and, in the absence of largo military forces in England, its existence was absolutely essential for the security of the British Isles. The presence at Kiel, within 24 hours of tho British coasts, of an immense German fleet, which in 1918 would consist of 38 battleships, with 20 first-class cruisers and nearly 150 destroyers, would constitute a standing menace and "could not be justified by the naval forces at the command of both Franco and Russia. Nor could it be said that the German fleet was intended for tho protection of German commerce, since German trade could not be protected by a fleet lying always at its base. DANGER OF INVASION. Tho Emperor replied with some warmth that tho talk of invasion was sheer nonsense, and that such an idea had never been contemplated by any serious person in Germany. Moreover, it was ho that directed the foreign policy of Germany, and was it likely that ho would ever tolerate such an idea for an instant? Ho maintained that the figures given by "Nauticus" were correct, and that those given by the Admiralty were intended to deceive public opinion in England. It was in England that the first "dreadnought" had been built in greatest secrecy, and on its completion Admiral Fisher and the press had at once announced that she was capable of sinking the whole of the German navy. These statements had forced the German Government to begin building ships of a similar type to satify public opinion in Germany. Although England had previously increased the size of her battleships, Germany had kept to the smaller size of heretofore, until provoked b3' the action of the British Admiralty to build ships of the largest size. As for the German fleet being kept at Kiel, he kept it there because Count 'Metternich had reported to him that the Foreign Office and public opinion in England, were sensitive, and did not like to see the German fleet passing up and down the Channel. Moreover, Germany had not the numerous bases which England possessed in distant seas, and German ships had in consequence to bo kept at home. He had, however, now sent his ships 'to the Canaries, and, to show his confidence in British policy, ho had dono so at a moment when the North Sea was full of British warships engaged in i naval manoeuvres. Tho Emperor repeated that the German naval programme of 38 battleships and 20 cruisers must be completed by 1918 at the i various stages prescribed by law, and that no further increaso would then be ! made, but that the navy would be main- , tained at that strength. As for his Majesty's Government, they were, of . course, free to build as they pleased. I replied to the Emperor that tho ! danger of invasion would in that case, 1 unless counter-measures were taken, al- ; ways be possible in the future, but, I ' trusted, not probable. Although, from the experience of tho last 20 years since ; his Majesty had been on the throne, his ; Majesty's Government had tho fullest ' confidence in his peaceful intentions and ; in those of his Government, it was al- • ways possible that a wave of public ' opinion might, on some pretext which i we could not foresee, break down all I resistance and precipitate a catastropho 1 such as war between the two countries. ■ Such an incident would be more likely ' to happen when a weapon such as the ■ German navy had been forged at great ■ expense and would cost still more to ■ maintain in an efficient state. I ad- ■ mitted that the building of ships of the • "dreadnought" type might in the first ■ instance have been a tactical error, ■ but that that could be no justification ■ for the encouragement of naval rivalry • between the two countries. I demur- '' red to the Emperor's statement as to ; tho intention of the Admiralty to de--1 ceive public opinion in England by i their figures, and added that it was a matter of common notoriety that, if 1 the present shipbuilding programmes ■ are maintained, Germany will, in about i three or four years' time, have as many ■ if not more "dreadnoughts" than England. I expressed my astonishment i that Count Metternich should have in- ■ formed his Government that the For- ! eign Office were sensitive and disliked • the idea of the German fleet passing . up and down the Channel. I could say i with confidence that such was not the case with the Foreign Office, nor with public opinion as far as I knew. As proof of this I could point out that

the passage of the German fleet to the < /anaries had provoked ho unfriondly aminent in. England. Reverting to the general question of naval expenditu<o I expressed the hopo that,moderate, counsels would still prevail, and that although friendly discussion between the two Governments might as the Emperor insisted, be barred, still I was convinced that his Majesty's Government would require no written formula nor verbal statement from the German Government, but only a visible proof that tho programme of naval construction had been modified or slaclcened, in order to make a similar modification or slackening in their own. Without some such proof it would bo quite impossible for his Majesty's Government to resist tho pressure of public opinion, and a large counter-pro-gramme of naval construction would be inevitable. HERR VON JENISCH.

The conversation here ceased, but two hours later I had an interview with Herr von Jenisch, who had been out with mo on a motor drive, and had had no means of communicating with the Emperor in the meantime. I developed the situation to him in much tho same terms as those which I had used earlier in the day to the Emperor, only possibly in greater detail. I gave him the most positive assurances of the friendly intentions of his Majesty's Government, and urged upon him with tho utmost insistence tho necessity of arriving by some means or other at a modification of tho present German naval programme or at a postponement of its completion, so as to avoid an insane rivalry in naval construction between the two countries which could only end in their mutual hatred and impoverishment. Herr von Jenisch gave mo precisely tho same replies as tho Emperor had already given, to the effect that the programme which had been passed by law must be completed; that the date of its completion could not be in anyway deferred'; and that no changes were possible which could be interpreted in any sense as due to tho suggestion of another Power. I mentioned.to Herr von Jenisch that I knew that the King proposed to • speak to the Emperor of the possibility of the King and Queen paying an official visit to Berlin next year; but I felt it my duty to warn him that, if the British public had by that time realised the competition in naval construction which was to be initiated between tho two countries, such a visit might become very unpopular in England and have consequently to be abandoned.

Herr von Jenisch strongly urged the importance of the. visit taking place, since it was ardently desired by all classes in Germany, and there could bo no doubt as to the warmth of tho welcome which the King and Queen would receive in Berlin. He stated that at the time of the visit of the King and Queen to Reval, although it was well known that their Majesties had not the time at their disposal to pay a visit to Berlin, there had been a feeling of general regret that a visit had not been possible. Ho was absolutely convinced that a Royal visit to Berlin would create a revulsion of feeling in Germany such as it would be difficult to conceive and he therefore pressed hard that under no circumstances should the visit bo abandoned. He remarked that such a visit would be worth more than ono or two battleships. I asked Herr Von Jenisch to inform Herr von Schon of the substance of our conversation, and ho promised to do go. A PREPARED REPLY. From the foregoing account of my interviews with the Emperor and Herr von Jenisch, I think there can be little doubt, from the identity of tho views expressed by them, that the conversations had been foreseen and a reply prepared. I do not think it is to be regretted that a clear exposition of tho viows of the Governments on the subject of naval armaments has been placed before the Emperor and the German Government, since their reply offers a complete justification to Parliament and to the world at large for any counter-measures that his Majesty's Government may decide upon taking in the near future. Although it is to be regretted that tne German Government have assumed such an uncompromising attitude towards any discussion or modification of their actual programme of naval construction it is as well to know the worst and to be prepared for it. What strikes me forcibly in the attitude of tho Emperor and of tho German Government is their unreasoning fear that any reduction of the German programme may be regarded by their countrymen as due to tho dictation of a foreign Power, more especially of England, whose proposals for a reduction of armaments were strongly resisted by the German Government at The Hague Conference last year. If such be the case, it shows that they realise tho Chauvinistic spirit of tho German public, and that they know they must take it into account. I heard while in Germany that financial difficulties may not improbably hinder or even prevent tho realisation of these naval projects, since it is said that Prince Bulow, in order to secure financial equilibrium, proposes to place additional taxes on tobacco and beer. The prosperity of tho lower classes has, however, deteriorated of late to such an extent owing to the general financial depression that it is thought probable that, on the imposition of the new taxes, they will have to reduce their consumption of beer and tobacco, and that the additional revenue will therefore not bo forthcoming. This will make it very difficult for tho German Government to build and maintain a largo navy at a moment when they are oven increasing by two army corps the enormous army which they have already under arms. KAISER ON TURKEY. The same evening, shortly after dinner, the Emperor, who was in the best of spirits, called me, made me sit down by im, and talked to me for more than an hour in a very pleasant and agreeable manner on every conceivable topic. In alluding to the recent coup d'Etai at Constantinople the Emperor stated that it had not been organised, as was generally supposed, by the Young Turk party, but by the army, who wero afraid that further concessions derogatory to tho honour of Turkey would be wrung from tho Sultan by the Powers in connection with the AngloRussian scheme of reforms for Macedonia. He himself has strongly advised the Sultan to grant a Constitution to the people, and he felt that in its success lay the only hope for a peaceful regeneration of Turkey. General von der Goltz, during his recent visit to Constantinople, had given the Sultain a serious warning that the old system of Palace government could not bo indefinitely prolonged, and that ho should rid himself of Izzot Pasha and tho Palace camarilla, a corrupt and infamous coterie, and he was confident that much good was to be anticipated from their dismissal. He expressed his conviction that there is far greater vitality in Turkey than anybody'imagines, and that, with fairly good government, her future will Ce

greater than that of some European Powers. His Majesty remarked that recent events in Turkey would undoubtedly create difficulties for his Majesty's Government' in Egypt and India, but that they should remember that it is a matter of vital importance to Europe to conciliate Mussulman public opinion in Asia, since it was the Mussulman races alone who could oppose an effective barrier between Europe and the yellow races of tho Ear East. He maintained that His fears of the "Yellow Peril" had not been exaggerated, that tho situation would be extremely critical if a Jenghis Khan were suddenly to appear and to lead the yellow hordes of China against the West. The Russians were already beginning to realise the danger, which lie considered was a very real one. Turning to tile recent action of the Austrian Government in connection with the Sanjak railway, the Emperor said that it had caused his Government much annoyance, since the Austrian Government had acted without consulting them, although it had« been generally believed that they had received encouragement from his Government. As a matter of fact, the Russian Government were aware of what had taken place some three weeks before the German Government heard of the project. The German Government were anxious to support and encourage all railway projects in Turkey as a means of developing the country, but they were not disposed to permit the assumption by any European Power of a position of preponderating influence in the Balkan Peninsula. I was ablo to assure his Majesty that the views of the British Government towards railway development in Macedonia were identical with those of the Russian Government. THE BOER WAR. During the course of this conversation the Emperor made several satirical allusions to England's policy and her "new friends," and endeavoured to show what a good friend he had been to England in the past. Thus he repeated the statement previously made (I think) to his Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin that, during tho Boer War, he had been approached by the French and Russian Governments to make a coalition against England, but that lie had absolutely declined to do so, and had threatened to make war on any Power that dared to make an unprovoked attack on England at that time. I did not think it worth while to mention that this account does not tally at all with that given by M, Delcasse and the Russian Government of this transaction.

So also his Majesty told mo that, after our early reverses in the Boer War, lie had received a letter from the late Queen Victoria, full of grief at the losses suffered by tho British troops, which had touched him deeply. He had at once instructed his General Staff to draw up a plan of campaign, which he had sent to the Queen, and this plan had been followed by Lord Roberts in all its details. "And yet," his Majesty added, "I am said to be the enemy of England!" The Emperor complained that no British statesmen ever visited Berlin, and that consequently it was impossible for them to understand German sentiment and the German people. He constantly sent his statesmen to England to study various questions, but he could only remember two instances of English statesmen doing the same. The two instances were those of Lord Rosebery many years ago and Mr Haldane quite recently. To tho latter everything at the Ministry of War had been shown and nothing kept back. It would be difficult to find an Instance where greater confidence had been shown towards a foreign statesman. Towards tho close of the interview an' aide-de-camp came to the Emperor and announced that the King was ready to leave for the railway station. As I somewhat hurriedly rose and asked permission to go to fetch my coat and hat, the Emperor stopped me and said in a very emphatic manner.:— "Remember that I fully adhere to and mean every word that I uttered at the Guildhall last year. The future of the world is in the hands of the AngloTeuton race. England, without a powerful army, cannot stand alone in Europe, but must lean on a Continental Power, and that Power sohuld be Germany." There was no time nor opportunity to continue what might have been an interesting discussion of a somewhat ambitious policy. On thinking over the Emperor's words and tho general trend of his conversation, I cannot resist the conclusion that his last sentences were the climax to which he had been gradually leading, and that he wished to urge once more the greater advantage to England of friendship with Germany over the understandings with France and Russia which have already shown such beneficent and practical results during the past few years. The King left Cronberg at II p.m. on the 11th instant, and arrived at Ischl on the following morning. The cross-headings were not in the original document, but have been inserted for the convenience of the reader.