Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1924. THE PRICE OF IMPERIAL UNITY.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIV, Issue 940, 12 February 1924, Page 4

Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1924. THE PRICE OF IMPERIAL UNITY.

The goal all true Britishers are aiming at is a united Empire. There are, however, obvious difficulties in the way of that complete unity between the several countries and States of the Empire, which is at once desirable and necessary if we are to maintain a united front to the outer world, and develop along the lines which will make us largely, if not wholly, independent of other countries. We know—for it is now a matter of history—that, for many years prior to the outbreak oi war, Germany was accumulating at the expense of other countries, but more particularly of Great Britain, the wealth which enabled her to prepare for, and carry on, the war she entered upon in 1914, in the attempt to gain what she termed “welt politique. ’ It is a notable fact, and one winch ought ? 'to prove very disconcerting to those who still'argue in favour of and support the free trade policy, that, in less than two decades, Germany’s export trade, under her protectionist policy, which was adopted in 1879, had come within measurable distance of that of Great Britain, and was increasing in a greater ratio than that of the latter. Taking the years 1894 1904 and 1913 (the latter the year preceding the war) the export trade of the two countries expressed in sterling was as under:—

In 191.3, Germany’s total trade (imports and exports) amounted to £i,070 300,300, against £344,900.000 in 1894 and £441,200,000 in 1 1904, the similar British trade figures for the three years being: £560,600,000, £781,500,000 and £1,293,980,028. The figures thus given tell their own tale, and show that British trade supremacy was being rapidly undermined by German traders and manufacturers, who were assisted both by their Government and the German shipping companies, the former by way or bounties and the latter'by preferential shipping charges. It is, or should be, evident from this that her protectionist policy has paid Germany better than the free trade policy lias served Great Britain. on the average of the four years immediately preceding the war the value of the foreign trade per head of the population was:—Great Britain, £2O 4s 7d (imports, £ll 16s Sd; exports, £8 7s lid) ; Germany, £ll 6s Id (imports, £6 5s od; exports, £5 0s 8d). France with £lO 19s od (imports, £5 13s Gd, and exports, £5 5s Ud) came third on the list and America (the United States) fourth, with £7 4s (import's, £2 19s 7d ; exports, £4 4s sd). In 1914 Germany’s foreign trade was only exceeded by that of the United Kingdom, and, as already pointed out, she was fast overtaking the latter and actually supplanting British manufacturers in many lines in which they had long reigned supreme. By all accounts Germany is ready to resume, and has even begun, her trade war against Britain, the resumption of trading relationships with the latter affording her the opportunity of dumping her surplus products and manufactures on tlie British markets, while she is also resuming her trade with the Dominions. She is again capturing British trade and underselling British manufacturers, with consequent loss to the latter, both in output and employing capacity, thus increasing the burdens

uridmployment lias pluced upon the Country. But. lie-cause free trade seems to provide the purchasing public* with a cheaper article than it is possible for the British manufacturer to produce, the average majority voter elects to stand by it, unconscious possibly of the evil ho is working agaillSt llis OtVn countrymen and his kinsmen overseas.

THE WIDER VIEW

It is unfortunate that the Workers Oi Great Britain do not view the Dominions with too favourable £tn eye. That, we take it. is because so many of their leaders have always held to what lias been aptly termed “The Little Englander'’ school of politicians —the men who, in Gladstone’s day, and before it, looked upon the colonies as an encUihberahce, scarcely Worth troubling about, and ol which they would have ben glad to lie rid. 1 bey wrongly assumed that preference to the Dominions, in the purchase of supplies drawn from overseas, meant dearer food and, particularly, a smaller loaf. When the late Mr Chainhei'lain hist raised the preference civ. in the nineties of the last century, the British working men were told that ft would involve a dearer and a smaller loaf, and nothing that has since been said or done appears to have disabused tlieir minds of that idea. While the Britisher’s chief Concern should be for the development of the vast resources of the Empire and increased production, the majority hold to the belief that it is better to maintain Britain on a so-called free trade basis, and the representations made, from time to time, by Dominion statesmen on the preference question, appear to have given them the idea that the Dominions are desirous of taxing their foodstuffs, although nothing is further from their thoughts. What the Dominions do ask for is that their food stuffs should receive fairer treatment on the British markets than is sometimes meted out to them. The imports into the United Kingdom in 1922 amounted to £1,003,098,000, those from foreign countries being valued at £685,330,-000,-while from the British Dominions and possessions the imports were valued at £317,768,000 —less than one-half of the imports from other parts of the world. Articles of food, drink and tobacco accounted for £471,881.000 of the total, £151,051.000 being consigned from the Dominions and British possessions. Just a little over onethird of the British imported food supplies consequently came from outside the Empire, and the question is consequently ruiset]: “Why tax- two-thirds of these imports (mostly the actual necessaries of life) for the benefit of those producing the other third?” But the trouble is that while the free trade policy may give Britain a “cheaper run for her money” in the purchase of food supplies—sugar, wheat and meat, for instance—it must, as production increases in the Dominions, force the latter to seek other than British markets (they are in fact seeking them now), with the inevitable result that, exporting to other countries, they will also be found importing from those countries goods and manufactures which could, under, other circumstances, be obtained from the United Kingdom. As every one who has studied the question knows, trade is largely a matter of exchange, imports being paid for by exports, and exports by imports. If we are compelled to open up markets for, our produce in the United States. Germany, or Japan, it means that we must increase our trade with those countries, and that the goods or produce we sell to those countries will be paid for by goods or products manufactured or grown in those countries, and purchased by means of the credits thus established. Imperial preference j'already in existence, although on one side only, that of the Dominions) would enable us to increase both our trade and production and would further extend our business dealings witli Britain. The foreigner who sells his manufactured articles to Britain takes payment mostly in raw materials. Out of her total imports of raw materials, amounting in value to £282.000,000. Britain re-exported in 1921 raw materials to the value of £113.613,000. all of which, if made up in the United Kingdom, would have given employment to many thousands of workers. The Dominions are capable of producing practically everything that the British people require—gold, wool, meat, grain, sugar, tea, cotton, flax, minerals, etc.—and would supply all Britain’s needs were the opportunity afforded them.

Great Britain. 1894 1904 1913 £ £ £ 216,000,000 300,700,000 Germany. 525,245,289 148,000,000 261,200,000 509,965.000