The Gallipoli Adventure.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIII, Issue 1680, 20 November 1919, Page 5

The Gallipoli Adventure.

COMMISSION’S SECOND REPORT.

BLUNDERING AT SUVLA BAY

STORY OF A GREAT DRAMA

By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.

Australian-New Zealand Cable Association. LONDON. Nov. 17. The following is a precis of tho second report of the Gallipoli Commission. In the general review it says: From the outset tho risks of failure of tho expedition outweighed tho chances of success. Tho problem never was fully investigated by competent experts and no correct appreciation of tho difficulties had been arrived at. Tho Commission considered that General WolfeMurray should have prepared a general plan, and it was tho duty of tho Secretary for War to oiisuro that this was done. The naval operations of November, 1914, and February and March, 1915, naturally led to a great strengthening of tho Turkish positions. There was undue delay in consideiing tho situation after tho failure of the attacks following tho first landing, while tho plan of attack from Suvla and Anzao in the beginning of August was open to criticism. Tho attack at Suvla was not pressed as it should have been. Orders given by General Ilanunorsley wore contused and iris staff work was defective. General Sitwell, senior Brigade Commander, had not showed sufficient energy and decision. _ General Stogford had not taken sufficient means to inform himself of tho progress of operations and ho and his staff were partly responsible* for tho supply of water for tho troops. In tho Commission’s opinion. General Stopford’s difficulties were increased by General Hamilton’s intervention. While recognising General Hamilton’s personal gallantry ami energy, ho should mve examined the situation disclosed by tho first landings more critically, and weighed tho probabilities of success and failure more impartially, having regard to tho resources at his disposal, and submitted a comprehensive statement to the Secretary for War, for and against tho continuance of operations.

After General Monro’s advice to evacuate had l)ecn confirmed by Lord Kitchener, a prompter decision should have been taken. The War Cabinet bad a considerable amount of artillery available in Egypt and Mudros for tho Suvla, operations; but it was not utilised. The Commission finds on the whole that tho food supply was satisfactory, but the provision for tho evacuation of the wounded, especially tho hospital ships, was insufficient. This was due to the want of a general plan. Tho supply of medical requisites on tho whole was adequate, except in the case of the Australians and New Zealanders, who wore short* of ordinary medicine, especially castor oil, and tho variety of food for sick men. KITCHENER’S SECRETIVENESS.

The Gallipoli narrative shows that Lord Kitchener’s death made tho Commission’s task difficult, owing to his secrotivencss in military matters, and his reasons for various actions being unknown early in 1915. Lord Kitchener thought the Dardanelles a suitable objective probably requiring 150,000 men. He had in view a possible stalemate on the Western front, and tho necessity for providing another theatre of operations. The War Council subscribed to the latter view if a stalemate occurred in the spring, without, however, specifying the Dardanelles. Tho general opinion seemed to bo that either the Dardanelles or Serbia was the most suitable. The question of joint naval and military action was not considered because months must elapse before tho troops wore available. _ Mr Winston Churchill, at tho War Council on May i4th, stated that if he had known it would bo three months before an army of 80,000 or 100,000 could bo available the May attack by the Navy alone would never have been undertaken.

POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE. Towards tho end of January diplomatic efforts to secure the co-operation of Greece and Serbia failed and attention was turned to the Dardanelles, but anxiety as to a possible German offensive on tho Western front delayed the departure of the troops until March. There was a diplomatic side to tho proposed expedition. Tho Commission’s interim report indicated cliat Russia wanted relief from Turkish pressure in tho Caucasus, while in addition was tho hope that the success of tho Dardanelles would unite tho Balkans against the “ Centrals.” Tho disastrous effect of possible failure was not altogether absent from the minds of the War Council. On the military side there was a doubt as to the fleet’s ability to guarantee the landing, and in view of this risk tho Staff was not prepared to recommend an attempt. The Director of Naval Intelligence, while generally in agreement with the General Staff and fully concurring the great risks involved in the joint enterprise, thought that the Staff underrated the value of the fleet’s help of covering fire at the disembarkation point. Tho War Council had not thought tho Staff’s opinion wholly applicable to the existing conditions. The full of tho Namur and Liege forts had led to tho conclusion that permanent works wore easily dealt with by long range guns, while tho value of a naval Iximbardmeut had been greatly advanced by aircraft observation. Tho development of submarines had also encouraged the hope that tho Turkish communications in Gallipoli through the Sea of Marmora would be very vulnerable. DIVERSE OPINIONS AS TO OPERATIONS.

Tho question of tho appointment of a Commander was discussed in February, General Birdwood’s name was first consider, cd, but as the troop operations had been enlarged it was thought advisable to select an officer of higher rank and greater experience. General Hamilton was chosen. General Birdwood went to tho nollos and made a reconnaissance and the telegrams which passed between him and fiord Kitchener showed that tho latter intended the troops were to bo used in a minor capacity only, while General Birdwood, who fully appreciated the formidable character of 'the Peninsula’s defences, anticipated large military operations were necessary. General Maxwell telegraphed to Lord Kitchener on February 24 that Gallipoli was practically a fort, against which an attack from any quarter without heavy guns'would bo hazardous. Ho advised Lord Kitchener of tho recommendation of Colonel Maucorps, formerly French Military Attache at Constantinople, wherein the latter suggested an attack, from the Asiatic side as the least difficult. Colonel Maucorps regarded a landing at Gallipoli us extremely hazardous.

NO GENERAL PLAN

Tho Commission was satisfied that no general plan was evolved and it failed to soc why this should not have been (lone. Tho Naval authorities in March said it. was necessary to clear the enemy’s artillery from Gallipoli before the fleet could njake the Straits safe for transports. Lord Kitchener thereupon thought no operations should take place before tiro arrival of the 29th Division. MILITARY A SECOND STRING.

General Hamilton’s evidence showed he hud been given clearly to understand that ids ioice was" merely a second string—that the Navy could force the Dardanelles on its own and the military must not chip in unless the Admiral definitely “chucked up the sponge.” General Hamilton added that lie could obtain practically no information of the position and before he left lie was net supplied with tho information prepared by the General Staff in 1906, nor was Colonel Maueorp’s view communicated to him. The War Office’s information on the whole subject was of the meagrest typo. He had received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that the occupation of the Asiatic side was strongly to bo deprecated. General Hamilton, after his arrival, had conferred with Admiral Robeck and the latter said tho War Office was too sanguine in thinking the Navy’s guns could prevent the Turkish lodgment on tho Peninsula. Tho Germans had grappled with tho situation and got their troops scientifically disposed. Tho heavily entrenched enemy had nothing to fear owing to tho flat trajectory of the naval guns. General Hamilton, in a orivuto letter to Lord Kitchener, said that “ Gallipoli on the spot looks a tougher nut to crack than it did over tho map in your office.” General Hamilton, after witnessuig the naval bombardment, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he had boon reluctantly driven to tho conclusion that the Dardanelles was less likely to bo forced by the Navy than once seemed probable, and if tho army participated, it would not astiwua tjw ■ subsidiary tpffli iutbortq aaiicd-,

patcd To this Lord Kitchener replied: •< Yo,,’ know my views that the Dardanelles mart-be forced. If a largo military operation is necessary it must be undertaken and carried through.” General Hamilton states that at the conforonce aboard the Queen Elizabeth Admira Robeok said it was quite clear ho could not get through witliout tho help of the troops. Admiral Wemyss concurred and nq voice was raised to question this momentous <lc* cision. , Admiral Robock, reporting to the 'Jim Lord of tho Admiralty on the assumption that the forts could bo destroyed by naval fire, conclusively disproved tho analogy of tho, Belgian fort? which was quite misleading, as those ; were destroyed by howitzer fire.

COMBINED OPERATIONS NECES - SARY. '

After this Mr Winston' 1 ' Churchill saw clearly that a combined operation was essential, instead of lus original plan of achieving tho result without involving the army. General. Hamilton, on April 4; told Lord Kitchener that he had, not enough ammunition to destroy the entanglements by field guns and howitzers, therefore he niust rely on other methods. ' ' . The. Commission was unable to ascertain the precise date whereon, after tho failure of tho naval attack, the military operations were decided on. When the decision was taken there was much ineptitude displayed in loading the transports whereby the men, material and stores were shipped in the different vessels, resulting in a delay. Much unnecessary .material was. also taken. On May 14, the War Council discussed the situation. There were insistent demands for men for Franco while we were saddled with the requirements of Egypt and else* where. The Council had therefore to consider the wisdom of continuing the Dardanelles campaign. There was a tendency to send more reinforcements, but nothing was immediately done beyond Lord Kitchener asking General Hamilton how many men were required to ensure success. He replied: “If tho present situation is unchanged,, wo will need an additional army corps,” General Hamilton reckoned ho could advance with half the loss of life if he had had a liberal supply of guns and munitions, especially high Lord Kitchener replied on May 19 expressing disappointment that his preconceived views as to the conquest of the positions with the necessary support troops on land were miscalculated, and it now became a question as to whether we could support two field operation* draining our resources. POLITICAL CRISIS CAUSES A DELAY. The intervention of a political crisis blocked a decision on General Hamilton’s request for reinforcements for 24 days and in Mr Winston Churchill’s opinion the crisis prevented an unbroken stream of; reinforce: ments. Provision was made to send two divisions and then Lord Kitchener changed his mind and sent only one. Mr Asquith admitted that the political situation caused a delay, but he thought it was tho shortage of available’ troops. The Commission, however, thought tho crisis was tho main cause. When the. new Cabinet was constituted, several new members had to be convinced that the expedition was justifiable.

FIRST HINT OF WITHDRAWAL,

Lord Kitchener at tho end of May informed the-Dardanelles Committee that tho difficulties of tho enterprise had proved more formidable than was anticipated and a much greater effort than originally bargained for was now required, and for 'the first time was a hint of evacuation hoard.’ Lord Kitchener prepared a memorandum on May 28 and submitted three solutions—firstly a withdrawal; secondly, to seek if possible an immediate military decision;, and thirdly, to continue to push and make what progress was possible. In regard to the withdrawal, Lord Kitchener declared that tho disadvantages were so great that it could only bo justified in order to avoid a groat disaster and lie threw his weight in favour of the third solution because it avoided a blow at our prestige and kept the door open to the Balkans’ intervention and an ensured strategical position preventing active Turkish operations in Egypt, Mesopotamia and tho Caucasus. . Early in Juno-the’Russian reverses relieved tho Turkish position and General Hamilton telegraphed that he foresaw those might enable tho Turks to throw a quarter of a million men against him, a nd urged that some equivalent for the Russian cooperation was now vitally necessary. Three fresh divisions-were despatched and ■when they, arrived tho mistake was apparently made of employing them at Suvla without ,a mixture of seasoned troops. Moreover, their officers were, generally speaking, inexperienced and the failure which followed was tho precursor of the evacuation. Eventually General Monro went to Gallipoli to report and he came to the conclusion that with the exception of tho Australian and Now Zealand army corps, the troops on the Peninsula wore unequal to the sustained effort owing to their inexperienced officers, want of training and dof ( 'Cii vo staff work. General Birdwood agreed with General Monro regarding tho* difficulty of making progress, but he opl>osed t!ie evacuation, considering tho Turks would view it a.s a complete victory, while their effort had had an effect on tho Mahornmedans in Egypt. India and Persia, r Ul ther. the lateness of the season and tho probability of bad weather would make a withdrawal dangerous. Generals Byng and Davies agreed with General Monro in regard to tho evacuation.

FKlOail ENTERPRISE ABANDONED. Wd Kitchener, on November 3rd, wired to General Birdwood :, “1 uni coming to see you; I believe the Admiralty will agree to force the Straits. Wo must do what we can to assist them and examine the best landings at the head of the Gulf of Saros. Wo may perhaps have to evacuate Suvla. All the best fighting men that can be spared, including your Anzao boys and everyone I can sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrated at Mudros ready for this enterprise. You will have command of the whole force. Monro will go to Salonika. Please work out plans. Wo* must do it right this time. I absolutely refuse to sign the order for evacuation, which will be the gravest disaster and condemn a largo percentage of men to death or imprisonment.” It appears that Admirals Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes held strongly that the fleet should aHempt the Straits in order to relieve the army, but between November 3 and 4, Ixrrd Kitchener’s proposal to seize the Bula.ir Isthmus was adversely- criticised by the Admiralty and General Birdwood. Therefore Lord Kitchener on November 4 telegraphed to General Birdwood : "Naval operations might not be renewed. The more I look at the problem the less I tee tho way through, so you hud better quietly and secretly work out any scheme to remove tho troops.” On-November 22 Lord Kitchener telegraphed to the Prime Minister: "As tho Gorman assistance to tho Turks is now practically available, our position is untenable, and evacuation seems inevitable." Lord Kitchener ,on November 15 had reported to tho Prime Monster the result of a personal inspection, and said ; "The country is more difficult than I imagined. To gain what we hold has been a most remarkable feat of arms and everyone has done wonders, both on sea and on land.” The fact' that the base •at Mudros was too detached f-otn the field force and the impossibility of prpper hues of communication was tho main difficulty for successful ooerations.

Telegrams which passed between the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener show that tho latter was greatly concerned over, defending Egypt in the event of an cvucu--ation, and ho advocated landing at Ayas Bay, near Alexandrotta, and to cut tr.c Turkish railway communications. Thk project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from Salonika and I* range, as well as diverting Indian Divisions on their way to Mesopotamia. The General Stall did not support it, and it was ultimately rejected at a joint conference in Pans bo tween the Erencli and English Governments. -r Cabinet discussed the evacuation on November 23. Viscount Curzon, on behalf of several colleagues, elaborated the case against evacuation, whereto Mr Bonar Law replied that every military expert favoured evacuation. Mr Bonar Law in a memorandum showed that the Prime Min- , istor and, the First Lord o tho Admiralty opposed the evacuation, hut their military advisers’ advice was accepted. TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF TROOPS. Meanwhile, a blizzard during the last days of November aggravated the condition of tho troops, 280 men being drowned ’ in the at Suvla and many frozen 1 to death as they stood, while 16,000 were frost-bitten. General Monro then telegraphed to Lord Kitchener pressing for a 1 decision. From November 25 to f December 8 Admiral Womyss, with. remarkable pertinacity, advocated a renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral Robock, who was then in England, placed his views before the Council, and .as a Jesuit of tho War Oak

met meeting of December 2, Lord Kitchener telegraphed to General Monro: “Owing to ppjitjcal consequences there is a strong feeling against the evacuatjon. If the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal, could you make Suvla retainable? Navy would also take the offensive.” General Monro replied that he did not think there was any reasonable chance of success. The naval guns could not search the Turkish positions. On December 7 Qabinet, mainly on Lord Kitchener's advice, decided to evacuate. Admiiiil Wcinyss again telegraphed on learning of the decision, urging a renewal of the offensive, adding: “I am convinced the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive. ' I am confident of success”; but the Admiralty declined. Lord Fisher appends a memorandum regretting that official duties precluded his attendance at the sittings; therefore ho was not justified in attaching his name to the report. Sfat THOMAS MACKENZIE’S VIEWS. Sir Thomas Mackenzie supplies a supplementary report. He regrets the evidence was not published, making narrative inadequate. While substantially agreeing with the findings ho holds stronger views upon certain of them. He believes the forcing of the Dardanelles was practicable had the authorities' approached the problem adequately, aiid they should only have launched a combined attack after the proper preparations. Whether General Hamilton was the right man to command can never be answered, because he was .hurriedly despatched, imperfectly instructed, and inadequately equipped. Though General Wolfo-Miirray attended the War Council, he expressed no opinion and tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision was Urrived at to prepare a naval attack. When General Murray was asked why ho had not prepared a plan, he replied that he, was overshadowed by Lord Kitchener. Sir Thomas Mackenzie believes that the vital period determining success or failure was between August 6 and 10, when General Stopford -and his officers threw away a golden opportunity and gave the Turks time to reinforce. The failure at Suvla was not due to the opposition of the-. Turks, but to General Stopford’s failure to provide water lot the troops. Sir Thomas Mackenzie directs attention, to the-evidence of several witnesses as to frittering away life through General Hunter-Weston’s repeated, frontal attacks, and ho quotes Colonel Wilson’s evidence that - lives had to bo sacrificed almost with futility, and General Hamilton’s admission to Lord Nicholson that lives wore used instead of shells.; Regarding the treatment of the wounded, Sir Thomas Mackenzie quotes General Howse s matured opinion: “That ho , personally would recommend his Government whop the war. was over, under no Conceivable conditions to trust the Imperial authorities with medical arrangements fw tho care of Australian sick and wounded.

THE RIVER CLYDE.

Australian-New Zealand Cable Association. Received November 20, 8.45 a™m. LONDON, Nov. 17. < There are many protests from Ireland against the proposal to break up and sell the River Clyde, which was beached at Gallipoli. It is suggested the vessel should bo sent to Ihiblin as a memorial of the participation of the Irish in the Gallipoli landing. Tho Admiralty replies that the attempt to bring the ship homewards will probuoly result in her foundering and-it is potter to convert her into cash. Moreover, says a prominent commander, tho Anzacs 'inlght: dispute Ireland's claim.'