Manawatu Evening Standard. SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1919. THE BRITISH TRIUMPH.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIII, Issue 1524, 3 May 1919, Page 4

Manawatu Evening Standard. SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1919. THE BRITISH TRIUMPH.

Thk most galling thing to the Teutonic mind, with its repeated asservations of superiority over "the brutal British," must be the complete triumph of'tho latter in the great world war and the part men of the, English-speaking race have played in the peace settlement, not merely swaying, but compelling the counsels of the Allied Powers. Although, latterly; attempts have been made to show that the United States of America proved the dominating influence, and that the Allied victory really came about through the superior •weight of American arms, etc. tho facts remain undisputed. That tho victory was facilitated by America's effort may readily bo admitted; that the war might have been indefinitely protracted had she elected to remain neutral seems also probable; but, beyond that, it cannot be seriously contended that the war could have ended otherwise than in the defeat of tho Central Powers. The failure of tho March offensive, in which, despito tho severe set-back and actual reverses sustained by the Allied forces, AngloFrench prowess re-asserted itself so brilliantly, demonstrated to the German High Command tho fact that the Teutonic armies were beaten, and that they could never hope to attain the goal of their ambitions. And, with no desire to under-rate the importance of the American effort,, it may bo pointed out that the' part played by the Americans in resisting the German pressure was, comparatively speaking, of minor importance, for although the American armies in France numbered close lipon two millions when the armistice was signed, the men actually engaged, in the fighting line at no time exceeded 100,000, the brunt of the Allied operations, both defensive and offensive, being borne by the British and French forces. The British colonial troops (Canadians, -Australians, South Africans and New Zealanders) alone saw more fighting, and achieved greater triumphs, than those standing to the credit of General Pershing's troops, great as the latter certainly were. But, great as was the colonial effort, it Binks into comparative insignificance when placed side by side with that of the people of Great Britain, and tho part borne by the English, Irish, Scotch and Welsh regiments. The genius of the British race was never move brilliantly exemplified than it has been' throughout the four and a-half years of war. It stands out transcendant above that of all other, races. Even America's spokesman—the man whom the Huns profess to regard as having the Allied nations under his command, President Wilson—comes of English stock, and during his recent visit to England he made a pilgrimage to Carlisle, to the old' home of his grandfather, visiting the houso . in which the latter was born.' Instead of being Deutschland übor. alios, the Hun* has painfully to reflect to-dav that he has helped to consolidate, invigorate, and strengthen British sentiment. "British power, and British influence throughout the world. FINE WORK FOR NEW ZEALAND. It is interesting to note the, part our New Zealand statesmen have played in the negotiations, which the cables inform us have now ended, in the peace treaty which has been formulated for Germany's acceptance. It lias been the fashion, in certain quarters, to belittle both the New Zealand Prime Minister and Sir Joseph Ward in their work for New Zealand, With a larger perspective, and a clearer insight into

the momentous happenings of the past five ' months, and of the work they accomplished for New Zealand and the Empire during the war itself, the historian of the future will say of Mr Massey and his colleague, the Minister of Finance, that they laboured Jong, earnestly, strenuously and well for New Zealand", and that by their united, efforts they made tho Pacific safe for the young nations of the South Seas. The cables have told us, from time to time, of the apprcciatory references made to Mr Massey's labours as Chairman of the Repatriation Commission, and his work at the Peace Conference in connection with the mandatory control of the ex-Gorman Pacific possessions now stands before us. M. Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George, even President Wilson- himself, have been impressed and convinced by the cogency of Mr Massey's representations, and the logic of his arguments proved too much for tho latter, who very considerably modified ■ his views and attitude upon tho mandatories. Mr Massey's efforts were directed towards securing guarantees of permanent security from enemy influence in Samoa, and he has (we are informed from Paris) been heartily congratulated by both M. Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George on the success he attained. As originally proposed by President Wilson, the mandatory control might easily have led 'to a renewal of enemy activities and influence in the Pacific, for it was entirely lacking in safeguards. Mr Massey pointed out that "a temporary settlement with apparent security was not what New Zealand wanted; they desired a permanent settlement with guaranteed security from the German menace in the Pacific." President Wilson wanted the islands to provjdo "an open economic door for all nations'' joining the League of Nations, with "fiscal equality to all nations trading to the territory to be controlled by the mandate." Mr Massey pressed for "specific, safeguards against an idealistic system which existed only on paper and offered no guarantee of permanent security." The Pacific, Mr Massey pointed out, "was a world in itself,' and the South Sea Islands encompassed the British Dominions in the South Pacific like fortresses." Prior to the war, "Samoa, a German naval base and the centre of wireless German communication in the Pacific, had lain athwart New Zealand's main sea-route to the Motherland," and he contended earnestly that "such a menace could never be allowed to again exist iii any shape or form. There were .strings of islands suitable for coaling stations and submarine bases, and unless and until these passed into secure control, there could bo no guarantee of peace and security for the British Dominions in tho Pacific. Ine mandatory control must be secure, and must not permit of confusion or conflicting interests. Arguments such as these won their way, and in the final agreement, arrived at the mandatory powers were made secure in their- control, and the danger of the enemy influence , returning was eliminated, a result due largely, if not wholly, to Mi Massey's sturdy commonsense and bulldog tenacity in sticking to hie points.