DRINK NO EXCUSE FOR MURDER.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXI, Issue 453, 22 April 1909, Page 4

DRINK NO EXCUSE FOR MURDER.

In view of thj recent accquittal of Dr Goode, of New Plymouth, on a charge of murder, ou the ground of insanity, interest attaches to a recent decision in the Old Country, where it was held that drink was no excuse for murder. Justices Darling, Walton and Pickford sat as a Court of Criminal Appeal in London to deal with the final appeal by Thomas Meade, who was sentenced to death at Leeds Assizes for the wilful murder of Clara Howell, a woman with whom he lived for seven years. Mr Jardine, who represented prisoner, argued that although it was admitted the man killed the woman, the blow was given in the course of a drunken quarrel, and he should have been found guilty of manslaughter only. He further argued that Mr Justice Coleridge, who tried the case, misdirected the jury by referring to the fact that prisoner’s mind must be dethroned by drink before they were justified in reducing the crime from murder to manslaughter. As a matter of fact, a man’s drunken condition might be less than that, and yet be such that a jury would be allowed to return a verdict of manslaughter. In giving judgment dismissing the appeal, Mr Justice Darling said a complaint had been made respecting certain words used by Lord Coleridge in his summing up. The original law was that although an insane person was not liable to the same consequences, or to be judged by the same standards, as a sane person, yet_. if the person were suffering from drunkenness produced by his taking intoxicating liquor,- he was not to be excused for a crime. After 1819 a certain immunity was given to such persons, but the Court did not consider it was part of their duty to enlarge such rule. In the words used by Lord Coleridge there was a sufficient warning to the jury, seeing that he used the words, “ If he be insane, the knowledge or intent is not presumed, but insanity is not pleaded here.” The man accused of a crime such as the one in question was taken to intend the consequences of his act. That the defence might rebut by showing his power of will to have been so affected by the drink that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous. Their lordships had carefully considered the case and the words of Lord Coleridge, and thej r were words which were not contained in any other judgment, but a judge could not be condemned to the use of commonplace .language. It was said that the language was picturesque and figurative, but it was quite possible to express what was true in such language. They were not prepared to lay down a definite rule for the proper summing up in cases such as that. It

was unnecessary to criticise the language of .Lord Coleridge and the appeal would be dismissed.