ESTABLISHED 1866. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1903. THE "SMASH" IN SOMALILAND.

Marlborough Express, Volume XXXVII, Issue 144, 22 June 1903, Page 2

ESTABLISHED 1866. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1903. THE "SMASH" IN SOMALILAND.

As an example of " how not to do it" the British War Office has never done anything better—or worse—than its management—or mismanagement — of the Somaliland expedition. The first expedition, some years ago, narrowly escaped being ignomlniously "wiped out," and when preparations were proceeding for the despatch of expedition No. 2, the War Office was, it is understood, flooded with protests from the British authorities at Aden, and others likely to know the full significance of the Mullah's plan of campaign, against the insufficiency of the force destined to operate against this dangerous fanatic. One might have imagined that with the lessons ef certain South African disasters fresh in their memories, thft War OSec *n{*cri- ~ ties would not have again fallen into this old error of misconceiving and underrating the numerical strength and power of resistance possessed by a Jfoe, but the War Office big wigs are apparently like the Bourbons, of whom it was said that " they forgot everything and never learnt anything." The second Somaliland expedition, like the first, has proved absurdly inadequate, and so -far from avenging the " reverses"—a grimly significant word nowadays in view of South African experiences—which were met with by the first expedition, it has encountered an even more determined opposition. So far from achieving the desired success of " smashing" the Mullah it has met with repeated " disasters"—" disasters," like "reverses," is a new synonym at the War Office for the oldfashioned but ugly-sounding "defeat." The two chief sections of the main force were, at latest advices, in grave peril; whilst outlying camps have been overrun and broken up by the ruseful foe. Had it not been for the timely and effectual aid rendered by the Abyssinians there can be little doubt that tne British forces would have been annihilated, just as was the ill-fated Hicks Pasha's force in the first Soudan campaign. The position is now most grave. Two British columns are isolated and so harassed by an audacious, and tranifeatly, well led enemy, that neither can stir from its base to assist the other. Reinforcements are being sent from Aden, but it is doubtful whether they will be of sufficient strength and arrive in time to prevent a disaster ten times more serious than its predecessors. In the long ran, in all probability, the Mullah will be "smashed" and the half done work completed. But the Mullah, in the meantime, holds all the strong cards in the game, and his j prestige with the fanatics he leads is increased by the spoctaclo of British officers' heads stuck on poles. The Mahdi similarly decorated Khartoum, and gnat was the indignation of the' British people with the Gladstone Government, whom it held, and properly held, responsible for such a damaging blow to the British maua.

Now-a-days it bas been proved that a Conservative Government, to whom we have always looked for a "strong" policy at the War Office and the Admiralty, can bungle and blunder just as badly as ever poor Mr Gladstone did. Unless the Balfour Government has better luck than bad Mr Gladstone and "smash" the Mullah before many weeks are over, its prestige will receive a very deadly blow. And, after the Woolwich election, the discontent over the Education Bill, the " split" over the Chamberlain proposals, and other sources of weaknesses, the present British Ministry is already in such an awkward position that only a very trifling matter might bring about its downfall. Unless events in Somaliland rapidly develop a better outlook, the Balfour Government will be perilously near that very disagreeable position known to sailors as being on its " beam ends."