ESTABLISHED 1866. The Marlborough Express PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1902. CLOUDS IN THE EAST.

Marlborough Express, Volume XXXVI, Issue 232, 4 October 1902, Page 2

ESTABLISHED 1866. The Marlborough Express PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1902. CLOUDS IN THE EAST.

m*m The cause of the Russo-Tarkish War of 1878 was the ill-treatment of the Bulgarian soldiers, and on more than one occasion since the Treaty of Berlin was signed the relations of Bulgaria and the Porte have narrowly escaped bringing about a renewal of hostilities between the armed hosts of the Tsar and the Sultan. Recent events on the Turkish or southern frontier of Bulgaria may or may not have been the indirect outcome of Russian intrigues, but that Russia is bent upon stirring up trouble between the Danubian States and Turkey seems to be very widely believed in London and Berlin. The Bulgarians are, we are afraid, by no means the innocent peace-loving race that they were painted as being by Mr Gladstone ; indeed, since they have obtained their independence they have been in an almost constant state of political turmoil. Two or three of their leading statesmen have been foully assassinated, and it has become notorious that the Bnlgarian of the Greek Church can behave just as tyrannically towards bis Moslem brethren as did the latter towards the former in the bad old days when Bulgaria was a province of the Turkish Empire. Careful and wellinformed observers of Eastern European problems hold the opinion that the Bulgarians are now endeavoring to so irritate their Turkish neighbors across their southern frontier that reprisals will be indulged in by the Porte, whereupon Bulgaria will appeal to Russia, with whom she is acting in secret concert, to step in and again invade Turkey on the now familiar plea that she desires to assist her Christian brethren to overthrow the Padishah's tyranny. Such a war would be immensely popular in Russia, where the peasants still firmly- believe that their " Little Father," the Tsar, is a heavenborn champion of Christendom against the Moslem. In Russian military circles the war would be additionally attractive from the fact that it would afford opportunity for promotion and corruption, whilsc Russian officialdom and the anti-reformers generally would see in a new Turkish campaign a means of distracting public attention from the rapidly growing national feeling for greater social and political liberty. There are signs, many and unmis takeable, that Russia does seriously contemplate war with Turkey or some other Power. She has recently floated huge loans in Paris, and is spending vast sums in the perfection of her already terribly powerful fighting machine; she has added largely to the strength of her Black Sea fleet, and only within the last few weeks has managed to induce the easily gulled Turks to allow a small fleet of Russian torpedo destroyers to pass eastwards through the hitherto most jealously guarded Dardanelles. Pretexts for a quarrel with Turkey, quite apart from what we have shown the most convenient Bulgarian troubles as being, could be very easily found; Indeed, there are already rumors of diplomatic disputes between the Tsar and the Sultan, and the fertility of Russian resource in the way of discovering subjects for dispute has long been regarded as being practically limitless. The main question for British students of the present; very dan-

gerous situation to regard is, how another Russo-Turkish war would affect the other European Powers, including, of coarse, Great Britain herself ? We do not believe that any British Ministry would countenance the idea of any armed intervention in favour of the Turk, for the position has changed very much since the exciting days of 1878 when Lord Beaconsfield sent a British fleet to the Dardanelles and virtually compelled the victorious Russians to remain in their camp at San Stefano and relinquish their longcherished idea of making a triumphal entrance into Constantinople. The Turkophile of 1878 is not so prominent in British public opinion or influence as he was thirty years ago, and although, no doubt, British diplomacy would endeavor to save the Turkish Empire from extinction in Europe, we do not believe for one moment that if it became a question of war or peace Great Britain would send a single man or a single warship to the Bosphorns to prop up the Sultan's threatened supremacy. Any danger of a European war, outside the two main combatants, would, we believe, come from Berlin rather than from London. Wisely or foolishly, the Kaiser has, during the last few years, taken upon himself to champion the Turkish cause in more ways than one. His famous trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem, when he indulged in many absurdly bombastic flights of eloquence, undoubtedly has the effect, whether intended or not, of strengthening the Sultan's position, and it is only fair to assume that the importamt and valuable railway and other concessions granted to Germany in Asia Minor were only a practical quid pro quo for the assurance of German support of the Turkish policy in Europe. Germany might not desire to enter the lists as a champion of the Sultan against the Tsar, but her position, were a Russo-Turkish war to be actually threatened, would necessarily be one of great delicacy and, let us add, not a little danger. As against the fear of German intervention on the Sultan's behalf there is, however, a factor of some momeat in the shape of the Ru3so-French alliance. That alliance has, ifc is true, been sneered at as a onesided bargain in which the ahape of French flotation ef Russian loans vastly outweighs its merely sentimental value to France, but although, as the Fashoda incident and its sequel proved, Russia may not be willing to espouse any and every foolish quarrel which bellicose Parisian journalists might wish to fasten upon " la perfide Albion," the fact-cannot be gainsaid that the friendly relations of the Cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg are viewed with an ever constant jealousy and distrust at Berlin. Hence, no dout*, the anxiety of the Kaiser and his Ministers to subdue, or at least tone down, the Anglophobia which is so popular in Germany. The Kaiser, though rash and reckless, is no fool. He fully recognises that the time may come, when, with Russia in the east and France on the west, he may find himself in a remarkably unpleasant "tight corner." If his obligation, written or understood, to the Sultan force him into a support of the Turk, he would have to face the probability of two great Powers —one on either side of his territories — making a joint attack Now, the German army is admittedly a splendidly efficient fighting machine, but, strong as she is, Germany must recognise there are limits to her powers of rpsistance. If ever the day arrives when Germany has at one and the same time to withstand a Russian attack on her eastern frontier and a flanking French aggression on the west, her position would be most precarious. At such a time, and we believe that it may arrive very early in this twentieth century, she may have good reason to regret the malignant intensity of her enmity towards Great Britain. Great Britain may think twice before deserting the Sultan, but there is, we take it, no doubt whatever that the German Empire might go to rack and ruin before the combined attack of France and Russia without" that despicable nation —the English,"—to quote a recent deliverance of a leading Berlin newspaper, raising a hand to secure Teuton safety. Great Britain's motto may well be, " Let our enemies quarrel and fight among themselves ; ours is a seagirt land; none of them, nor all of them, can injure us." And in that day the pro-Boer curses of the blackguard German press would come home to roost. If there be one Power, we repeat, whose peace and security are endangered by the present " clouds in the East" it is Germany.