GERMANY’S OIL

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4676, 1 February 1945, Page 4

GERMANY’S OIL

WHERE HAS IT COME FROM? AIR TARGET OF FIRST IMPORTANCE

■ In a recent issue of the 8.8.C.’s ‘Listener’ Squadron-Leader John Strachey, Royal Air Force, makes the statement that Germany has since the beginning of the war possessed greater oil resources than all but the few credited her with, through her discovery of several new oilfields within her own territory just before the outbreak of war, and also to the opening of fields of impressive output in both Austria and Hungary. “When we rediscover Central Europe after the war,” he says, "we shall find that it has become a considerable oil-produc-ing area. That is a new tact in the economic geography of the world.” “You will remember that in,the first year of the war many an optimistic article was written, proving, with fact and figure, that Germany could not really be a serious menace because she simply did not command the oil necessary to sustain a modern war. The facts were impressive and nobody seemed to be able to contradict them. How then has Germany in fact been able to sustain five years of world war? Where has she found the oil to do it?” he asks. His answer is that she built 20 or more enormous synthetic oil plants, which at the beginning of 1941 were turning out about 40 per cent, of her oil needs, and that the remaining GO per cent, came from the Rumanian fields and, more importantly, from the new fields in Central Europe. Synthetic production plus production from new fields he estimates at 1,250,000 tons a month at the beginning of 1944 —probably Just enough, but by no means ample. Even with substantial

new sources of supply the Nazis could never have felt secure about their oil position, and the strategy of the 1942 Russian campaign was probably distorted by the need to break through to the huge oil resources of the Caucasus. THE DELAY IN ATTACK UPON OIL "An output of 1,250,000 tons a month was a most remarkable achievement. It wus the fuel basis for the Nazis' drive for world empire. Why did we lot all this happen? Why did we let the Nazis build their huge synthetic plants, sink new oil wells, and build their refineries? Why did we not switch our attack on to oil four years ago, as many people were always" saying we should? The answer is perfectly simple; we tried to do it and found we could not.”

Attempts were made by the R.A.F. in 1940 and 1941 to attack synthetic plants in the Ruhr and elsewhere, Squadron-Leader Strachcy states, but it was soon found that there was neither the force nor the operational technique to put them out of action long enough to matter; it was not lack of Will, but lack of means that stopped the R.A.F. bombing oil in 1941 AIR WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS In the years that followed, two major developments in air warfare took p’ace: American Fortresses and Liberators, with their longdistance fighters, appeared in the skies of Europe, and R.A.F. Bomber Command acquired the now scientific instruments, and learned the operational technique needed to attack precise targets at night. Both these things had to happen before the two bomber forces could go for oil.

The Nazis were not idle either. When the Forts and Liberators first cast their shadows on German soil the Nazi leaders saw the red light, and began building defensive fighters on an altogether new scale. If the Germans were allowed to carry through their huge programme for mass-producting singieengiue fighters it might never be possible to strike at the vitals of Germany by daylight, and so the first task of the Forts and Liberators, before they could go for oil or anything else, was to strike down the rising defensive power of the German air force itself. For nine grim months, from about July, 1943, to March, 1944, the Eighth and Fifteenth American Air Forces

went for the German fighter assembly plants, and the American escort fighters fought battles over the Reich. Long maintained attack did not prevent the Germans from turning out fighters. On the contrary, by a remarkable effort of dispersion, they managed to maintain a very considerable output, but attacks did decide the ba'ance cf air power and never again had there been any doubt that the American day heavies could penetrate into every part of Central Europe. Those attacks nieant that for the past six months American air power had been decisively ahead of the German defence. USING AIR SUPERIORITY Air superiority in the first place made-possible the invasion of Europe by land and sea forces and it made possible, at last, a sustained and concerted attack on Germany's oil resources. In. April last that attack began. The two great American aitforces of day precision bombers played

the predominant part In the campaign against oil. When the Russian troops entered Plocsti they found that the output of Rumanian oil had been reduced to under a quarter of what it had been four months before. The magnificent work of the Ffteenth U.S. Air Force, based on Italy, had meant that the Germans suffered the loss of the bulk of their Rumanian oil as ear’y as April and May. The E’ghth U.S. Air Force, from Britain, had taken as its specialty the synthetic plants of Central Germany, each plant covering several square miles. NIGHT BOMBING ALSO The Americans wore the first to recognise that Bomber Command of the R.A.F. had proved able to play a surprisingly large part in the attack on oil by a new capacity to hit precise targets such as oil plants at night. The most important synthetic oil plants of the Ruhr were first put out of action in a series of successful night precision attack's during the early months of the European summer of 1944. With the advance of the armies upon Germany fighter cover could bo given Bomber Command over the Ruhr and oil plants were attacked by Lancasters and Halifaxes in the middle of the day, an entirely new development for Bomber Command. GERMANY FEELS THE STRAIN “In October,” Squadron-Leader Stratchey stated last month, "the enemy managed to produce only a small proportion of the oil fuel which he produced last March, before our attacks began. I msut not tell you how small that proportion was; but I can assure you that it was so small that it will cripple the enemy’s whole war effort, if only his oil output can be kept down for a few months more. Already, hardly a drop of oil is being used in German war industry. We also know that German military operations, both on the ground and in the air, are already being gr&vely handicapped for lack of oil. Unquestionably, if only we can prevent the recovery of his oil industry, there will come a point when the work of the German panzer divisions and the German air fleets will be so crippled for lack of fuel that they will not bo able to withstand the pressure of the Aided forces. “The Nazis are making the most extreme efforts to repair and rebuild their plants. The job ahead of the Allied air forces, the job of keeping down the Nazi oil industry, will bo almost as big and difficult as the job or crippling that industry. The struggle goes on. Much has still to be done, but more and more in the air, as on the ground, the balance tilts our way. After the war, the 1944 attack on German oil supplies will be studied as the first major air attack, with adequate resources, upon the economic vitals of an enemy power.”

A French curate watches the liberation ceremonies in the main square in fihcibourg.