THE WAR IN THE AIR

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4348, 18 January 1938, Page 2

THE WAR IN THE AIR

EXPERIENCE IN SPAIN TESTING GROUND OF PLANES HOW THEY PERFORM “ I was standing on the roof of a ruined house in Spain watching an artillery bombardment when my attention strayed to the sky over to the left. Through a smoke haze 1 saw a flight of three black bombers. I watched them, fascinated. “ Dimly, I realised that they were making a lot of noise for just three aircraft. I looked behind them. 1 saw another flight following, and another and another. There were six flights in all, or 18 big plaes. “ This procession flew along the enemy artillery lines dropping bombs, the tracks of which one could follow from machines to objectives. Huge explosions rent the air. My eyes wan dered to the bright blue sky above them, and suddenly I perceived a number of tiny silver gnats that tumbled and zoomed and dived “ At intervals I could hear the pup-pup-pup of machine guns. There were at least 50 fighting planes in combat at about 12,000 ft. . , “ Having dropped their bombs, the bombers wheeled over my head and made for home, but one, for some reason, had dropped behind and was being attacked by three loyalist fighters. 1 waited for the inevitable moment when it would be brought down.

THE BATTLE ENDED

“ Then 1 heard that exhilarating whine of high-powered machines in a dive and I saw a group of machines detached from the melee at 12,000tt. plunging down to the rescue. “ There was a racket of machine and engines and the loyalists used their superior speed and made off. A few minutes later order appeared from the chaos above. The battle was over. The rebel fighters formed into three squadrons. Two of them followed the bombers as escorts. The third squadron circled around for perhaps 1U minutes before they, too, made on homeward.” . This is the description by an eyewitness. who also is a trained pilot, of one of the air battles waged daily above Madrid, writes Wayne Ihpmas. in the Chicago ‘ Tribune.’ The inter-national-Spanish civil war is a rea | conflict. It can he compared without exaggeration, to a small-scale version of a modern European war. ft is so regarded by the mihtari airmen of every world Power These airmen have been studying the conflict between the Government forces, which have been bolstered by the Communists of Russia. Franee, and Eng land, and General Francisco Franco s rebels, who have been supported by Fascists from Italy and Germany. Without considering the moral, ethical, economic, or political factors, the flving soldiers of the world s armies are extremely interested in assimilating the surprising lessons which are being learned there. These lessons are authoritative, hist, because the war in Spam is the first in 9 0 vears in which two determined armies'of white men equipped with the latest weapons, have met m the field Secondly, the war is serving as a testing ground, for air weapons which have been developed during '-0 years of peace times. not crushing force.

Most observers who have been in Spain already have reached some conclusions about air power and the types of military aircraft which world Powers have been developing, fc'onie oi the lessons are summarised as follow: 1 Air power is important, but not the crushing, all-destroying force some have declared it to be. ... 9 When two well-equipped air forces meet neither can stop the other trora bombing whatever objectives are strategical or tactical targets. 3 Modern bombardment aeroplanes are more than a match for single-seat fiafiters so long as they hold formation. °4 Air warfare is extremely expensive. and the combatants quickly come to regard aeroplanes and engines as expendable material—a contrast to the peace-time attitude. 5 Development ot high-speed pursuit aircraft—machines which will compromise manoeuvrability and armament to speed alone—is apparently damned bv the findings of the air war. ‘6. Modern anti-aircraft cannon not onlv have kept pace with development of aeroplanes since 1918, but are prov ing that they are really effective defensive weapons. , Probablv the strangest part about the war is the small percentage of native Spaniards in any of the armies. And there are almost no Spaniards fighting in the air The flying men on both sides are 95 per cent, foreigners—Germans and Italians with General Franco’s Fascist array, and Russian, French, English, and American with the Government forces. There are no Spanish aeroplanes in the war. All the machines —there are about 400—have been imported, most of them since the opening of hostilities

equipment available

Tho equipment available to both titles is extremely interesting. The Loyalists fly with a strange mixture of Russian, French, English, and American aeroplanes, many of them commercial ships converted for war purposes. The backbone of this force is the Russian unit.' There are at least 100 Russian bombing and fighting planes, all of them fast, low-wing mono,planes, with their regular U.S.S.R. crews to operate them Everv pilot who has scon the Russian ships has been astonished at their speed. The bombers, many of them with four engines, are credited with top speeds of 200 miles an hour, and the fighters with 240 miles an hour. Roth rebel and loyalist pilots believe the Russian ships are the best ships in the war. Most of these planes are of all-metal construction They resemble American Boeing transports or the Martin R-10 bomber, which is now considered obsolete in the TT.S Armv Air Corps The fighters are copies of the Boeing R-26. low-wing monoplane which is now the latest single-seat fighter in service with the U S Armv Air Corps. Instead of an air-cooled engine, the Russians flv with a liquid-cooled motor sunnosed to develop from 700 to 800 horsepower.

The rest of the loyalist aeroplanes are a hodgepodge of English Hawker biplanes, Monospar twin-motored monoplanes, a few old De Havilland 3loth ships, American Stinson, Bellanoa, V ultee monoplanes, and a few ChanceVought and Curtiss biplanes. None of these ships as converted for war has a performance higher than 180 miles an hour.

MODERN FRENCH SHIPS.

There are, in addition, a few modern French army planes—Breuget and Potez bombers, large multi-engined monojplanes, and a number of Marane scouting ships with an inferior performance. General Franco’s army probably has more bombers than any other type of ship. They range from ponderous allmetal German Junkers Jus2 tri motored ships to the trim, well streamlined Italian Savoia-Marchettis, also tnmotored monoplanes. The Junkers has a top speed of about 160 miles an hour. The Savoias are 20 miles an hour faster. There are a few Italian Alfa-(Romeo single-engine monoplanes and a very few German single-motored Heinkel bombers. Most of the rebel fighters are Italian Fiats. These planes are built by the Fiat motor works and are powered with a 700 horse-power Fiat liquid cooled eno-ine These fighters have a top speed of about 195 miles an hour, but a notably light wing loading. In spite of the fact that both sides are thus armed with superb weapons, neither group has demonstrated that the striking power of bombers is anywhere near as great as had been anticipated. There are several reasons whv this may be true. Franco has been anxious in the past to prevent as much destruction of Madrid as possible, and. therefore has used his bombers largely against troops or ammunition dumps. This use of the bomber has proved as nothincr else could that air battleships are magnificent striking weapons but are nof at their best against elusive targets such as deployed troops and artillery Franco’s air tactics have shown that' bombers should be . used only against targets such as cities, manufacturing plants, railroad yards, powei and water plants.

USE AGAINST CIVILIANS

One effective use of bombardment planes has not been tested in Spain. This is to cow and terrify civilian populations. The theory as proved fn wars ot the past. U that no arm, can fight after its civilians want the fighting to stop. One way _to make them want the war to end is to subject them to bombardment. .„ But in Spain the situation is different. Several times there have been random bombings of various cities by both sides. Many civilians were killed in the raids. But the desired psychological effects, although arrived at, had no influence upon the fighting forc ®® for the reason that the war has gone out of the hands of Spaniards into those of foreigners. , , , , One other reason why bombardment has not proved itself to be complete V devastating is the fact that air raids, while frequent, have not been on a large scale. During the Woild Wai German planes in squadrons of eijv teen or more bombed London. In Spain to-day the largest squadrons engaged in bombardment consist ot ei„h 5 number of raids attempted by each side is about equal. The slight edcre enjoved by Francos forces is the result of the willingness of the rebel armv pilots to fly at nigh . Russians 'and the other loyalist anmen apparently lacking ground facih-'take-offs and landing 'never atteimot them. The bpanisn nbdits are clear almost the year round, and under brilliant moonlight targets on the ground are picked out with ° a Observers report that the rebel army bombers are able to drop their loads from altitudes between 4,000tt and '6 000 ft, with the average height about 5.000 ft. This should ensure great ai The?ehels are able to fly this low because the Government forces apparently lack up-to-date anti-aircraft cannon The anti-aircraft defence at Madrid consists of 22 millimetre qnick- ™ guns, which shoot small shells weighing a pound or less, and machine "is The limit of range for these weapons is about 4,000 feet. • • The few men who have been pinilecred to act as observers behind the loyalist lines report, towevet tha the Russian bombers stay at 12,000 feet or more on their expeditions. This height is the limit of accuracy of the superb German anti-aircraft guns possessed bj Franco's .troops .Most of these guns are manned by tiained Ger man crews. , , “These men and guns have done some brilliant shooting,” writes an exwar pilot who spent a month with Franco’s troops. “1 saw_ a battery ox 88 mm. guns go into action against a single Russian bomber flying about 10 000 feet. It was a fast machine, and the pilot obviously thought himself safe, what with the height and his speed. But they got him, astonishing as this sounds. “Those guns are set in a large square, with one at each corner, and thev are controlled from one central point. The bursts preserve the original square formation. Anyway, this battery fired five rounds, and the last one brought the bomber down.” The bombing raids on both sides are hardly impeded by intercepting squadrons of fighters, airmen say. The Hussion bombers can run away from the rebel fighters, and, heavily armed, can stand them off while slowing down for bombing. . [ While the rebel fighters hinder the raiders somewhat, they rarely bring one down, or even scare thorn away. The Russian bombers are equipped with two to four machine guns that cover every sector of the ship. The rebels repo'rt that the Russian machines have no blind spots. The rebel bombers have from two to three gun turrets. The Junkers has a turret on top of the fuselage about halfway between the wing and the tail, and another retractile turret which can be let down from the fuselage belly. The Savoias have three gun positions —one atop the fuselage, another at the rear, and a turret on the belly just behind the nose motor. Loyalist pilots are “ very brave, and they rise to meet every raid, according to rebel bomber pilots. The lovalist fighters are from 50 to 70 miles nn hour faster than the bombers, and engage them vigorously, but because of the poor manoeuvrability of those fast machines their pilots dare not press anv attack completely home. the rebel bomber pilots say the loyalist planes often are armed with four

machine guns, which provide a heavy fire power. The rebel bombers offset this fire power by holding tight formations when attacked. By doing this, the gunners of five or six ships find it easy to stand off the fighters. The bombers of both sides thus are able to proceed against any indicated target without the aid of fighter escorts. Most of the rebel fighter squadrons are Italian and their planes are the Fiat biplanes. Although their ships are inferior in speed and armament to the Russian fighters, the Italian pilots refuse to exchange the Fiats for a higher-speed monoplane fighter with a higher wing loading. “ We’ve tried out those monoplanes and we don’t like them,” one squadron commander told a military observer. “ They give us more speed, but they are not good for lighting. “ The secret of it is that the biplane can turn inside the monoplanes, outclimb them in short, steep turns, and outroll them all day long. “ The only advantage is that the monoplane pilot can end a fight at any time by diving away.” The superiority in a dog-fight of a slower biplane over a monoplane fighter is well known to military pilots. The squadron commander’s explanation is right. The biplane has more keel surface and a lighter loading. The monoplane tends to “ mush.” or skid, on sharp turns. Some of the high-speed monoplane fighters cannot be pulled abruptly out of a dive. If the controls are violently moved at high speeds the aeroplane will change its attitude in the air but will continue along the line of its progress. Not until it has slowed down considerably will its line of progress deviate from the straight dive. Because of this tendency to continue in any given line, monoplane pilots dare not approach an enemy too closely for fear of collision.