MEDLEY OF GROUPS

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4329, 31 August 1937, Page 2

MEDLEY OF GROUPS

FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES j A COMPLEX SYSTEM In British eyes the multiplicity of the so-called political parties in France which have been manoeuvring for power during the recent changes might well seem somewhat bewildering (writes “ Pert-max,” in the London ‘ Daily Telegraph ’). ISo fewer than 14 such groups can now be numbered in the Chamber of Deputies—l 47 Socialists, 110 RadicalSocialists, 42 Communists, 49 “ Republican Federation,” 43 “Alliance of Lett Republican and Independent Radicals,” 33 “ Independent Republicans of Social Action and Independent Agrarians ” 34 “Democratic Left and Independent Radicals,” 20 “ Socialist and Republican Union,” 25 “ independent Left ” (including the “ Camille Pelletan Party,” the “ Frontist Party,” the “ Party of Proletarian Unity,” and the “ Party of the Young Republic ”) 16 “ Independent Popular Action ’’ 15 “ Independent Republicans,” 11 “ Popular Democrats,” 5 “ Independents of the Republican and National Union.” and finally a remnant of 29 “ belonging to no group.” It will be observed that seven out of the 14 groups in the Chamber have managed to introduce the word “ Independent ” into their label. The Senate more modestly comprises a mere seven groups (including one section “ belonging to no group,” with a strength of 32 Senators more than one-tenth of the total). How shall we account for this medley and what is its practical significance? Its origin can perhaps be traced back to Gallic individualism, but less remote causes certainly have some practical responsibility. Politicians in France rely less than elsewhere upon regular promotion within the ranks of a party in order to secure Ministerial honours. They trust rather to the degree of influence they can wield and to the fears they can inspire in the powers that be. Moreover, the Parliamentary Commissions in both Chambers and Senate (Finance, Foreign Affairs, Tariff Duties, War, Marine, etc.) are wont to intrude upon the field of the executive branch of Government. Bills are submitted to them by the Cabinet for previous examination before the debate. Here is a wonderful opportunity to make oneself troublesome and to secure concessions. The Deputy in Charge of the Report on the Budget can rightly be regarded as the Minister of Finance of to-morrow. Now the rule has been established that every group of 14 Deputies may be entitled to have one representative upon every one of the 27 commissions of 44 members each of which are in existence. The average member of no very conspicuous ability (except as far as intrigue and hard bargaining are concerned) has therefore a direct interest in the multiplication of the groups; the group system, seen from this angle, has the appearance of a mutual benefit society for the conquests of the sweets of office. FIVE MAIN PARTIES. In reality there are to be found, outside Parliament, only four or five large parties, which cover the whole country with the network of their committees and to which the parliamentarians pay direct or indirect obedience. They are the Communists, the Orthodox Socialists, linked to the Second International, the Radical-Socialists, the Democratic Alliance, and the Republican Federation. These parties are the larger nuclei around which cluster the tiny mutual benefit clubs 1 have enumerated. Further, the electoral system, which involves two ballots and election by a relative majority at the second ballot oniv, results in the formation of coalitions between the contending groups. As a consequence, two blocs, one of the Left and the other of the Centre and the Right, are apt to assert themselves on every important occasion. The bloc of “ National Union ” (Centre and Right, supplemented by the moderate section of the Left—the Radical-Socialists) has prevailed at elections, under such leaders as Poincare and Clemenceau in 1919, and again under Poincare in 1928. The “ Cartel of the Left ” overcame its opponent in 1924 and 1932. , In 1936, again, it achieved a triumph but this time, under the name of “The Popular Front,” a new name intended to express a new situation, the entrance of the Communists into the “Cartel of the Left.” As a result of this innovation, the system was. in fact, drastically transformed. Prior to 1936, the Radical-Socialists, who are the true representatives ot the lower middle classes and of the lindier peasantrv, in short, of the ayer-ao-e Frenchman in the Provinces, had called the tune within the “ Cartel of the Left.” In Parliament the Socialists supported them at will, but they refused to share .in their ministerial responsibilities and they reserved for themselves the right to end their cooperation at any moment. Hence the innumerable ministerial crises which were such a distinctive feature of the period 1932-36. . Two years ago, the Communists bavin,,- derided to join the alliance of the IRadhal-Socialists and Socialists, the leadership shifted (under the additional impact of the Stavisky scandal) from the former to the latter. It was in this way that M. Leon Blum was appointed Premier, 12 months ago* following the large gains made by the Communists in the General Election of Mav, 1936. , . Despite the little parliamentary mutual benefit societies, there are, it will be seen, in reality, large French political parties which can be assimilated to the political formations in Great Britain and in the United States of America. The difference (and it does not tell to the advantage of French democracy) is that responsible leadership is much more difficult to achieve here than on the other side of the Channel or of the Atlantic. CARTELS OF CENTRE. There is hardly a political programme that any deputy or senator can call his own—although it must be added that senators, elected as they are by a restricted college, are much freer from electoral entanglements than their colleagues in the popular Chamber. Electoral considerations and the care which has to be taken to spare the

feelings and interests of the allied elements in the constituencies make individual opportunism an exacting and imperative necessity. The Centre and the Right (Democratic Alliance and Republican Federation) work under similar conditions, but the electoral cartels they succeed in forming are much looser; they can seldom achieve unity and enforce discipline to the same degree as their rivals. To-day they are divided between divergent schools; there are the old-fashioned Conservatives concealed behind multifarious appellations, there are the semiFascists, and there are Conservatives in the British sense of the term —for instance, mep of the stamp of M. Paul Reynard and M. Pierre Etienne Flandin. ] Men of this last type have no desire to tie themselves to the defence of ■ vested interests or of outworn docI trines; their minds are wide open to | social reforms of a practical nature. | and they have come to the conculsion 1 (reached and acted upon by Poincare ! many years ago) that the only possible j salvation lies in a combination between j their followers and the Radical-Social-ists which would make it possible to carry out a “ Centre ” policy. In the old days the Right and the Centre were cemented together by a , common attitude in foreign policy and by a common agreement to advocate orthodox methods in public finance and currency questions. But the follies of j the Laval era, the badly conducted rapprochement with Italy, and the obscurantist deflationary policy that are to be ascribed to that Minister have hopelessly divided these forces of mode--1 ration, bids giving a tremendous 1 impetus to the “ Popular Front.” 1 The purpose of all their intelligent I leaders is not so much to constitute a j “ Front of Liberty ” —a tactical move j which would probably come to grief in 1 a general election owdng to the spirit j of social jealousy which is so charac--1 teristic of France—but to detach the Radical-Socialists from the bloc of the i Left and to work with them, j This is the manoeuvre which we are ■ likely to see tried. The Radical-Social-ists are narrow-minded and timid. i They are up in arms against the “ two I hundred families ” which controlled the Banque de France, against what they call the financial and economic oli- | garchy. But they are firmly attached | to private ownership, and, in spite of 1 all their prejudices, they are probably far-seeing enough to realise that a man with a capital of, let us say, 5,000,000 | francs, cannot have his wealth expro- ’ printed without the humbler possessor of 500,000 francs being endangered at i the same time. Against this must be set the fact that most of these RadicalSocialist politicians canot afford to lose their parliamentary stipend of 75,000 francs a year and the small subsidies i of odd sorts that round it off. They have approved of the first batch of social reforms promulgated by M. | Blum (higher workmen’s salaries, paid i holidays, collective bargaining, etc.), I but they have been shocked and reI pelled by the Socialistic tendencies of j the regime. They have seen with disi may the growth of social unrest, the all-powerful influence of the General ' Confederation of Labour, the incom- . peteut financial management, and, to j crown it all, the decrees which, if the j former Cabinet had had its way, would j have been directed to the virtual con- | fiscatiou of foreign investments (on the | Mussolini model), and would, indeed, I have paved the way for a totalitarian ! State. The'' replacement of M. Blum by M. Chautemps as Prime Minister, within the Popular Front, means that I the Radical-Socialists, headed by the j elder of the party in the Senate, have rebelled—at least below the surface. It remains to be seen whether M. Chautemps and the other Radical- | Socialist leaders will be clever and cour- \ ageons enough to enforce a “ Centre ” ' policy with or without M. Blum. If I they fail in that endeavour nothing will , prevent the clash of extremists, and the French Republic may not escape . , fundamental changes.