ABYSSINIAN WAR

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4324, 27 July 1937, Page 7

ABYSSINIAN WAR

SECRETS OF CAMPAIGN i MUSSOLINI'S LONG DRIVE ! BUSTLED SOLDIERS ' Marshal de Bono’s story of the preparations for the first phase of the Abyssinian campaign, as recorded in ‘ The Conquest of an Empire ’ is frank to a degree, writes Major-general ■ A C. Temperley in the ‘ Daily Telegraph.’ He reveals himself as loyal, enthusiJ astic, and quite undeterred by the most I appalling administrative difficulties. ; Behind him wc see something of the ; towering figure of the Duce, who inl spires all, knows all, and gives cvex-y ; order. Terse commands keep flying | over the ether and de Bono monoton- , ously replies “ Very good,” but the strain increases and the last one is ; too much. Even so great an optimist | is bound to say, “ It can’t be done.” ; This brought dismissal and the consoi latory baton of a marshal.

The book opens with an appreciative introduction by Signor Mussolini, in which he truly remarks that ‘‘ without what we may call the de Bono period, the victorious campaign would have been neither conceivable nor possible.”

In 1932 General de Bono, as Minister for the Colonies, was sent by the Duce to report on the condition of Eritrea. Both the East African colonies had been neglected owing to the needs of Libya. The garrisons were small; they were largely roadless and considerable harbour improvements in Massawa had been long overdue. Relations with Abyssinia were bad.

General de Bono set in motion some essential constructive work, but began more and more to ponder over the idea of an offensive war, in spite of the discouraging attitude of the General Staff. His importance in the Fascist regime must not be forgotten. He was one of the famous quattuor viri who led the march on Rome and, as the only general among them, he took the chief part in the organisation of the Fascist militia. He stood indeed very near the Fascist throne.

PLANNED IN 1933. In the autumn of 1933 he went to the Duce and spoke to him as follows. “ Listen. If there is Avar down there —you ought to grant me the honour of conducting the campaign.” The Duce looked at me hard and at once replied, “Surely.” “ You don’t think me too old.'’ I added. “ No,” he replied, “ because we mustn’t lose time.” From this moment the Duce was definitely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no later than 1930, and told me as much. 1 replied, “ Very good.” It is thus established historically that the war was planned between the Duce and General de Bono m the autumn of 1933. Henceforth General de Bono took into his own hands all practical details of the preparation of th H(Thad to begin at the very beginning There was the reconditioning ot thexport of Massawa, the construction of roads and bridges, and engineering work of all kinds, as well as the pieparation of a first-class asphalted road from the harbour to Asmara, the capital. On the military side the Eritrean troops had to be raised from 4,000 to 65,000, and every kind of stores and war material had to be obtained from Italy. , Reading between the lines, one can see that General de Bono beileved that at least as much could be done by what he euphemistically calls “ political preparation ” as by fighting. The ex-militarv attache at Addis Ababa became head of the political bureau and with plenty of funds was able to throw his net wide. Hail Selassie Gugsa was a prominent renegade. In January, 1935, General de Bono landed in East Africa, first as High Commissioner and then as Commander-in-Chief, and he notes that “about this time the conversations with Laval took place in Rome, which gave us reason to hope that, if he did haA r e to take action France would put no obstacles in our ivay.” This is contemporarv evidence of some undertaking that M. Laval afterwards denied in the Chamber

ONLY BY OFFENSIVE. On December 20, 1934, the Duce personally compiled his “ Directions and Plans of Action.” “ Time is working against us,” he wrote, “ we must haste. Besides (50,000 native soldiers, there ou°'ht to be as many Italian. Three hundred aeroplanes and 100,000 Italian soldiers must be ready in Eritrea by October, 1935.” Again the Duce writes: “In case the Negus should have no intention of attacking us, we ourselves must take the initiative,” and talks of 200,000 white soldiers. On March 8 he once more raises his bid and mentions 300,000 plus 300-500 aeroplanes and 300 swift lorries. “ You ask for three divisions by the end of October; I mean to send you ten, I say ten: live divisions of the regular army and live divisions of Black Shirts. These (latter) will be the guarantee that the undertaking will obtain popular approbation.” General de Bono was continually harping on the theme that the Abyssinians did not want to light, and with the masses of troops then promised, the idea of a preliminary defensive phase was dropped and an offensive only was decided upon. This incidentally disposes ol the argument that the _Abyssinians were so bellicose that it became a war of self-defence. As the divisions began to arrive from Italy the feverish preliminary work was to be highly tried. There were the inevitable breakdowns and both troops and labour corps suffered considerable hardships, while the congestion in Massawa was terrible. These are the inevitable accompaniment of a campaign, and the performance of General de Bono, his staff and his engineers showed powers of organisation of a very remarkable character.

NEAR A BREAKDOWN. By September General de Bono had three armv corps, each of two divisions. in line near the frontier, and two divisions in reserve. He seems to have had fairly accurate information of the numbers opposed to him and their probable attitude. The intelligence service was good. He finally fixed October 5 as the day, after being told by the Duce to

“ make au end” and that the order to advance was to come from him (deBono), On September 29 he received yet another telegram from his chief. “ I ordei you to begin to advance early on the third. I say October 3. I await immediate confirmation.’’ As wc- know, the Italians succeeded in occupying Adowa —Aksum —Ardigrat almost without opposition and' the wiping out of the old score aroused immense enthusiasm in Italy. The difficulties of supply, of roads, and of lorries multiplied, and General de Bono’s agents combed out the Middle East for camels, mules, mechanical transport and oil. On October 8 he wired, “ Continual consignments of petrol wanted, having only two months’ supply, excluding that for aviation.” The position in view of the possibility of oil sanctions or closing the canal was almost desperate. Marshal Badoglio had arrived on a visit of inspection on October 16 and he had made de Bono realise that more reinforcements 'might cause the whole machine to break down. They represented this accordingly in a joint telegram to the Duce, who still insisted on sending another two divisions of Black Shirts.

Further differences of opinion occurred as to the date of the next advance to Maikale. finally, after de Bono, who had become more and more uneasy, had sent a long telegram temperately setting out the very real difficulties on the lines of communication, he received a brusque order to move on November 3, with which he complied

THE FINAL STRAW. But the pace could not last; he had hardly consolidated his position at Maltale before he received a telegram on November 11;

“On the right bring the Maravigna Army Corps to the front on the Takazze, and with the native divisions march without hesitation on Amba Alagi . . Reply to me.” This was the last straw. General de Bono .said that it was not possible and that it would only end in disaster. On November 17 he was informed that he would be superseded by Marshal Badoglio . . . “ While waiting to see you once more; 1 embrace you with unchanged cordiality. Mussolini.” The whole relationship between the head of the Government and the Com-mander-in-Chief is an extremely interesting study. The former in his office in Rome was actually executing the functions of the supreme command. He was even moving army corps and divisions on the battlefield.

One can understand the intense impatience of a masterful man avlio could hardly realise the delays and difficulties ivith roads and transport. He saiv the political clouds gathering and speed was essential, yet from a military point of view de Bono was undoubtedly right.

The advance on which the Duce insisted on November 11 was not considered possible by Badoglio till ' the middle of January. The continual antedating of offensiA’es by the Duce for no apparent cause but his oivn restlessness must have inflicted great hardships on the troops and enormously increased the difficulties of the staff. He Avas haunted by the lesson of Adowa and insisted upon sending more and more men. Marshal Badoglio, ivith a greater understanding of war, realised in time that in a campaign of this kind, Avhere problems of supply predominated, the larger the mass the greater the immobility, and he had the courage to thin them out. In accepting the command he probably secured a freer hand.

Marshal de Bono’s book makes it clear that the Avar Avould not have been Avon before the rains without Signor Mussolini’s remorseless diwe, but it can hardly be considered a normal method of conducting a campaign.