POLITICAL ACTION.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 18218, 4 October 1919, Page 4

POLITICAL ACTION.

BY RETURNED SOLDIERS’ ASSOCIATION. THE CASE EXAMINED. Tho proposal that the New Zealand Returned Soldiers’ Association should become a political body, which was solidly rejected by the Christchurch conference of the association in May last, is again to be brought forward at tho Dominion conference of the association in tho middle of October. In this article, contributed by a returned soldier, tho proposal is critically examined. THE CASE FOR POLITICAL ACTION. A close examination of the newspaper reports of the debate on political action at the Christchurch conference of tho N.Z.R.S.A. in May last disclosed the somewhat startling fact that the case for tho proposed action was | as remarkable in its weakness as the i case advanced b,y those who opposed it. Tho fact that an important conierene should have wasted so much time in listening to illogical assertion and monotonous reiteration is not a creditable record for a conference whoso work on other questions was remarkable. Boiled down the arguments for political action were as follow: (a! The assertion that the R.S.A. had failed ignominiously in its work, and, without the submission of a shred of further evidence, the contention that political action would succeed. The reply to this argument is simple. Firstly, it is illogical, because there is no necessary connection between the first assertion and the second. Tho vital importance of this logical connecting link was lost sight of by both parties in the emotional enumeration of “ injustices” by the partisans of the new policy. No evidence was adduced to show that political action was no: merely a bold plunge into extinction. Secondly, the first assertion is obviously false. Only those who are incurably biassed, or hopelessly ignorant of the experiences of the returned soldier during the past three years, can fail to recognise the value of the \voik of tho R.S.A., of which a recently published summary of R.S.A. operations not to mention the recent con-, cessions by the Minister of Defence of tho R.S.A claims are conclusive evidence. It is also noteworthy, as a commentary on the suggestion that even a threat of political action would be likely to force the hand of the Government, that the recent concessions cl the Government to the claims of the R.S.A. took place after the proposal for political action had been thrown out decisively at the Christchurch conference. (b) The argument that tho Returned Soldiers’ Association could command 160,000 votes. This is obviously fallacious, as also is the deduction from it, that these votes could bo relied upon in support of a particular platform. It must be remembered that 1o finance whatever proposals the R.S.A. puts forward someone must find the money, and among the people who do very many will be returned soldiers. In tho case of the gratuity, for instance, in many cases the soldier vill simply be transferring his money ou: of one packet into another. In other cases, if he is v. oalthy, he will bo paying out more money than he receives. The fact that the returned soldier as a citizen must find his share of tho future annual charge to the country arising out of war liabilities is not to be obviated by political action, but rather emphasised. It will rathor cause him to examine R.S.A. demands more closely and critically. _ While the supporters of political action'will abu-'e any returned soldier who thinks in this way, the votes of these men cannot bo ignored by these who profess tv calculate their voting strength. The undoubted effect of political organisation within the association would be to tempt tho supporters of each existing political party to influence the choice of tire association in favour of their party candidate. Die tendency would bo for many of those whose representatives failed to secure selection to refuse to vote for tho candidate selected. This is a human weakness which is obvious to all but those whose faith in political action has blinded them to realities. W hen it is further considered that many will resent any attempt by an organisation to influence their vote, it will be realised that any effort to capture and direct tho voting of returned soldiers is likely to result in much less support for a given policy than the association’s present policy of leaving the returned soldier alone to make liis personal and private decision. It 16 ridiculous to suppose that oven a large proportion of such a cosmopolitan group as 80.000 returned soldiers could be. induced to vote on bloc on any issue whatever—much less on such issues as are involved in the general question of a square deal for the soldier. It is further to be remem bered that every voui lost is a double loss in effect, because if exercised lor tho opposition it neutralises a further R.S.A. vote. When to these considerations is added the fact that returned soldiers are so evenly distributed throughout New Zealand that they would predominate everywhere or nowhere, it will be realised what an illusion is the case for political action. (c) Tho assumption by the advocates of political action that seats in Parliament are the seats of the mighty, and tliat the possession of a majority of such seats is sufficient to guarantee the passing of any legislation that may bo desired. In this assumption there is some room for more than a suspicion that their visions are coloured by the anticipation of themselves as occupants, but a rudimentary knowledge of poetical machinery would dispel their illusion. What is generally described sis traitorous conduct on tho part ol the member to his electors is duo verv frequently to his discovery that his power in Parliament is only a vestige of what he had anticipated. The advocates of political action, who frequently denounce all politicians as corrupt, have been confronted with the pertinent remark that those are the 'people to whom they propose to commit the destinies of the lt-S.A. Their reply that they will secure signed pledges, and that the* day of *' scraps of paper ” is past, wilt readily be recognised as typical of the claptrap of the venal politician. THE CASE AGAINST POLITICAL ACTION. It will be segn that the case of political action has been based ou grounds which, have been shown to le false, and it remains to be considered what reasons can bo advanced against it. These may bo summarised as follows - 1. The development of an organisation for political purposes requires:(a) Time.—lf the proposals are adopted at the forthcoming R.S.A. conference just six weekß will be left or this purpose. It is notable that one of the arguments urged at the phriuchurch conference months ago in suppor of political action was that it was then a case of “ Now or never.” (b) Internal Organisation.—The internal organisation of local returned soldiers’ associations has not beaa

framed for political purposes, and is uniformly unready for the work, the extent and complexity of which is entirely unrealised. (c) Money.—The amount necessary for fighting 80 elections, at £2OO each* is £16,000. All seats need not be contested, and others will be contested by candidates who will privately find the necessary funds, but failing these tho association must either sell its vote to other organisations or find its own money. .Neither course is an attractive one. (d) Leadership. The leadership necessary must bo strong, clear-think-ing, of a character to command public confidence, and experienced in political warfare. It is for returned soldiers to judge to what extent tho association is likely to secure such leadership, which can he looked for only among the advocates of political action. 2. No political organisation which is going to be effective can afford to remain non-party. The very fact of its being called into existence implies that an issue has to be fought, and this in turn implies opposition. Whether the new organisation attaches itself to an existing party, or whether its policy creates new party divisions, is immaterial—tho party principle is undeniable.

The “ non-party ” political proposal is a figment of the imagination, and can only carry weight with those who fail to comprehend the real issues and whose thinking on the point is shallow. It is noteworthy that tho Auckland R.S.A., which lor some time insisted strictly on its “non-party” proposals, finally realised their futility, confessed its own selfish aim in tile programme which it had laid down, and camouflaged the said selfishness in a so-called “ national ” programme, the chief merit of which apparently was that it was calculated to attract additional support for tho strictly returned soldier planks of the platform. 3. Even if political action should gain immediate ends, it cannot secure the future position. What is won by the political sword must be held by the political sword. In so far as immediate cash payments to the soldier are concerned, they are not recoverable if a rival party comes into power. But the same is not true of pensions, reoat, and land settlement. Particularly in regard to the last-named, any concessions wrung by political action from a reluctant country will bo revoked or nullified so soon as the inevitable sway of the political pendulum returns the next party to power. If a break in prices takes place in. the near future, failing a benevolent administration which will in necessitous cases revise capital values and defer, capitalise, or wipe off interest due, the returned sojdier settled under the Discharged Soldiers’ Settlement or Repatriation Acts will be facing bankruptcy. It is then that the returned soldier who has not been able to “ dig in ” will be, more than ever before, in need of sympathetic treatment from a public which will be much nmre likely to say: “ You despised our assistance and appealed to the political machine- -you can now stand the racket just the same as everybody else.” Nowhere is this prospective public hostility more likely to work to the detriment of the returned soldier than in the case of pensions. Tho present standard of prosperity in Now Zealand is unlikely to continue for ever. If taxation becomes hurdensomo, relief will be looked for, and may be oxpectod from two sources:—(l) Increased production; (2) retrenchment. Both conditions point directly to soldiers' pensions. A generous pension scale tends to discourage more work than is necessary, and the taxation necessary to produce it will be a large annual item.

When tho war has been practically forgotten, and id* cl 'swe ace to-’! " ''*■> burden, cases will be cited of soldiers with a pension large euougu io du.,uh on who could do something, but are doing nothing. A reduction in the pension scale will relieve taxation, and will be calculated to encourage production. How can a. diminishing soldier vote stem tho popular move in tliis direction ?

Eve i if it were possible to develop a political machine of the type proposed, it would not survive more than a limited period. Even the rosy estimates of its voting strength by its advocates do not contemplate m-ore than tho R.S.A. holding tho balance of power. The voting strength of tho R.S.A. will bo continually decreasing by deaths of members and continuous losses as the particular R.S.A. objects diminish in importance in comparison with future problems. No voting rcaniorcemonts are forthcoming. On the other hand, tho problem of tho incapacitated man and of dependents will be a very important one for many years to come. Owing to war service many ex-sol Hers, though relatively fit now, will break down in health at a much earlier age and perhaps much more suddenly than they otherwise would. New aspects of dependency and incapacity questions will arise, and it is then that the soldier will need the support of tho well-informed and sympathetic public opinion which tho work of the R.S.A. lias already been successful fn so largely developing, and which the advocates of political action do not hesitate to jettison for tho sake of temporary and largely illusory advantages. By Press and public, political action by the R.S.A, has been uniformly condemned.

This fact, however, does not deter its partisans. They demand for themselves recognition as the only genuine friends of tho soldier. Criticism of their proposals, and warnings of their probable fate, can (according to them) originate only in questionable motives. In their view the condition of, the exsoklier is so desperate that they are prepared to risk all in one heroic and spectacular frontal attack to secure justice for him. (It is noteworthy that they must have employed more discreet methods on sendee at tho front.) But no one who has studied the facts will agree with them, either in their diagnoses of the case, or in the remedy they suggest. While there remains much for tho R.S.A. to do, much has already been done, and nothing than an appeal to tho political sword will destroy more quickly tho confidence with which the public has come to regard the work of the R.S.A., and on the basis of which tho futuro can be confidently faced.