HAIG’S FINAL DISPATCH.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 18116, 5 June 1919, Page 5

HAIG’S FINAL DISPATCH.

FEATURES OF THE WAR. “ A SINGLE GREAT BATTLE.” The War Office released for publication in April Field-Marshal Haig’s final dispatch. Part I. deals with the advance into Germany, Part 11. with tli9 general features of the war, and Part 111. consists of the Commander-in-Chief’s acknowledgments of services rendered by various commanders and others. The most valuable section is that which discusses the features of the. war, "anff it is intended, to reproduce tins in full in the “ Dyttelion limes ” from the columns of tfie Lonuon “ limes.” An instalment appears below:— In this, my final Dispatch, I think it dea-uilme iu o-j.AAAii.oiit oiioAiy Ujjuii certcA.Ai ai lent urea tv men conjoin tiie vvnoAo oOiiCS Oi opOAiitions can led out iaUuloa iuj uuiiiiuuuLi. J. am tneieto oy tno eon v union tnat nci'tner tne oouiso in tne war itaen nor tne /unitary leoaons to no drawn tne/droni can propei'iy ue cdiupienenuea, UlilcSS toe mug pUwcejDioii oi outtieS eomnicuceu on tne Pennine in auj-O ana eUuea in iNoVeinoev oi last year on tue isaiuure aie Viewed as ioiining pj.it oi one great anu conLiiituus en 0 j o enlent. 10 direct attention to -any single pilasa oi tnat suujieutious ana incessant struggle ana seen in it me explanation oi uui' success, to tne exclusion or neglect oi diner pnaxes pommy less strniing m tneir immeuiate or obvious eonsequeneea is, in my opinion, to lisa tne lormacion oi unauunu doctrines regarding tne cuaracter and requirements of niouern war.

ii tne operations of the past four and a null yeais are regained, as a single continuous campaign, mere can Ot jccogmsed in tiiem tne same general and tlie same necessary -stages union between lorces oi approximately equal f stieugtn fiav.e ' marxed all the conciusiv<f' oattles of history. There is in tne nist. instance tile preliminary i-tage ot ilie campaign in winch tne opposing foices seen to deploy and man-u-uvre lor position, endeavouring-wliile doing so to gain sonie eany advantage unica might be pushed home to quick decision. This puase calue to an end in tne present war witli tlie creation of continuous trenen lines Irom the, Bwris fiontier to tlie" sea. Bafiie having been joined, there follows the penou oi real struggle in which tne main lorces of the two belligerent armies are pitted against each otner in close and costly combat- Each commander seeks to wear down tUe power of resistance of his opponent and to pin liim to his position, while - , preserving or accumulating in Uis own hands a powerful reserve torco with which' he can. manoeuvre, and when signs of the enemy bt coming morally and pnysioally weakened are observed, deliver the decisive attack. The greatest possible pressure against the enemy’s whole front must be maintained, especially when the crisis of the battle, approaches.; Then every man, horse-and gun is required to co-operate, so as to complete the enemy's overthrow and exploit success. in the- stage of the weanug-out struggle losses will necessarily be neavy on both sides, for in it the price of victory is paid. If the opposing forces are appi oximately equal in numbers, in courage, in moral and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of the-price or of eliminating this phase of the struggle. , , ■ . . ‘ In former battles this stage of the. conilict' has rarely lasted more than a lew days, and has oiten been completed m a few hours. When armies of millions arc engaged, with the, resources of great Empires behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises of. lighting winch, when viewed separately and apart Irom the general perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles, this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917. which wore down the strength of the German ai.vfies. Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and leadership of one of the belligerents as the result or j greater resources or tenacity, or by rea- | son ot higher moral, or from a com- | bination of all these causes, the tune will come when the other side will begin j to weaken and the climax of the battle , is reached. Then the commander of the j weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engagement, if he | can, while there is yet time, or stake i on a supreme effort what reserves re- i main to him. The launching and de- | fraction of Napoleon’s last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this World War the great sortie of the beleaguered German armies, commenced on March 21, 1918, lasted for four months, yet it represents a. corresponding stage in a single colossal battle. The breaking down of such a supreme effort will be the signal for the commander of the successful side to develop his greatest strengtn. and seek to turn bo immediate account the loss m material and moral, which their failure must inevitably produce among his opponent’s troops. In a battle joined and decided in the course of a few days or hours, there is no risk tbnt tne lay observer will seek to distinguish the culminating operations bv which victory is seized and exrdoited from the preceding stages bv whWi it has been made nossible and determined. Tf tne whole operations of the present war are remarried'in correct perspective the victories of the summer and autumn of 1918 will he sppn to he ns dirertty dependent upon tile two of stubborn fighting that preceded them. LENGTH OF THE WAR. If the causes which determined the length ot tno recent contest are exammed. in tne ngnt ol uue u “ principles of war, it will be seen tnat L duration ot the struggle was governed by and bore a direct relation to certain definite factors which are enumerated below* In the first place, wo- were .fr pared for war, or at any rate toi a war of such magnitude. We were deficient in both- trained men and military mate- j Hal, and. what was,far more unportaut, j had no machinery ready by winch eiUier ; men or material could be produced m . anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences were two-fold. Firstly, the necessary , uiachinerv had to, be improvised hurriedly and improvisation is never economical and seldom satisfactory. In this cm?* tho high-water na rk of our lightu g strength in infantry was only reached after two and a half years of conflict, bv which time heavy casualties bad already been incurred In consequence, tho full man power of the-Empire WAS never developed in the field at period of tho war As regards material,, it was not until midsummer 1916. that the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the conduct of.jna.im- operations. Throughout the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery aimuumtinn had to be watched witli tho jw est eav«. During the battles of i"I < p?mnupition v/jvs plentiful, but tho situatin'’ l a source of constant anxiotv. Onlv in 1918 was', it possible to qrvr\rlimt artillery " operations nideiiepnf aw limiting eensidcratlmv pt.l'or tkau that of tranyeort. Tk., ; oonr).1 of OUV UP 1 TV-OP"—-'kmc- <r-.s t’-«f "tv wb-t' T„ l,!r, f.o of lb" «>!' *" ’ ~r .1,- T . M . ftvr, k-’ .Ipr,; nri -A .ntl-I . (t. +,rv 'leoisl ni;r A .’V’ .a fAviro'' TVSC oldrt fr, -aim n Tiolukln "in I.' l ' 1 sdl--I" fifru I>V n?tnkliokin<T ikimseD in .Rnlstinn'' and nortbern Franco, and throughout j <

the early stages of the war was tree to concentrate an unuue proportion of liis effectives against Franco and Russia. The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant Army of Franco during this period caused them losses, the elieet of v.lnclT lias been felt all thaough the war and directly influenced its length. Just as at no time were - we m an Empire able to pul e-iir owm j-ai> strength into tho field, so at no tamo were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on a larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was actually achiev * by our original Expeditionary Foow It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which has been fully prepared, for war has almost invariably gained a rapid ana complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1866 .and 18:0, Austria, and then France, were overwhelmed at the outset by means .cf , superior preparation. The initial advantages derived therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action, regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the .first stunning blows. - The German plan or. campaign in the present war was undoubtedly based on similar principles. Tho margin by which the German onrush in 1914 was stemmed wps so nar- • row and the subsequent struggle so revere that the word “miraculous”, is hardy too strone a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory of the Allies. . . ' A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war on the western front during its Inter stages, and one following indirectly from that just stated, was'the situation in other'theatres. The military strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical period, when, had she been able to carry out her military engagements, the war might have been shortened by a year. At a later date, the military situation * in Italy in the autiunn of 1917 necessitated the transfer of five British di- . visions' from France to Italy, at a time when tlieir presence in France might have had far-reaching effects. Thirdly, the'All es were handicapped in tlieir task and the war thereby lengthened inherent difficulties always associated with the combined action of armies of separate nationalities, differing in speech and tempera- . ment, and, not least important, in military organisation, equipment and supply. Finally, as indicated in the opening paragraph of this part of my dispatch, the huge numbers of men engaged on either side, whereby a continuous battle front was rapidly established from Switzerland to the sea,, outflanking was made impossible and manosuvre very difficult, necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks. This factor, combined 1 with the strength of the defensive under modern conditions, rendered a protracted wearing-out battle unavoidable before the enemy’s power of re- '' Bistanco could be overcome. So long Vs the opposing forces are at the outset approximately equal in numbers and moral; and there are no-flanks to turn, a Ion? straggle for supremacy is inert . table. ' , . . N (To be continued.)