IN THE AIR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17946, 13 November 1918, Page 6

IN THE AIR.

. In no theatre of .the war have there boon greater, surprises or more rapid developments than jiT tho air. .Four years of war, under the pressure of national necessity, has seen the; aeroplane -make greater progress than it would have made in twenty years of peace. Feats that were considered impossible in 1914 have become the ordinary affairs of an aerial day, and machines which in 1913 served to establish records, are now nothing more than slow, dangerous and ineffectual experiments. The war did much, because ia the air there was much to be done. When the war broke out the aeroplane had just been accepted as an aid to scouting, but its offensive properties were discounted. The first military use of tho aeroplane in war look place ill Mexico in 1911, when an ainnau kept the Government forces acquainted with the movements of the rebel armies. Seven months later Italy was' using aeroplanes against the Turks in Tripoli both for scouting and bombing, but the experiences of the Italian airmen, while showing tho great value of aerial reconnaissance by observation or photography, rather discounted the aeroplane as an offensive. This was the result, too, of the use of the aeroplane by the Balkan allies against the Turks in 1912. In these wars the! aeroplane had no opponent in the air, and had to contend against oniy riflebullets and shells from guns not adapted for use against them. These early experiments in aerial warfare were carefully watched by all the nations, and when the outbreak occurred in 1914 all of tlie belligerents had made more or less effective attempts to establish an aeroplane arm in their armies. Germany had organised her service most thoroughly, and was actually the best prepared of the great Powers, while Franco, though she made plenty of machines and pilots, was probably the least organised in an effectual military sense. .Britain had a small aeroplane department in tho army, well organised, but unfortunately dependent on foreign importations, ' German and French, for its engines. Germanytook the field with about 600 machines, the samo number as France, but the * r -«tfr.iajt ’""'"'"Wi wbr.v all, soecially do-

signed for war ' service, • standardised: and grouped into definite units. Tho French machines wore mostly Farrnan machines, but included -many other types, and they had practically no organisation behind them of any real value. When machines got out. of repair the difficulties multiplied, and tho service found itself seriously handicappeed. The British had not more than a hundred efficient machines when the war commenced. The Germans wero aware of their superiority,' and they were led into believing that it would bo possible through I,heir advantage in neriql scouting to mass their infantry for surprise attacks against tho enemy’s 'weakest point,, but tho Germans did not have an air supremacy and the French seouters wore able to see as much as their enemies saw. The Germans used their airmen as ‘ spotters” for their artillery, and achieved brilliant results in the early days, so much so that it soon became clear to the Allies that- it was not -enough to use tho aeroplane as-ail-auxiliary to the artillery and cavalry, iliac tho air service imd to take the. offensive against its opponent and drive j him from the air. Fortunately though, tho German machines .were I armed with _ machine-guns, the early I designs permitted tpom to fire only to tho rear, which reduced their superiority greatly. _ From the- commencement) the British arid French airmen were more daring and mure enterprising than their opponents, and established an individual air sneriority which- when the ' temporary German medianical gains were overtaken, placed the issue beyond doubt. It is not necessary to give the details of the advance in engine design, though tho contest of fhe air became largely one of speed and armament. The British wove'the first- to develop the use of. vrirck*s on their machines, and. though they started tho war with a weak aerial arm, they developed it more rapidly than any of ihe Powers, appreciating its powers and needs, and became the most efficient air force in the war. The Fokker was a German effort in 3915 to regain the superiority lost by the 'appearance of fast Bri£jsh biplanes, bub within a few weeks, this machine which fired its machine-gun through its propeller blades, was countered and doomed. and in 1.916 came the. big twinengined Gothas which .made destructive daylight air-raids on Britain, but it, was a copy of a British machine, and last year was eclipsed by the improved Handley-Pnge. The Germans first used the aeroplane for bombing towns, but their attacks were never more than attempt:; to harry and annoy the people behind ihe front. It remained for the British air service to develop the air raid-as u 'destructive weapon,. 'Promiscuous bombing was found to be of little value, and it was discovereed, too, that unless airmen flew low they could not expect to use their bombs with any ,degree of accuracy. The British airmen. too. developed tile idea: of lowflying for the purpose of escaping gunfire. and were responsible for the use of the my rhino-cun against infantry on tiie ground. The cud of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 saw the development j of air-raiding, the German' towns being severely punished by regular visitations by largo Allied air forces." The aviator had already established his position on the battlefields as a lighter, ’a scout, a -messenger to keep touch between the advanco infantry of his own armies, and a means of feeding the' front line with munitions and food. Over this ho became a weapon, of great force and destructiveness .behind" the lines, and a- new means of 1 inging the enemy to his knees. The . Germans started tho bombing of town*, but the British airmen developed this weapon to real effectiveness. The Zeppelins, upon which Germany placed so much reliance, proved the most spectacular failure of the war. Their raids against England and France were exceedingly ineeffctual, tho aeroplane attacks, were much more destructive, and when the anti-aircraft defences were established the Zeppelin visits proved expensive to the enemy and wore abandoned in 1917. It- is probable that the Germans used these, big airships with more success in scouting operations in the North Soa, but for that work .and the'task of hunting submarines, the British wore as well, if not better, equipped with their various types of non rigid airships, the best known bbing the “’Blimp.” Germany s fondness for the Zeppelin kept her from aeroplanes until 3.912.- but her experience with Zeppelin engines was invaluable, when she came to take up the heavier-th .mi-air machines, and contributed largely to her early' superiority. This was met in the early

stages by the individual superiority of the Allied airmen, and gradually they asserted their ascendancy over tho enemy in all departments of aerial warfare. The Germans never obtained ah actual supremacy, local or .otherwise, as the British and French did on occasion, though the lleichsfcofen circus, a special concentration' of fighters flung suddenly into the desired sector, was an attempt.to secure this desired end, the real aim of the- airmen in tho battle area. The use of the aeroplane as a fighting machine, of course, developed special air tactics, particularly tho famous. V battle formation, and tho introduction of specialisation, but the most important result of the aeroplane’s participation in the war Vas its development from an auxiliary 'to the scouting arm to a weapon of great offensive power, and essential aid to the work of every arm of tho service, and a potential winner of victories.