NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17933, 2 November 1918, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR.

So far as Germany is concerned, the official Allied references to the peace possibilities have been extremely guarded. It is to be inferred that communications aro passing between the Allies and Germany, but the fact has not been officially stated, and consequently there is no reliable line to the actual state of affairs. At tho moment of writing the sole word of encouragement of an official character is an announcement that tho war risks on 6hips sailing from British or other ports during tho currency of an armistice with enemy Powers will be reduced to onehalf. The only enemy Power that really counts in such a matter is Germany, and the announcement would not have been made if there had not been a prospect—possibly remote—of an armistice being arranged. Unofficially it has been stated that the terms on which an armistice would be granted to Germany had been communicated to Berlin, and it is certain that the terms have been stated or will be stated to Germany in the immediate future. Those term 3 would not be decided solely with an eye to encouraging Germany to give up the struggle, of course, since their prime object would be to secure the Allied position, and they might be so drastic that acceptance would be out of the question a.t this stage. Under pressure of circumstances, on the other hand, tho German Government might be induced to accept terms that a week ago, even a few days ago, would liavo been promptly rejected.

Tho opinion of the people of Allied countries is so emphatically that nothing short of unconditional surrender 6houkl be allowed to end the war that the terms framed in reply to Germany's request are bound to bo severe. Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary have -been driven to the last extremity. But it is perhaps not strictly true that unconditional tiurrender is being demanded of all the enemy Powers. What happens when an armistice is requested is that tho belligerent to whom tho request is addressed states the conditions it imposes, and it is for the applicant to say whether or not those conditions will bo accepted Easier conditions might hi granted to Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria than to Germany, and there is tins difference, also, that whereas a suspension of hostilities with a minor enemy Power might bo agreed to, the Allies, treating Germany as the principal enemy, would bo bound to secure themselves absolutely against any resumption of hostilities. So far as the minor enomy Powers are concerned, many points of the settlement might bo left for future decision, but with Germany it would be ne-jessary to impose such conditions for a cessation of hostilities that compliance with th/a ultimate demands of the Allies would bo assured. Then the minor enemy belligerents admit defeat. Germany has not yet done so. Her power to resist is not at can end, though resistance is obviously hopeless.

It te interesting at this moment to turn back to the accounts of the situation in France after Waterloo. The parallel between Napoleon's ' position and the Kaiser's, though far from exact, is perhaps sufficiently close to afford some sort •of guide to what is now happening in Germany. Napoledn, after Waterloo, had gono straight to Paris. He was under no illusions, but he seems to have cherished the hope that a dictatorship might bo established and time gained for tho reorganisation of the army. This proposal did not lack support, but there had grown up a powerful popular, party that was tired of the war and anxious only to restore peace to the country. Its plan was to assert finally the authority of the National Assembly and to place the' military forces entirely under civil control. If Napoleon imagined that he would be allowed to temporise, he was speedily disillusioned. Lafayette, who took a strong lino in tho chamber, had the sentiment of the majority with him. Reproached by' Lucien, who charged him with ingratitude, Lafayette retorted in a way that roused enthusiastic approval. "You accuse me of wanting gratitude towards Napoleon!" he exclaimed. "Have you forgotten what we have done for him? Have you forgotten that the bones of our children, of our brothers, everywhere attest our fidelity—in the sands of Africa, on the shores of the Guadalquivor aud the. Tagus, on the banks of the Vistula, and in the frozen deserts of Muscovy? During more than ten years threo millions of Frenchmen have perished for a man who' wishes still to struggle against all Europe. We have done enough for him. Our duty now is to save the country."

vThere was a loud demand for Napoleon's abdication. The National Guard stood by the Assembly, and it was already evident that the Emperor's cause was lost. A commission was set up to decide the measures to be adopted, but the outcry for abdication increased in volume. When the determination of the Chamber to act immediately was made evident, Lucien still pleaded for time, but could secure no more than an hour. A deputation went to the Emperor with the" vei-dict, and in the hour the abdication had been signed. The story may be carried a stage further. The designs of tho popular leaders were not to be carried into effect, because already the Allied armies were closing on Paris and the decision was to rest, not with the French, but with the enemy at the gates. The capitulation of the capital was soon seen to be inevitable, and on July 3 tho French commander requested. an armistice. Blucher demanded an unconditional surrender, a demand that the French marshals promptly refused. There followed a period of negotiation, during which the Allied leaders were in close touch with the French Government. Uutimately, on July 3, it was stipulated that the French army should evacuate the city, with arms, artillery and baggage, and should, within eight days, retire to the south of the Loire. The Allied commanders undertook to respect private property except that or a military value. The terms were by no means harrsh, but the Allies had all the guarantees they needed concerning the intentions of the French Government, and the forced abdication of Napoleon had cleared the way. The abdication of the Kaiser now, of course, would not have anytlung like the significance that tho abdication of Napoleon had in 1815.