NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17935, 31 October 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

It is highly probable that the new Italian offensive across tho Piave was planned with the intention of stimulating' Austria to come to a decision regarding the continuation of the war. Not a great deal is known about tho military conditions on the front, but it is asserted that the morale of tho Austrian armies is good. Of course tho enemy suffered a terrible defeat on this front in June, when ho opened an offensive in support of the German offensive in France. Tho Austrians then forced tho passage of the Piave but wore held up in the second lino of tho Italian defences. Then thfe Piave came down in flood, washing away the temporary bridges, and as the bridging detachments were constantly harassed by shell firo and by the Allied airmen it became impossible for the enemy to supply his forces western bank. Ultimately he was thrown hack across the river, having sustained extremely heavy losses of men and material. Surprise was expressed at tho time that tho Italians did not immediately exploit their advantage, seeing that many Austrian divisions had been broken, and it was considered probable that a counter-offensive would find a weakness in the enemy’s front and that he would be compelled to retreat.

There were, however, sound reasons wily the advantage was not pursued. Obviously if the Piave could come down in flood and cut off the Austrians it might repeat the trick against tho Italians, and tho Italians would have had to bo very suro of their ability to maintain their bridgeheads and their lines of communication before venturing to push large forces across the river. This, however, was not the main influence at work. Tho Italians wore strongly posted on the western bank of tho river and it would havo been folly to have launched a great offensive prematurely. MoreQver, there was reason to believe that the enemy had a very powerful concentration in the Brenta valley, against which it was necessary for tho Italians to hold a considerable force in reserve. To havo weakened that reservo for the purpose, of adding weight to an offensive on the Piave would have left the Brenta front en-

dangered, and the Italians certainly could not risk an advance to the east whilo there was am/ room for anxiety regarding the mountain front. Then thero was the consideration that although the losses of material and men suffered in tho autumn of 1917 had been largely made good the Allies were concentrating their efforts on building up the armies in France, where the gravest clanger threatened, and consequently thero must have been a doubt whether the Italians could call on them for tho men and guns that would have been needed for a great offensive.

The conditions have changed materially in the interval since Juno. The load of anxiety has been lifted from tho Allied shoulders in Franco and there is no reason why the Italians should not use their reserves freely. Moreover, thero has been a lapse of some months in which the reserves of munitions could bo accumulated, the strength of the artillery could be increased and the training of tho newer levies could he completed, this last being a factor of considerable importance. Then the political conditions nre highly favourable, since the whole Austrian Empire seems to be almost on tho verge of disruption. Thero is still the obvious strategical weakness in the offensive beyond the Piave, since the northern flank lias not been cleared, but the Allies have just carried out strong demonstrations on both sides of the Brenta and they have doubtless tested the.strength of the enemy in the mountains. If Diaz is prepared to undertake a big advance on the Venetian plain he must he confident regarding tho mountain front.

Tlio present offensive was launched, apparently, on a front of about twelve miles north of the Treviso-Oderzo road. Tho first attack, by the British, wan planned to capture tho big island of Ivrave di Papadopoli, between the two arms of the, Piave. At this stage there was a suggestion that the flooded state of the river would interfere with tho plans, hut cn tho second day the British forced tho passage of the eastern arm of the river, and the Italians on either flanks also managed to cross, although they do not appear to have made very great progress. However, onco the bridgeheads were established, tho offensive proceeded on the whole front, and a general advance was commenced northwards of the Oderzo road An unofficial message claims that the advance lias readied a depth of ten miles, but the official reports show that the actual movement of tho infantry is considerably less. However, the energetic British attack reached Vazzola, four or nvo miles beyond tho Piave, and tho latest report states that tho enemy’s resistance is weakening. The Allies hold tho east bank of tho Piavo along the whole front from Valdobbia-dc-:ne down to Ponte di Piave, rouglily twenty-five miles, and tho reports indicate that the Austrians are falling back steadily.

The effect of a considerable advance on this front will be, of course, to bring tho Austrians back from the whole lino of the Piave. It is not, known what subsidiary lines of communication tho Austrians have been able to construct during the past year, but for practical purposes it may be accepted that their main supply lines arc limited to three railways, the Brenta Valley lino, and the two eastern lines. If that is the position, the Italians, advancing towards tho east, should have no difficulty in covering their northern flank beyond the Piave. The menace in tho Brenta Valley would still remain, but there would bo no great danger of an enemy demonstration from tho mountain region to tho north-east, and tho Austrians, if forced into a retreat, would necessarily move back bv the Udino and Trieste lines. This is tho sector on which the main weight pf the enemy has boon concentrated. In all probability tho Italian plan would be to drive north-east towards Belluno, with the idea of splitting thoxenemy armies into two groups, both of which could then he forced into retreat. How far this plan is at present in contemplation remains to bo seen, but thero is a strong temptation to believe that the offensive is aimed mainly at Vienna and is designed to influence the course of the political position there.