NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17903, 24 September 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

The latest communique from Palestine shows that General Allenby has cleared Samaria as far as Nablus and that the Turkish forces are now confined within the territory to the northeast, whence they are endeavouring to escape across the Jordan. The enemy abandoned his strong hill positions astride the Nablus road as soon as he found himself outflanked, and the rapid dash of the mounted troops, cutting his Lines of communication, must have hastened his retreat. As the British infantry pressed northward and eastward tho Turks were steadily forced along the northern and eastern roads. The roads to the Jordan are the only ones not commanded by the mounted men, and as they are for the most part rough, mountainous tracks, the Turkish retreat is being made under conditions of the utmost difficulty. The mounted men in Galileo are concerning themselves mainly with the enemy’s possible lines of retreat, and, of course, with the lines by which reinforcements might arrive, and so the operations have been confined to the quadrangle bounded by Afuleh, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee and Beisan. Nazareth, as the centre of a Christian community, is naturally of importance in British eyes, but it had a military consequence, because it is a road junction, and the ridge to the north of it controls the direct road between Haifa and the Jordan.

The infantry’s advance may appear to have been slow, but it was slow only in comparison with that of the mounted troops. General Allenby’s plan was not to smash the Turks by frontal attacks. His initial object was to break through on the maritime plain, to permit the mounted divisions to ride north, so that they could cut the enemy’s line of retreat. The infantry on the coastal sector moved north for some miles and then turned east and north-east, ultimately reaching the north and south line of the railway as far as Tul Keram. There was an advance to tho east to clear the railway and to convince the Turks that they were outflanked, and then, pivoting on his left flank a little to the north-west of Samaria, General Allenby moved his centre and right forward until tho whole lino was again

fronting almost north. He could not ignore the possibility of danger on his right flank, however, and the movement in the difficult country above the Jordan valley was therefore blow. However, at Beit Dejan, east of Nablus, tho British command the valley of tho Fara, one of the main routes to the Jordan, and it looks as if the Turks had only one road practicable for wheeled transport left to them.

There is a road running south from Beisan by the valley of the Jordan to Jericho, and in all probability the mounted troops have been feeling their way down this road in the hope of intercepting the retreating enemy. There is. a considerable Turkish force east of the Jordan, however, and although its movements cannot be rapid it is bound to make some sort of a demonstration on the British flank, and possibly it may be employed to protect the crossings of the Jordan. Concerning the total enemy strength in Palestine no definite information has been given. It was suggested that there were under 20,000 Turks south of Nablus, but as 18,000 prisoners have been taken by the British already, and as the enemy is still able to offer some resistance in the hills, it is obvious that the estimate was very inaccurate. However, the clearing of the whole of Samaria is only a matter of time, and as the cavalry and Anzac Mounted Division have already made a beginning with the operations in Galileo it is reasonable to look for a big movement northwards. So far no attack has been directed ngainst Haifa. Tho enemy’s retreat from the port lies now by the coastal line to Acre and then by road northwards, the lino of retreat to the east being completely severed. Haifa and Acre are both likely to be isolated in the very near future.

There is little information concerning the operations in Serbia. The communique briefly states that tho Serbs are now north of Kavadar, on the southern of the two main roads from Prilep to the Vardar valley. The northern road from Prilep runs over tho Babuna Pass to Koprili. ’ Kavadar is only a matter of seven or eight miles from the Vardar valley railway. It is stated, however, that enemy reinforcements are arriving, and it is highly probablo that the Bulgarians will take steps to cover their railway, the importance of which is inestimable. Possibly the reader has been disappointed at the brevity of the communiques and at tho absence of evidence of tho farreaching results he had expected. The results avail oome. It must be remembered that the Serbs broke through on a mountain sector and their advance was not really rapid until they reached the wide valley of the Cerna. Then they had to cross the Cerna in the rear of the Bulgarian positions northwards of Monastir. Here, again, the enemy had the advantage of strong mountain positions, and the lack of good roads made the Allied progress' extremely slow. To the right, again, the enemy was established in tho forbidding ranges along the Greek fronttier. The process of expelling him took time, but he was expelled, and then the Serbs gained access to the Bashava valley, affording a second line of advance to the Vardar. The front of the advance was now from ten to fifteen miles wide. To the west it Was restricted by the mountains beyond the Cerna, and to the east it was similarly limited by the northern extension of the Marianska range.

There is reason to believe, moreover, that all the communiques concerning tho Macedonian front are deliberately couched in very restrained terms. At tho moment tho Serbs may appear to be the only forces in motion.. But it is certain that tho Allies are either attacking or aro about to advance as soon as the Serbian break-through produces its inevitable effects on tho general Bulgarian position. Indeed, tho influence is likely to be felt as far afield as Albania. It is true that the British briefly reported an attack on tho Doiran sector, but this was very obviously a containing battle, tho intention being to fix the Bulgarians on the sector to their ground, pending the development of the Serbian advance. Naturally a great deal depends on the ability of tho Serbs to reach the Vardar valley and to debouch there. If they succeed in cutting the main line of railway thirty miles in the rear of the Bulgarian positions, tho whole aspect of the campaign will speedily change. In any case important changes in the general situation are certain, and one must await them patiently.