NOTES ON THE WAR

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17879, 27 August 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR

Although nn unofficial message received yesterday afternoon declared that Bapaume had been captured, and a later message from New York stated that the 'British were entering the town its fall had not been officially announced at midday on Sunday. Sir -Douglas Haig’s communique, indeed, indicated that strong enemy reinforcements were appearing and that the resistance was becoming more pronounced, so that a direct attack on Bapaume would certainly encounter stiff opposition. The general course of the battle, however, strongly suggested the early evacuation of the place. Tlie British were advancing on a wide front, and olearly the enemy had been prevented from organising anything in the shape of a continuous line of defence. If a centre of resistance was organised at one point it was’epeedily outflanked, and although the general rate of progress was not great, it wap steady. Moreover, there were no direct indications that the Germans would be able to stabilise the position north of Bapaume, and if they failed oh that sector Bapaume itself could not be saved, however tenaciously the troops in front of it might cling to their strong points. South of Bapaume the Germans have been retiring steadily, making use of the familiar high ground, and falling back only in conformity with the retreat further north.

In this way the British reached, on Sunday morning, a line running north from the ridge east of Bray, to the east of Mnmetz, Contalmaison. Le Sars and Warlencourt. The enemy had offered a stubborn resistance on the ridge between Bray and Suzanne, ms he was bound to do, because too speedy o re treat on the north bank of the Somme might easily have prejudiced his position on the south bank, involving a readjustment of positions there that might have affected a considerable width of front. Moreover, it would have been futile for him to attempt to delay the British advance on the ridges south of Bapaume if the flank on the Somme had been uncovered. It would not be without a stiff fight, therefore, that the Australians carried the Suzanne ridge, but having carried it they would have Suzanne below them. Even then, however, the way would not be altogether dear to Curlu and the old 1916 line, and it will come as no surprise to learn that the struggle has been as continuous and as intense on the north bank of the Somme as on any other part of the whole front of the battle.

The most serious problem arising for the Germans out of Saturday’s actions was that created by the irresistible rush

of the' New Zealanders towards Bapaume itself. The eneriiy could not afford to be caught in tho'town before ho got away the bulk of his stores, and apart from that aspect of the matter, the loss of Bapaumo would have endangered the orderly retreat on the sector immediately to the south. It would be to Bapaume, then, that the reinforcements would first be rushed, and it will be interesting to have the details of the battle, because they will throw a flood of light on tho condition of the enemy’s ‘ reserves. Unfortunately the British correspondents do not specialise in the class of detail that is most useful to the student, and it is only occasionally that illuminating sidelights are telegraphed while an action is still in progress. But a little later there ought to be information as to the identity and the quality of the German troops that joined in the battle in front of Bapaume. Then there was an obvious danger of a break about C'roisilles, so that the German lino would need strengthening at that point also.

Unofficial reports suggested that the British had pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Bullocourt, the scene of a tremendous -Australian battle early last year, but if tho patrols got near Bullecourt the German resistance must have melted away at one point, and the story is a little difficult of belief. Croirilles could be reached by rail either from Cnmbrni or from- Douai, at both, of which cities there must have been divi-i ns in reserve, and a little further to the east the Germans still have the verv complete system of communications that they built up to supply the Hindcnburg line. By Saturday the onestion would be less one of transport facilities than of available reserves, ana that is why the identity of the fresh troops thrown into the battle, by the Germans is important. Naturally one does not expect very definite information to be made public at this stage, but the point is mentioned as one on which the serious render ought to watch for hints. It may bo taken for granted that by Sunday the enemy would have fresh divisions in action on the whole front north of Bapaume, and in the absence of any official news on the subject ono would naturally infer that the resistance had increased.

' In point of fact this is what has happened. The Germans have gathered all the reserves immediately available and thrown them into the fight by regiments, and their counter-attacks temporarily checked tho British advance, except to tlie south of Bapaume, where the Germans were retreating to a safer lino. Tho counter-attacks would gain time for the arrival of further reserves and for tho organisation of new strong points, but tho Allies have worked out an effective system of dealing with isolated points of resistance, and unless the enemy succeeds in linking up his machine-gun nests and hastily fortified woods and villages, his retreat will continue. The official -news carries tho story of the battle only to the gates of Bapaume, and leaves the position to the north altogether in doubt. It is not the deepest penetration of patrols that counts in such an operation, of course, because patrols can be driven in, and the official reports record only the ground that has been definitely captured and consolidated against counter-attaok. Normally there ought to have been a further extension of tho front of the battle northwards beyond the Cojeul, because if the enemy is left undisturbed ho will endeavour to restrict tho British advance by organising a powerful defensive system on which to rest his flank.