NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17644, 23 November 1917, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

There is one question concerning the new British push that every serious student of the war will naturally ask, and it is whether the attack on the twenty-mile front towards Cambrai has "the full measure of weight behind it or whether it is in the nature only of a. great demonstration designed to distract German attention from the Italian front. The course of the operations will answer the question, but there are certain considerations that are worth taking into account in tho present state of one's information, To commence with, every student of the war has been expecting a thrust on the front south of Arras since the opening of the YpreF battle. The earlier operations for the reduction of tho Havrincourt forest, the thrust to Vendhuille, on the canal and, later, the operations for the reduction of that other strong enemy position on the Hargicourfc heights, suggested that the machinery for the continuation of the main offensive in the British centre and on tho right, was rapidly being brought into a condition of efficiency. The bis German retreat had compelled tho British to advance the whole of the vast offensive organisation, to prepare new roads, construct new railways, establish advanced bases and depots nnd munition clumps, and it went without saying that months would be spent in this labour if the Germans were able to fix themselves in permanent fortified linesMonths were so spent, but during tho Arras battle and the Ypres battle the work has gone steadily ahead, and it is probable that at any time since the beginning of August it would have been possible for tho British to assume the offensive on a wide front between Arras and St Quentin.

When it was authoritatively stated that the British plan of campaign for this year involved not one offensive but a series of offensives at different points tho critics exercised their imagination •in guessing where the thrusts would be delivered. The Arras battle had hardly subsided before tho Anzacs and the Irishmen stormed tho Messines ridge, and it was then evident that the next big push would bo in Flanders. There remained, of the obvious possibilities, a thrust to Cambrai, but as the Flanders battle continued into the cold weather and as the extreme end of the Passchendaele ridge remained in German hands, it was doubtful whether the Cambrai push would be carried out before the spring. Then came the Italian disaster, and the British, like the French, were called on for reinforcements of men and guns and material, and it .was more than ever doubtful whether a third big effort would be made in the west this yieair. Thus it came about that when the attack was actually made ft came as a surprise to friends as well as to foes.

There was no warning- Every other push has been preceded by a/ period of intense artillery preparation, and the Germans have been given ample warning of the British intention to attack, even though the precise front of the movement might be in doubt. But on this occasion there was no preparation. Quietly the Tanks had been gathered behind tho lines, and before daylight on Tuesday they were let loose. They flattened tho entanglements and obstructions, preparing the paths for the infantry, and although the Germans at various points offered a desperate resistance their front was broken in tho centre and the British infantry pushed across the Canal du Nord and into Marcoing, barely four miles from Cambrai. The weather, which had been fair, broke during the day and became stormy, and it may have steadied the progress during the afternoon. But, even so, the results were remarkable.

The front of the attack extended from Fontaine-les-Croisillos, some seven miles north of tho Bnpaume-Cambrai road, to a point on the canal near Vendhuille, say, ten miles south of the road. Allowing for the larger irregularities of tho front, thero were twenty miles of battle. On tho two flanks the progress made was of comparatively small importance, though on the northern flank a portion of tho Hindenburg line was stormed. The main push was made in the triangle formed by the Cambrai-Bapaumo and Cambrai-St Quentin roads. A breach eight or nine miles wide was here made in the Hindenburg line, and the British pushed through to a depth of nearly five miles, and possibly more at certain points. Apart from the big enemy retreat, which was forced as the result of months of fighting, Tuesday's advance constitutes tho most considerable thrust achieved by tho Allies on any one day of fighting since the armies settled down to trench warfare.

On Wednesday morning the offensive was continued in bad weather, the attack being directed particularly towards Cambrai, tho great road and rail junction of which the Germans havo mado such use during tho past three years. The southern flank of the advance had been cleared along tho canal, which at Crevecceur, following the channel of I'Escaut, bends sharply to the west for two or three miles to Marcoing. This canal! had been crossed at Masnieres prior to the capture of Marcoing, and tho British now pushed east towards Crevecceur, and north-cast and north of Marcoing, to Noyelles and Cantaing. both villages being captured in spite •of the enemy's desperate resistance. At this stage Cambrai was less than three miles distant, but the maximum advance had been made on a front of little more than two miles, and operations against Cambrai were out of thc question. However, on the left there was an important movement to widen tho salient, the attackers working north to thc edge of the Bouri'on wood, rendering the village of Mamvres untenable. There Sir Douglas Haig's latest communique leaves the position, the fighting being still obviously in progress. Tho push had developed a salient with a base line of twelve or fourteen miles and a maximum depth of more than five miles, and the subsidiary operations had partially cleared the flanks of the whole advance.

The importance of the push cannot be estimated on the present reports, and any discussion of strategic problems would be out of place until the question stated at the opening of these notes is answered. Tho value of Cambrai, one of tho most important of all the enemy's advanced bases, is apparent, and since its capture would mean that the Germans were badly broken the immediate effects of another few miles of an advance would be considerable. At the moment it can be said that the British advance of Tuesday and Wednesday, if it is maintained, will compel an adjustment of

the enemy's front on a width of probably *uvanty-fivo males, because tlie consequent operations will inevitably break down tho enemy's defensive system on tho flanks of the new salient end the effects will be felt as far north as ftceux, on the Scarpe. The British progress on Wednesday was stopped less than three miles from Cambrai, so that tho position must have been full of anxiety for the enemy, and it i> certain that desperate fighting will continue in front of the city, perhaps on a narrow front. This is the moment at which the weight of the attack will bo apparent, and one can only watch tho developments.