NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17592, 24 September 1917, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

In striking contrast to the statements that wore current-in‘America and elsewhere a few months ago is a Purvey of the French military position sent to the American Secretary of Wnr by M. Andre Tardieu, tho head of a French Mission in the United Slates. It was current talk in the United States that France bad been "bled white,’’ that her ability to strike a new blow had disappeared, and that at most, she could only fend off the German thrusts, pending the arrival of a strong American array in Europe. To some extent this pessimistic view seemed to be supported by tho discussions in tho Chamber of Deputies in Paris and by the very frank statements made by tho Minister of War in reply to interpellations /regards ing the April offensive. M. Painlovo’s observations did not bear the construction that was generally put on them, however, because while he admitted that the results obtained in the spring fighting were comparatively small in proportion to tho losses, or, rather, wore loss than had been hoped for, ho certainly did not leave the impression that Franco was at tho end of her resources. The pessimistic view of France’s condition was really given publicity by tho ardent. American advocates of immediate American participation in tho land war. They represented that France needed assistance, and when General Joffro expressed tho hope that the Americans would send men to France and would send them soon the statement was made tho basis of Mil! more gloomy articles on the condition of Franco.

M. Tardieu sets himseif to meet this pessimism. " I brought to your knowledge in a recent talk.” lie writes to Mr Baker, “ the surprise I felt in rending so often in American newspapers some utterly inaccurate information r«-

garding tho military conditions prevailing in Europe, and especially in tho French army.” and he goes on to give figures to “ show Franco as she is, vigorous and powerful, in spite of three years of suffering without precedent in history.” Her strength in men, he says, lias reached its maximum figure this year. “ This figure, which amounts to a little less than threo millions of men, exceeds By over a million the number of men actually in tho war zono at the beginning, and one must add to that figure tho men in the zone of tho interior and in tho colonies. Wo are certain, with the resources of our metropolitan and colonial depots, to be able to maintain that number up to its present level for a long time to como. Our strength in men, by reason of a better command and of better methods of instruction, ha 3 shown since tho beginning of the war constantly decreasing definitive casualties (killed, missing and those taken prisoner). Tho following figures substantiate this:— Battles of Charleroi and of tho Marne,— 5.41 per cent casualties (in proportion to the total mobilised strength). First six months of 1915—2.39 per cent (in proportion to tho total mobilised strength).. Second six months of 1915 1.68 per cent (in proportion to the total mobilised strength). First six months of 1916—1.47 per cent (in proportion to the total mobilised strength). Second six months of 1916—1.28 per cent (in proportion to the total mobilised strength).”

Tho proportion of losses during the first half of 1916 is particularly impressive, because that was the period of tho Battle of Verdun, when France was declared by tho Germans to have sulA fered unprecedented losses in defence of tho fortress. The second half of last 1 ear was the period of the Battle of the Somme and of the reconquest of the important positions north of Verdun. These percentages are made public now for tho first time, and tho Fiench Government, although it has never issued casualty lists, is the first of the belligerent Governments to permit such an analysis of losses to be made public. If the figures appear amazingly small it must bo remembered that they refer to definitive losses only, and do not include the wounded—presumably not even the wounded who havo no chance of returning to tho firing line.

M. Tardieu goes on to discuss other aspects of the subject. Ho indicates the proportions of the western front held by each of the Allied armies. “The western front has an extension of 739 kilometres (462 miles). Twenty-seven kilometres (17 miles) are held by tfie Belgians. One hundred and thirty-eight kilometres (86 miles) are held by the English. Five hundred and seventyfour kilometres (359 miles) are held by the French. Tho French army holds, accordingly, more than two-thirds uf the western front—that is to say, of the front whoro tho enemy lias always directed its chief exertion. Tho German divisions in line on the western front wore, moreover, in June, 1917, distributed as follows: —Forty-two opposite to tho English; nighty-one opposite to the French. A German division holds an average front of 4 kilometres 700 metres; a French division an average front of 5 kilometres 500 metres—that is to say, one-sixth more.” Tho distribution of the enemy divisions varies, of course, and at tho beginning of June there was undoubtedly a special enemy concentration along tho Aisne, but the transfer of reserve divisions from tho Aisne to Flanders does not appreciably alter the general argument.

M. Tardieu speaks next of th© artillery, and here he has again a most impressive story to tell. “Wo were amply furnished with.‘7sV sinco the beginning of tho war,’’ ho says. “ Tho number of these guns was constantly increased ; it is adequate to our needs. As for the heavy artillery, wo had in August, 1914, 300 guns grouped in regiments. In Juno, 1917, we had 6000 of them, mostly modern. During our present offensives we have, on an average, one heavy gun for 26 metros (85ft). If we sum up all tho trench, field, heavy artillery, wo have one gun for 8 metres in tho sector of attack. Our output in munitions was arranged in August, 1914, for 13,000 shots of ‘ 75’s ’ a- day. It is now arranged for 250,000 shots or ‘ 75’s ’ and 100,Ov/ shots of heavy guns. To be equal to this enprmous production invaded Franco did not hesitate, in the midst of war, to create new industries and to bestow on military industries the best of its productive strength. If you consider on another side the weight of the projectiles shot on the Gorman trenches during ono of the last offensives, you will find the following figures for one lineal motre: —Field artillery, 407 kilograms; trench artillery, ‘203 kilograms; heavy artillery, 704 kilograms; high power artillery, 12S kilograms; total, 1442 kilograms. Lastly come figures on the monthly expenditure in ammunition for the 175V:— July, 1916, 6,400,000: September, 1916, 7,000,000; October. 1916, 5,800,000. During the last offensive the expenditure was 12,000,000 shots in all calibres. I might also add that we completely re-equipped and rearmed the Belgian, Serbian and Greek armies. I recall, likewise, that the number of heavy guns given by U 3 to the Allies exceeds 800.”

]'t is as well that this statement was issued. Everyone knew that France had been making a mighty effort, and everyone knew that she had had to bear the brunt of the fighting, but these figures give a new view of the direction and magnitude of her achievements. M. Tardieu adds that on the financial side the French people have made hugo sacrifices ungrudgingly. Their expenditure on the war to the beginning of June of this year amounted to £3,300,000,000. Up to tho begin ning of 1917 France had received six thousand million francs from foreign countries, and had lent to Allied Governments four thousand millions. “If Franco alone, who has only 38,000,000 inhabitants, and whoso richest ami most populated provings are invaded, was by he&sclf capable of such a financial effort, it is becauso of the slrie; discipline which she forced upon th employment of her resources,” M. Tardieu concludes. “This discipline also ia proof of strength. Such is the situation. Severe was the ordeal. Strong© is tho national energy. Now it is a question of striking tho last blow to the adversary. You will help us? But,

the moment when tho American soldiers arrive in France it is proper ulot them know that they will find to receive them a country which, to-day a: well as during the past threo year? hears tho principal exertion of oui dreadful foe; a country which main tains to the maximum of her power, without- hesitation and without weakness. her strength, her means and he wilh”