NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17335, 25 November 1916, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR.

The text of Sir Percy Lake's despatch concerning tho operations of the Indian Expeditionary Force "D" from January 19 to April 30 is now available. A brief reference, was made to it in a cable message last month, but the document is worthy of closer attention, for it reveals the true causes of the failure to relieve Townshend's army at, Kut el Amara, and incidentally it throws a flood of light on the conditions under which the Mesopotamian campaign was carried on. Townshend's advance towards Bagdad, of course, was covered in Sir John Nixon's last dispatch, and Sir John, believing that measures for tho relief of Kut wore very urgently necessary, had ordered General Aylmer to push on at once. As a matter of fact a report came from Townsbend, dated January-25, to the effect that he had supplies for eightyfour days, but by that time tho prospects of a successful early advance by tho relieving force had already been prejudiced by a hasty attack with insufficient forces over land that had been converted by rain into a sea of mud. The general position of affairs on the c -<v- v- j' v„!)r.v >f). says t. l '"

dispatch, was that the bulk of General Aylme'r's force, after heavy fighting, was encamped on tho left bank of tho Tigris above tho Wadi River. Tho advanced troops wore in touch with tho Turks entrenched in their Umm-nl-Hannah position and General Aylmer was actively engaged in reorganising his forces for a further advance with tho least possible delay. Ho fully realised that an immediate advance must involve some deficiencies in his organisation and fighting strength, bnt was influenced by the following factors: (1) General Townshend's reports as to the limit of his food supplies and the influence of food supply questions generally on the operations of tho relieving column; (2) General Townshend's anxiety about the sufficiency of his ammunition supply and tho condition of somo of his troops; (3) tho rapidity with which the Turks might bo able to reinforce the troops opposed In General Townshend and tho desirability of forestalling them.

Sir Percy Lake remarks that tho difficulty experienced in pushing up reinforcemejits, supplies and munitions of war to the front seriously affected the operations. Tho number of steamers available in January for river transport purposes was practically tho same as when in June, 1915, the first advance up the Tigris took place. Additional river craft had from time to time been demanded as augmentations to tho force in Mesopotamia and were decided upon, but owing to the peculiar conditions, which vessels intended for the intricate navigation of the Tigris have to satisfy, the provision of these vessels was a difficult- problem, necessarily entailing long delays, and the supply was never able to keep pace with the requirements of the force. In consequence of this, it was never possible during the period now under report, cither to concentrate at the Tigris front the whole of the forces available in tho country or to equip such forces as could bo concentrated there witih sufficient transport to make thorn mobile and enable them to operate freely at any distance, from the river. It was always necessary, therefore, for general headquarters to balance most carefully the flow of reinforcements and supplies so that, tho former should not outrun the latter;

" After the battle of the Wadi River General Aylmers leading troops had followed tho retreating Turks to the Umm-al-Hannah position and entrenched themselves at tho mouth of tho det'tlo so as to shut the enemy in and limit his power of taking tho offensive," says the dispatch. "The weather at this period was extraordinarily unfavourable. Heavy rains caused the river to come down in flood and overflow its banks, and converted the ground on either bank into a veritable bog. Our bridge across tho Wadi was washed away several times while the boisterous winds greatly interfered with the construction of a bridge across tho Tigris, hero somo 'IOO yards in width. It was essential to establish tho artillery on tho right bank of tho Tigris so as to support, by enfilading fire, the attack of our infantry against tho Hannah, position. Guns and troops .jvere ferried across with difficulty, owing to tho high wind and heavy squalls of rain,, but by tho nineteenth all the troops allotted to the right bank had crossed over and were established in the position front which they were required to co-operate with tho main forco on the left bank." From January 19 to January 22 there was persistent heavy fighting on both banks, tho British being at first successful but afterwards failing because of tho condition of the ground and the fact that the troops had to advanco over level country against strongly entrenched Turks.

Tho effort, ceased, nnd the end of January and tho whole o"f February were occupied in reorganising the units, in improving: tho entrenchments ( and in preparing for a further offensive. Tho Turks, too, spent the time actively improving their defences and constructing new entrenchmeuts behind their original line. It was decided by General Aylmer to attack on the right! bank, with the object of turning the! whole Turkish position. The extreme Turkish right rested on the Dujailar redoubt, fourteen miles south-west of tho British line, and tho attack had to bo made before tho middle of March because by that time the Tigris would bo coming down in flood. Two columns under General Keary and General Kemball were ordered to march bv night so as to open tho attack at dawn, the latter was instructed to deliver the main attack from the south sido while the former supported him. Tho night march was carried out successfully, and when Keary arrived 'iu position he found tho redoubt and tho supporting lines apparently lightly held. But Kemball was not yet ready to attack, and when the moment seemed to have arrived there was a. long and unaccountable delay while tho guns registered and reconnaissances were carried out. The result was that the Turks had time to bring up reinforcements and the British were met b<> a'stovm of well-directed shrapnel that stopped them. They attacked at intervals throughout the day, but faded to make an impression on the Turks, and as the water supply was running short there was nothing for it but a retirement to tho old lines.

On March 12 Sir G. F. Gorringo relieved Sir F. Aylmer. On March lo the Tigris flood arrived, and tor the rest of the month the troops wero really fighting tho inundation. It was not until April 4 that offensive operations could be resumed, and then for eighteen consecutive days Gorringe's three divisious flung themselves with the utmost heroism at the Turkish positions. On April 6 the river was at its highest level, and a strong wind from tho north was forcing the flood waters from the Suwaikieh swamps down on tho British lines. But dams and banks were constructed under fire, and the assaults proceeded. At intervals the troops had to turn from the Turks to the floods, and then again to tho Turks, and they carried several lines of entrenchments, in spite of tho arrival of Turkish reinforcements of men and guns. By April 22, however, Gorringe's men were utterly worn out, and the attacks on both banks had really failed. In view of the now desperate straits of tho Kut garrison, there" was only one chance left, and it was to run the •blockade with a river steamer. The naval forces fitted out the fast Julnar, and on the night of April 24 Lieutenant Firman and Commander Cowley started out on tho forlorn hope. Th-

guns on both banks oponod a tremendous bombardment to cover tho enterprise, but the little steamer was discovered, and about eight miles from Kttt she was held up, both Lieutenant and Commander being killed. The airmen, too, had gallantly assisted, for they had carried no less than eight tons of supplies to tho garrison, but this was only a drop in the bucket, so to speak, and on April 29 the garrison, reduced by starvation and sickness, and with the ammunition stocks about exhausted, surrendered. The sole comment that Sir Percy Lake permits himself in the dispatch is that but for tho terrible weather conditions General Aylmcr would probably havo succeeded in capturing tho Umm-al-Hannah in January, an advanco that would, of course, havo given tho subsequent operations a reasonable prospect of success. The dispatch makes it clear, however, that tho forces at no time had the transport facilities that were really required, and if is not difficult to read' between tho lines the causes of the failure.