NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17286, 29 September 1916, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

Although tho public, rightly, attach importance to the capture of such fortified positions a-s Combles and Thiepval, it has. to be remembered that the possession of is not the question over which the armies are contending, nor can tho results of the Allied offensive bo measured in mere miles of country gained. The questions of immediate importance arc how long the Germans can endure the hammering of their successive lines of defence, how many more divisions they can summon to replace those shattered, and whether their moral stamina will hold good under the 'repeated blows. They have proved a tough enemy, apart from any considerations of their own preparedness and their initial supremacy in tho machinery of war. In sheer tenacity they have proved true to their traditional reputation. But the results of tho last fortnight of fighting suggested strongly that their moral fibre; was weakening, and iu a message published this morning Mr Philip. Gibbs declares that in the last important action their retreat resembled a. rout.

Fresh troops will he brought into the trenches by the enemy to hold the nedr lino of defence, but it- is reasonable to argue that the new lines will bo subjected to the same process of violent and sustained bombardment, and that another two or three divisions will bo shattered. Quito obviously tho process, is one against which the Germans cannot endure indefinitely, and if they were shattered at the rate of only four divisions a week —hy no means an extravagant estimate in view of tho regularity of the “pushes” the collapse of tho resistance would not he far 'When Mbrval and Rancour f were captured, the attack was delivered ou a front of not less than twelve miles, and none of the troops in the enemy’s trenches on that front can well have been fit for further action at the end.

• It is the sum, of the losses inflicted on the enemy, primarily, that determines the period of his resistance, but over and above the physical casualties there are tho psychological effects of tho-long sustained offensive to betaken into consideration. It has already been remarked in this column that so. far ns his western, front is concerned tho enemy is gambling against tho advent of winter. Ho is striving to prevent a serious collapse oi tho armies on the Somme sectors until tbo bad weather sots in, and he hopes that by that time tho pressure in both the main theatres, and especially in the. eastern, will be eased, so that he will be abio to give his attention to the task of repairing tho damage suffered in the west.

The enemy's losses in the Somme fighting have been\ on his own admisaiern, heavier thap those he suffered at Verdun, and yet all competent critics hold that his sacrifices on the Meuse would have been excessive even if he bad attained his objective. It must therefore bo held that the successive defeats which he is now suffering are moro damagiug in both moral and physical results than was the failure at Verdun. The year opened for him with the promise of speedy victory. It reached midsummer with tho definite acknowledgment of costly failure, and it is closing with a series of blows of unparalleled severity.

At Verdun the enemy opened tho offensive with fourteen divisions massed on a front of seven miles, y front held by only throe Frenah territorial divisions. Ho had a concentration, that is to say, of over twenty men to tho yard, and it is not surprising under these conditions that he was able to claim an advance of a mile a day for the first fc*ar days. But as he extended his attacking front and massed constr.nr.ly .tresh divisions, until at length he had three-quarters- of a million men on the banks of the Meuse, his rate of advance steadied. Then, except for isolated positional actions, he ceased to advance at all. His artillery preparations, overwhelming in the initial stages, became less and less effective. There were periods when his supply of shell wns deficient, and tho fine work of the French guns interfered -with tho supply services. It was the end of June before he reached the last line of tho French defences oa a

narrow front—four months occupied in a task that had been scheduled, according to German statements, for four days.

It is interesting to contrast the German effort on the Meuse with the Frattco-British offensive north and south of the Somme. The Allies attacked on a front not of seven miles but of nearly twenty. Stfath of the river tho French rushed from Dompierre to Biaches in a few days, and though the progress north of the river, where the defences were enormously stronger, was lees rapid, it was still appreciable and continuous. Moreover, the Allies achieved their results at a fraction of the cost that the Germans had paid. Their artillery, instead of weakening, grew stronger, aud the weight of shell thrown and the efficiency of the practice improved. Now, at tho end of threo months, tho rate of.-progress is greater than it was north of the- Somme in July.

One knows what the German plan was at. Verdun, because the ultimate objectivo was indicated from the beginning of tho struggle, but the Allied General Staff has kept its own counsel as to tho plan of tho battle of tho Somme. One may infer from the character of the long sti-uggle, however, that tho plan involved no dramatic strokes, that it was evolved purely as part of tho war of attrition, and that ite ultimate success must be measured by tho extent of the losses inflicted on tho enemy. It is as well to keep that principle in mind, because while the possibility of greater successes may be indicated, it is wise to guard against extravagant expectation. . Whatever developments tho future may have in store, the fact is established that the threo months of hard fighting on tho Somme have gravely weakened the enemy’s strength in the western theatre and have imposed a tremendous strain on his morale 1 ; and therefore they have brought the achievement of victory appreciably nearer.