THE TAHURE FIGHTS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17095, 18 February 1916, Page 5

THE TAHURE FIGHTS.

GERMAN FAILURES. AN UNFULFILLED ORDER. Mr H. Warner Allen, the representative of the British Press with tho French Army, writes; — it is scarcely possible to deduce from tho language of the French communiques the extent and! the importance of th.e German counter-attack in Champagne which, was carried out on October 30 and 111. The French troops who repelled it were themselves probably unaware of the full purpose of the German high command. they knew that they iiad been heavily attacked, and they knew equally that nearly everywhere the Germans Had been brought to a standstill, and that in the one place where they had progressed their gains were insignificant. it is interesting, however, to compare tee studiously moderate language oi tlie French communique with a paper captured on a German officer. This document is a copy of the order issued bv Count von richwenn. commanding'the 7th Division, to the troops taking part in tho assault. It is headed with the words: “Secret. Not to be taken to tho advanced lines. None the less., it reached nob only the Reiman front trenches, but also tlie r renen lines, for it was found oil the person of an officer taken prisoner, who jb™ so far forgotten the rules of discipline as to carry it in his pocket when he was leading the assault. Ihe diffe.ence between the German purpose ana achievement can he expressed m a single sentence: the enemy gained loss than one-eighth of what, he had se out to win with a very considerable display of force and the most? carefully prepared plans. In the countei-a-tack the assault was made oil a trout of about five miles, running from lahure Hill on the north to the Lom-tine on the south. Tt was an assault carrier! out along the western line ot tin important German salient which lemair.ed after the French general ofiV»nr«ivo of 25. In the enpturf'd document the enemy’s intentions lire expressed in tlie clearest language. He booed to carry all the I renew, trenches from the extreme western point, of Tab lire Hill up to the Dtux Mamelles.

enemy precaution. The document was accompanied by a map. which was also taken, and on ihi» map n. blue linn marks the points which the Germans hoped to reach. * Thee* •points.” said Count von Schwerin, "must be carried and definitely heal. Roughlv speaking, the German commander intended to capture tho whole of Tnkure Hill, the village ot Failure, Toothbrush Wood and the Deux Mamclles. He actually ousted the French from rather less than onu-half of Failure Mill. ,ii Yen the German High Command hod omitted no precaution tlmt might enable them to win a consideraole success. The front had boon scientifically divided into three sections. Most cateful instruction* bad been given to keep the various units of the attacking force in tho closest communication, and due provision had been made for reinforcements. On this point of the front six infantry regiments, six machine gun companies, and jeven .companies of engineers. without counting reserves, were engaged. The Germans have learnt the lessons of the battles of Nenve Chap-elle. Champagne and Artois. On October 30 the\ hoped to show that their artillery conk* prepare the way for the infantry as effectively as the French and British guns. The orders given to the German gunfiers were. “To engage’ the enemy's guns and destroy completely the positions to he attacked by an intense bombardment ol several hours, carried out by the artillery of the corps immediately before the assault. ’ Elsewhere the German commander says, “Our artillery in great force, and a quite exceptional number of rainemverfer (mine-throwers) will play on the enemy’s lines from eleven o’clock in the morning till four o’clock in the afternoon.”

“AT ANY COST.” If only the weather were fnvourame and the wind blew from the right direction, asphyxiating gas was to b* used. The German infantry wove to advance in five close waves, one behind the other. It was essential' that the whole of Tahure Hill should be carried immediately by a turning movement on tho north and on the west. This objective gained, there was to be no. pause, but the troops wqre to swoop down immediately across the southern slopes to a line marked on the map, and at any cost they were to establish a machine gun battery 1 at. a point of vantage, also marked' on the map. Particular attention was to be givento the assault oil the village. The advance guard was on no account to stop in the village, but to press on until it reached a position indicated on the plan. It was important that tlie roads through the captured village should not be blocked. As a matter of fact, the village was not captured, and consequently the German assault was in no way impeded by disobedience to this particular order. The French troops took charge of blocking the road. A particular brigade was ordered to keep in close touch with the attack on tho village, and to advance with two battalions on the height that the Gormans had christened “ Klitziug.” This Teutonic-sounding name is to bo identified with the hill that forms tho extreme point of Toothbrush M ood. According to the Gorman commander, this height was to be taken by assault, and its capture was to be regarded as the decisive action of the whole attack. “ Once it is in German hands,'’ says the order, “success is certain.” As tho German troops never set their foot there, it is possible that the Gorman commander does not consider that the attack of October 30 was a complete success. The German infantry, as soon as they reached the points that in point of fact they never reached, were to entrench themselves immediately. They Were to be provided with entrenching tools, ammunition, provisions, and the like by an elaborate organisation of convoys. But. as often occurs, n desire outran accomplishment.”

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED. No better instance of the real meaning that lies beneath the carefully guarded and matter-of-fact phraseology of the French official communiques can be given than this quotation, in close proximity to the German order, from the communique of November 1: “ Tlie enemy's bombardment reported yesterday in Champagne developed with the greatest violence. . . This preparation was followed along the whole of the same front by a regular attack, carried out by important masses of infantry.

“Iu spite of the vigour of the attack, and the extreme desperation displayed by the assailants, the enemy once more suffered a serious chock. The waves of the assault, decimated by our lire, oulj succeeded in reaching the summit itself of Taliure Hill. Everywhere else, and especially in front of the village, where the fight, was particularly obstinate, the Germans were completely repulsed, and driven back into the trenches from which they started. They

loft on the battlefield a very large number of dead.’’ The next day the enemy returned to 'the charge, and attempted without result four consecutive assaults, making free use of asphyxiating gas. The following day their attempts were repeated, but still in vain. The Germans, do what they might, could not grain mi inch of ground, apart from the top of Tohure Hill, which was dearly bought and of insignificant value. And their later efforts cost them 500 prisoners, as well as many casualties. Tho Germans have twitted tlio French with failure in the battle of Champagne, because they soy they did not attain their objective of breaking completely through the German lines. In the German counter-attack on Taliuro Hill it seems that the French have fair right to retort, and, indeed, to bring this reproach against the enemy with far better reason. In the light of events it is easy to understand why Count von Schwerin gave such strict injunctions that his orders should not be earned into the forefront of the battle.