RUSSIAN STRENGTH.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVI, Issue 16959, 11 September 1915, Page 10

RUSSIAN STRENGTH.

'[‘ijKitr is an article by Captain A. C. Alford ip. the current Jiumbcv of the

“Nineteenth Century” on “Russia’s Strength and liar Certainty of Ultimate Victory” that ought to make excoliunt reading at this stage of the vat. And in certain broad aspects it dobs' unquestionably present the Russian position in a useful light. For the -reader who can take “ long views,” anti; who can look forward to a war of exhaustion it is, doubtless, a comfort to know that Russia has enormous resources, that she is self-sustaining and that she will ultimately be able to place something like ten million men .in tlio field. But talk of the - kind just new is liable to be very misleading. • Of far more useful character Vi's Mr Robert Mnchray’s article in the June number of the sanlo magazine on The Resiliency of Russia,”' boon us:.- Mr Machrayat least drew his conclusions from the facts of the campaign in the eastern theatre and did not/ prejudice his case with vague generalities. The difficulty experienced by most a liters on the war is that the information they require for the formation of a sound opinion is strictly grinded by the various Governments and they tiro thus driven back on facts that wore available before tlio war. The available resources of Russia in men is a caso in point. Captain Alford gives the strength of the Russian army as thirty-seven army corps, with twenty-seven reserve divisions. At

lowing for tnreo corps and three divisions of reserves retained in the Caucasus, this would give a total force available on tho outbreak of war of about, 1,850,000 men. There have boon many estimates oS tho Russian strength, but lately the critics have c'oine bade to tho view that tlio figure named was approxifhatcly correct and that under two millions were brought nr.to tlio field in tho first few months of tho war. Thero were brought into tvnining, also, some .500,000 ' young men who constituted tho regular annual' contingent of recruits. This factor has been largely overstated in many estimates, but tho position is understood to have been that facilities ■for training nn<l equipping a, larger draft did not exist until tho mobilisation of tho first-lino troops was complete, and that even then the younger men could not bo. equipped at all rapidly because the supplementary reserve, including young men who bad not been called for training in their years, as well as tho veterans, had to bo mobilised. One authority states that no fewer than forty divisions of this supplementary reserve were called to tho colours, but while the skeleton of this organisation undoubtedly existed it could not have ‘been immediately utilised, and, in any case, tlio drafts would fall short of tho nominal SOO,OCO. We may perhaps accept tho estimate, however, that a million and half of men, including tho 1915 draft, were available during the first year of the war for the creation of new formations and to repair the wastage of the campaign. Tho wastage becamo heavy at an early stage, however, and it seems probable that the Germans and Austrians were able to •outstrip tho Russians in now formations, although W-e must remember that 'Austria suffered a* tremendous wastage in the first months of the Galician campaign. 1 However, ' it is certain that the Russians did undertake tho organisation of' fresh corps find- that at various critical stages they wero able to. throw strong reinforcements into tho field with excellent results. Tho recovery on tho East Prussian frontier was one* example, the defeat of the second Gorman advnneo to tho Vistula was another, and tho stand on tlio San was, perhaps, a third. But; tho Russian power to bring new bodies of troops into action lias unquestionably been reduced by the losses since tho beginning of May, and tho question of supremo interest just now is whether the German advance can bo held sufficiently long to enable the latest formations to bo efficiently organised. That General Ruraiky was called on to organise a now army for the defence of the Russian frontier proper was hinted in. semi-official reports in July, but events have marched so quickly that this force may not yet bo available.. Tlio Russian problem is commonly said to ho one of munitions, but it is not improbably one of trained men, also, and tlio task of the Czar’s forces is to delay the enemy until tho reinforcements of men and material are ready or until tho onset of winter gives some relief from tho full violence of tho German attacks. Russia unquestionably has the resources, but what she needs most is time to bring them into the war.