NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVI, Issue 16921, 29 July 1915, Page 9

NOTES ON THE WAR.

ON LAND AND SEA. A correspondent whoso suggestions throughout the war have been exceedingly helpful has written a mild complaint concerning what he terms the pessimistic tone of recent comments in this column. His reference, of course, is to the notes on the Russian situation. Optimism regarding the Russian prospects of immediate recovery is not encouraged by tho recent history of the campaign, and no close reader of the war news would' be surprised now if the Russians were compelled to abandon the Vistula line and to fall back on the true Russian frontier, marked by the Niemen and the Upper Bug. However, the decision in Poland is still to ho made, and in spite of the menace of von Hindenburg's thrust across the Narew it is possible that the enemy's offensive will fail. What the correspondent seeks, however, is not encouragement from the present facts of the war but support for his faith in the ultimate triumph of the Allies. In his own phrase he wants a " long view " of the position. Even Mr Belloc's articles, he says, are too coldly calculating to please him.

Possibly, since the name of one wellknown critic has been mentioned, the correspondent may be satisfied with the views of another of the prominent and helpful commentators on the war news. Colonel F. N. Maude is not an incorrigible optimist, but he certainly does take a- long view, and his comments are 1 a useful corrective to the habit of following the mood of the current messages. Like Mr Belloc, Colonel Maude makes the mathematics of tho war the basis of his estimate of the probable results. He starts with the fact that the Germans have beW wasting men at the rate of more than a quarter of a million a month, and argues that if that rate of wastage can be maintained until the end of this year the enemy's effectives will begin to dwindle away, and the superiority will pass surely and definitely to the side of the Allies.

" The primary condition of success," Colonel Maude says, "was to create such a plan 'of operations that this rate of wastage should be maintained, if not exceeded, and ever since the Allies', under the direction of General Joffre, have been steadily applying pressure upon the German lines to compel the latter to counter-attack under conditions so unfavourable to their purpose that their chances of success in any one operation were so small as to be practically negligible. From this steady aim General Joffre has never once departed, nor lias ho suffered even a temporary reverse; for the essence of it is, not the holding of a particular lino of trench or front, but the infliction on the enemy of loses greater in the ratio of about three to one, and sometimes recently as high as five to one, every time that the latter has essayed a counter-offensive. Of course, this tremendous rate of wastage has not been incurred in the Western theatre alone; the Russians, acting on a system similar in object, though not in details of execution, have been helping very materially indeed to keep it up, aud now that the Italians have joined forces with the Great Alliance, they also will contribute their share—but tho bedrock purpose in all is the same, viz., to compel Germany to produce her last reserves and to destroy them so completely that few will remain to dispute our invasion of German territory when at length tho moment for a combined effort arrives.

" It forms no part of General Joffre's plan to force an issue prematurely; what he designs to do is to draw out in succession the enemy's forces, and oblige them to fight on ground of his own choice .and preparation. The steps , he Ims taken towards such realisation hare been perfectly clear from the first. to tho trained observer, and since they have been openly stated in French of- | ficial publications, there can be no objection to my recapitulating them, particularly since nothing tho Germans can now do could compel him to modify his design. The strength of tho position taken up by the Germans, after their retreat from the Marne, lay essentially in the lines of railways and roads, running approximately parallel to their general front, by which they could rapidly transfer great bodies of troops, guns, and ammunition irom any one point in their long lino to tho support of any other. Owing to the varying nature of the ground these communications traverse, their lines approach the French front more closely at some points than at others, and General Joffre took advantage of those points of approximation to work up by the methods of siege warfare, sap and mine for instance, to such distance* that the railways could be threatened by artillery fire, and consequently, since tho Germans oould not afford to see them destroyed, this threat in- J variably compelled thorn to concentrate and attack, in the hope of beating their I enemy back. Then a fresh series of operations was undertaken at a distant point, which obliged the Germans to rush reinforcements thither and to attaok again to save tho newly threatened communications from the same | imminent danger. Thus tho same German troops were railed back una compelled to attack again and again at. different plaoes, for the staff could never) be certain whether tho danger threatening them w r as only a feint or a definite attempt to break through their line. ! "By the middle of March several such points of pressure had been estab- i lishad, but now the Allies bogaoi to fly at game. Points on the Russian frontier had shown them that the Germans had forced on the training oi their new armies, and it thus became our object to draw these fresh forma- . tiaru away irom the Russians and oon.- ! pel them to attack us. Ncuve Chnpeile, the operations round Hill (50, and aii i subsequent actions were successful ■ s;>eps in this design, for in each cas.C" ■ tho enemy's plans were anticipated, aaid j ho was forced to disseminate instead oi' ■ concentrating his efforts; and, as we | know from the casualty lists, the pun- | ishment inflicted upon him had been i immense, as compared to those we have . ourselves to deplore. Had the Germans not responded to our pressure any one of these latter attacks might, have at once developed into the commencement of the great forward movement, which the troops at the front have been so urgently desiring, and, since no doubt every arrangement was made to , cover this eventuality (to no end, as I it happened, since the opportunity did J not arise), it can easily be understood j how tho feeling of disappointment at

apparent failure, originated in that troops themselves, is now flowing back, ward into this country."

Colonel Maud« believes that this process of wearing down the enemy is succeeding, and that sooner or later the way will be clear for the opening of a general Allied offensive. But just as it is essential for the Allies to prolong the struggle, so it is essential for* the «nemv to obtain an early decision, and that "is whv the tremendous effort has been made in the eastern theatre. What that effort, ha* cost the enemy one cannot even guess, but certainly the price has been one that could only be justified by such a. success as would paralyse the Russian armies for many months to come. Not otherwise can the enemy hope to beat the Allies. And if, in defeating the Russians, the enemy bring their own armies to the point of exhaustion they must still lose. That *s where the stubborn tenacity of the Russians in face of the tremendous' AuYbro-Germnn superiority in guns.and munitions is likely to tell in the long run. The Russians may have to fall back to Brest Litovsk, but in tho meantime thev are inflicting such losses on the eneniv that the German rate of wastage has been increased fair above* the normal. Where the mathematical prophecies are liable to break down is in the estimate of German casualties during the past few months, for nnjt? the commencement of the big offensiv* in Galioia at the beginning of May the German losses may have been a good deal below a quarter of a million a month. .