THE AUCKLAND FURNITURE TRADE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CIX, Issue 13107, 22 April 1903, Page 5

THE AUCKLAND FURNITURE TRADE.

THE CASE BEFORE THE ARBITRATION COURT. [Per Press Association.] AUCKLAND, April 21. The Arbitration Court resumed its sittings with regard to tho furniture, trade dispute to-day, when the cross-examination of Samuel Tyson, Secretary to the Furniture Trade Industrial Union, was proceeded with. In answer to Mr Cotter, witness stated that in conversation with (Mr Garlick at the time the dispute arose, he suggested that' Mr Garlick should take back competent men at the increased -rate under the award, and that incompetent men should go back at their old rates until an adjustment was effected. He intended-that incompetent men should not go back at the old rate unles-s competent men were paid Is 3d per hour. There was nothing in the award about'a committee fixing the rates of pay to- incompetent men, but that was the most commonsense view to take. Mr Campbell asked the. witness if employers must not necessarily suspend employees who were incompetent after the issue of an award, or pay the minimum award. His Honour said that certificates were issued to incompetent men for six months, and did- not expire, notwithstanding a new award having been made. Mr Campbell said that the employers clearly understood that everything in the old award expired when the new award came in. If tbs employers had been aware of what his Honor said, that the wages of men not previously earning tho minimum wage were not immediately to be. raised pending a settlement, not one of the men would have been discharged at all. His Honor: There are two rates, one for competent men and ono for those unable to earn the minimum wage. Tho wage for competent men was raked by the award. It was nob certain from the old-agreement whether the. certificate continued in force, the clause being totally dissimilar to those in the other agreements. Mr Tole pointed out that the charge wan not concerning incompetent men. Several workmen also gave evidence. In closing the ca-se against the employers, Mr Campbell, addressing tb© Court, submitted that the applications did not disclose any breach either of award or of tb© Act. The proceedings, although enforcing a civil claim, were partly criminal, inasmuch. a,s a penalty was asked for. He submitted that there was no foundation in law which made it an offence on the part of a Union of employers to encourage mein;bers, to defeat tihe force of an award, the charge, in short, being that the Union encouraged its members not to pay the minimum. Apart from tho law of arbitrationthc.ro was no obligation on the part of any employer to employ any persons except by virtue of contract- between employer and employee. Ho contended that there was nothing' in tho Arbitration Act which made, it compulsory for any employer • to continue in his. employment any-man, that if an act bo .lawful it could not become unlawful by reason of motive or intent, no matter ,if the motive- were a bad one, and, further, that unless persons inviting others to perform l such act did it for the purpose of-inciting them to do injury- they, were not answerable in any notion for their conduct. Coming to particular cases, it was alleged that tho D.S. Company committed a breach of the award by discharging men, this being a charge of an unlawful act bv reason that it had a particular- and intended effect. That was the substance of the information. -He asked -whether the discharge of , men wa.s legal or illegal, and said thaty upon the answer to that depended the finding of the Court. He submitted that, apart from t'hc Arbitration Art. it could not- be said that there bad been a breach of the. law, raid that an employer could discharge an employee, no matter how malicious the motive might be. His Honor said that in common law there was nothing to prevent an, employer from locking-out all his men, or to prevent men from striking, but he asked if Mr Campbell said that under the New Zealand Act there was nothing to prevent an employer from locking his men out. Mr Campbell said that ho dM not propose to make his argument a hair s breadth wider than was necessary. ;Hls Honor said that if Mr Campbell would rather not express an opinion the Court certainly did nob want him. to. It might be necessary for the Court in. the present case to lay down, the general pro-, needing,- and if they found it necessary it would be their duty to do so. It might certainlv be of .assistance, to the. Court-if the matter were treated by counsel fio-m a general point of view, but ,he did not ask them to do so.

Mr Campbell said that he would do so. Ho contended that an employer’s right to employ or discharge- whom he pleased was not.affected by the New Zealand Arbitration law while a dispute was not pending. If it was contended that the Court had power to declare that an employer should continue to employ workmen during the currency of an award, then he was prepared to dispute absolutely any power of the Court to make any such provision, because it would be fundamentally opposed to British law and tbs rights of an employer, and even if such powers were conferred on the Court by the exact wording of,the statute, he would contend that such power did not exist. No such powers were intended ro bo conveyed by the Legislature. ilr Colter said that the charge did not within its four corners disclose an offence. He'also held that the 1 evidence had not shown that any offence had been committed. In dismissing l , any man tho employers were simply doing what the law entitled them to do. They said to the employees, “We cannot give, you the wages fixed by the Court, therefore we cannot keep you in

our employment.” As to the information against the Employers’ Union,- nothing was done at the meeting to disregard or defeat tbs award. Mr Tyson’s application was enough to stagger any person accustomed to the administration of law. It was practically to declare a certain thing a breach, and -asking the infliction, of a penalty for the prior commission of such breach. This application, so far as it asked for the imposition of a penalty, could not be upheld.