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CURRENT TOPICS.

Now that the negotiations between- the Imperial Gov:s. eminent and the Boer delegates seem likely to result in a speedy and satisfactorjvpeace, it will be interesting to look back for a moment On the previous attempts that have been jnade to pufc an end to the war. While the Boers were victorious there was, of v course, no talk of peace front their side. During the long period of their predominance, from October, 1899, to- February, 1900, we heard only of driving the British / into the sea, and of a South African Republic, in wirich they would have no place or part. When in Berlin in January, 1900, pr Leyds confidently predicted an early realisation of this dream. “I believe that England/’ he said, “ will have to give us back a good part of the territory formerly snatched away from us. The Boers will probably demand the cession of the strip of Coast between Durban and Delaigoa Bay, Vvith the harbours of Lucia and Kosi. The Orange Free State and the Transvaal are to he united and- to form one. State, together frith parts of Natal and the northern- districts of Cape Colony.” This was the Jnodest programme of Mr Kruger’s notorious lieutenant, when his boasts appeared, to some extent, justified by the British 7 disasters at Colenso and Hagersfontein, and the sorry plight of the beleaguered' garrisons of Ladysmith, Kimberley and Maleting. But there come a turn of the tide. The splendid genius of Lord Roberts, the ; heroic resistance of the garrisons, and the magnificent tenacity of the relieving forces changed the whole situation. Then for the first time -the Boers began to realise that : it might bo better to seem - © what they had fvon than- attempt to obtain more, and on Match 5, 1900, Mr Kruger and Mr Steyn sent their famous message to Lord Salisbury, in which, they declared that the war |iad been undertaken solely as a defensive measure, and that they were prepared to tay down their arms on the British Government guaranteeing the “incontestable independence ” of the two Republics, and granting a complete amnesty to British eubjeots—the Cape Colony rebels—who had fought against their Sovereign. “We hesitated to make this proposal earlier,” they •aid, “because we feared that as long as the advantage was always on our side, and pa long as our forces held defensive posi- ' tions far in her Majesty’s colonies, such a proposal might hurt the feelings of honour fcf the British people.” Lord Salisbury returned the only reply thait was possible. After showing -that the Boers were alone Responsible for the war, which they had Commenced in a spirit of wanton aggression, he declared' in unmistakable terms that her Majesty’s Government could not assent to the independence either of -the jßoufch African Republic or of the Orange Eree State. Such was the end of the first negotiations for peace. The war was resumed with more than its former vigour on the part of the British, and soon after Lord Roberts marched' into Pretoria Mr Kruger marched out of the ( • country, leaving his misguided! burghers to shift -for themselves while he kept up some appearance of*authority in a safe retreat in /Europe-, Louis Botha retained 1 command of the Boer forces and employed them as well aa the circumstances would permit, but by the end of another year even- he recognised that the struggle was hopeless, and on Feb. 20,1901, he obtained an interview with Lord Kitchener, who in the meantime had suc- . ceeded Lord! Robert®, and discussed the terms of surrender. The British Commander positively refused to consider the question of independence, but met the Boer General extremely generously in other respects, and ofu March 7, after conferring with Sir Alfred Milner and Mr Chamberlain, submitted the following terms: . 1. That, in consideration of a complete , military surrender, there should bo a complete amnesty for all bona fide acts of war for all burghers of the Republics. In the Case of colonial- rebels, if they returned to their colonies some inquiry must be held bn their conduct. 2. All prisoners to be at once sent back. 3. Crown Colony Government to be given / as soon as possible; this in turn to change to representative Government, as in all other free British possessions. The Courts • tif Law to be independent of the Government. 4. The Dutch and English languages to ' be put upon an equality. 6. That the Government should help to replace the farmers on their farms, to restore their buildings, should pledge itself , tot to specially tax them, and should pay as an act of grace one million pounds to meet the debt incurred by the Republican Governments to their own people during the ■War. 6. That the burghers be allowed sporting §rearms. 7. That the Kaffirs should have the protection of the law”, but should not have the vote. These, terms were far more liberal than the Boers had any right to expect, and if General Botha had been left to himself he would probably have accepted them, but . Mr IKruger and Mr Steyn still held out hopes of retaining the independence of the Republics, and between them managed to persuade the burghers to continue their ■ hopeless and) fatal resistance. Lord Kitchener declined 1 to have anything to do with Sir Kruger, but he gave the Boer leaders in the field facilities for communicating with the fugitive President, and many people believe that this concession was responsible for the failure of the negotiations. That General Botha was over-ruled by men who were not so well acquainted as he was with the true state of affairs is .shown by the fact that, two months later, he sought a renewal of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener. He had previously told the British commander — speaking, no doubt-, at the dictation of his colleagues—that he was not disposed to recommend, his Government to consider any terms that did not make provision for th§ independence of the Republics ; but. on May 10 he asked permission to submit the : condition of the country and the Boer cause to “ State-President Kruger,” by moans of .two messengers be proposed to despatch to Europe. Lord Kitchener replied that ho could deal only with General .Botha, and his superior officers in the field in regard to'the'cessation of hostilities, but that he would forward any telegram that the General wished to forward to Europe. This offer was accepted, and Mr Kruger again urged the brave men he had d'serltd to continue the struggle. He still had great hopes, Jje lold them, of a. Miuf-riid rssiu-

PEACE K.EGOTIATJO'

THU JODDLEBURG CONFERENCE.

EATEB PROPOSALS.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT19020526.2.52

Bibliographic details

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVII, Issue 12819, 26 May 1902, Page 7

Word Count
1,105

CURRENT TOPICS. Lyttelton Times, Volume CVII, Issue 12819, 26 May 1902, Page 7

CURRENT TOPICS. Lyttelton Times, Volume CVII, Issue 12819, 26 May 1902, Page 7

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