The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1893.

Lyttelton Times, Volume LXXX, Issue 10099, 26 July 1893, Page 4

The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1893.

It is difficult to believe that there can be any danger of war between Prance and England. Most men would be inclined to say that such a thing is absolutely impossible. Still the turn of events in Siam is very suggestive. The Preach plan, which has taken many months to develop itself, now stands revealed in all its gigantic proportions. According to the latest cable messages, the French demands of territory amount to not less than 145,000 square miles — 95,000 including a province formerly ceded by Burmah to Siam on condition of being held permanently, and 50,000 in North-east Siam, where the French have never penetrated. Now, the whole area of Siam is only 300,000 square miles, of which 60,000 are in the Malay Peninsula. The Preach demand is therefore for 145,000 miles of territory out of 240,000 of Siam proper; in fact, for more than half the country. This is very startling. The world has long been prepared for a rectification of the Eastern Siamese frontier, by cession to Prance of the narrow strip of country of which the King of Siam has but a nominal hold, lying between the Mekong river and the eastern boundary. In Northeastern Siam the Mekong as it cornea down from the Shan States (Eastern Burmah) makes a wide bend to the westward, before sweeping towards tho Eastern Siamese frontier, enclosing a large country in the northeastern corner. Here are the 50,000 square miles evidently which the French have never approached, and which they now demand. The province ceded by the Burmese is as clearly the country lying between the Mekong and the Salween rivers in Northern Siam, the latter being the western boundary of Siam over against Burmah. The cession of rather more than half of Northern Siam, and the whole of the country east of the Mekong, lying south of the line of bisection, is the new French demand. It is backed by gunboats, troops, artillery and a rabid Press.

Ifc was thought, so long as the French demands were confined, to the lino, of the Mekong, that the French object was simply to get command of the navigation of the river Mekong. The river has a course of 2800 miles, from its sources in the great mountains of Thibet, not far from the sources of the Chinese river the Tang-tse-kiang. Flowing as it does out of the Chinese Fro vines of Yunnan, it has been long regarded as the great outlet for the commerce of Southwestern China. It has consequently always been looked upon as the most promising of the great Asiatic trade routes of the future. But the course of the river was [little known until the explorations of the last ten years, and they have revealed the fact that beyond the fourteenth parallel of north latitude the navigation of the Mekong is impeded by rapids running between inaccessible cliffs, waterfalls and other obstructions, Now, the river comes down from about rue twenty-eighth parallel, utia ior seven degrees before it reaches the fourteenth is in Siamese territory. Naturally one asks, what do the French want with the command of a navigation which extends for no more than a degree of latitude, and brings down nothing from the waters lying in the degrees beyond? Especially does it seem useless when we reflect that the navigable degree lieu close to the rest of the three degrees of navigation which are in French territory. Clearly the navigation is not what the French are aiming it. The command of the river may bo a collateral advantage in the far future, but it will be trammelled with the necessity for making extensive works for surmounting the various obstacles. Neither is the object a mere frontier delimitation, because, as we have seen, a great deal move territory is claimed than is required for such a purpose. The question of what the French want in Biam thus becomes all absorbing. The answer concerns the peace of Europe, and the well-being of many peoples. The disagreeable note which has been sounded is that the attack on Siam is aimed at Great Britain. Its tons is not improved as it reaches us here, with the news that the British China squadron, under Admiral Fremantle, is ordered to Singapore, and is hurrying to that rendezvous as fast as steam can carry the ships along. A German squadron making

haste to get to Bangkok does not give matters a reassuring aspect; neither does the massing of Russian troops on the Austrian frontier. The last is an annual parade of the correspondents who •want to show the readers of their respective journals that they are ahve. But in this ca.se there is something in the other circumstances which makes a difference. Moreover, the Russian move on the Pamirs has been renewed in greater force than ever. Increase of force is, as usual, accompanied by increase of reassuring explanation. With these considerations before us, it is well to examine into the relations between Great Britain and France. The publication of the French Yellow Book the other day has shown us that the irritation felt in France at the continued occupation of Egypt has lately produced a ratber arrogant tone in the French despatches. Lord Dufferin’s retirement for a time, and the reasons for it, we have already noticed in these columns. The behaviour of the French Admiral at Newfoundland reminds us that the great fisheryterritorial dispute is not by any means over. Archibald Forbes we find writing in a late magazine of the serious offence given to Republican France by England permitting the Prince Imperial to take part in the Zulu campaign. The difficulty in getting anyone to succeed M. Waddington as French Ambassador at London is well known, and for some months was very perplexing. It is an open secret, moreover, that our annexation of Upper Burmah and deposition of King Theebaw displeased the French, mainly because the deposed monarch had promised them the command of the upper waters of the great river Irrawady. It is clear that the relations between the two countries are not what they were in the days of the entente cordiale, when the French and British armies besieged Sebastopol. Of itself the condition need not be immediately dangerous. Obviously it is not anything like so strained as the relations which have subsisted between France and Germany for the last twenty-three years. But there is something worsebehind—the political confusion in Peris. In the Republican capital there is political chaos, which renders the leaders on all sides ready to escape from domestic complication by means of foreign broils. Such a "thing as war between two such great nations seems an absurdity. But the hurrying of the ships, the tone of the French Government and Press, and the reticence of the Cabinet of St James, all point to a situation serious enough to cause disquietude; to a situation we should all like to see ended quickly as well as peaceably. -