Untitled

Lyttelton Times, Volume LI, Issue 5609, 15 February 1879, Page 4

The disaster in the Zulu country h evidently more serious than appears on the face of the account. When a Cabinet Minister finds it necessary to take the earliest opportunity publicly to deplore the defeat of a body of British troops, the inference is that something very untoward has occurred. The inference is strengthened by the very large scale of the preparations made for reinforcing the general in command at the seat of war, and the haste with which these have been pushed on. The fact that it has been deemed necessary at the War Office to despatch at once from England five large swift steamers full of troops, and to order 12,000 men to proceed immediately from Bombay and the Mauritius to the seat of war, shows that the authorities have been very much out in their calculations as to the extent of the force necessary to cope with the Zulu King. Moreover, there is a panic at Natal, which is believed to be in great danger. All this seems too great an effect for the ostensible cause. That cause is the destruction of 500 men and 30 officers of a single regiment. As Lord Chelmsford had by the end of December 1-5,#) men including Native troops under h;s orders, the loss of 500 men ought no: to have made the difference there is between certainty of victory and grave anticipations of defeat. But the fact is that the loss of 500 men has made the tone of the local commander? absolutely despondent, and that to supply the place of 500 men, forces amounting in the aggregate to liM'h) at least are despatched from Croat Britain, India, and the Mauritius.

The accounts of the disaster which have reached us lead to the belief that a regiment was decoyed into an ambusii of overwhelming numbers and perished. And the consequent proceedings of the authorities lead to the belief that there is something more. What that additional cause for alarm is vre are lett to conjecture. It can only be one thing viz., that the local commanders hau' found out that the enemy understand: the art of fighting in a manner hitherto unknown in South African wavtare. The Kaffirs during the six prior to the year 1857, in ff hie British troops were engaged wit them gave great proof of toughness of mettle, and in the war on y ended a few months ago they themselves by no means a despicao < enemy. Defeats of British troops an by no means uncommon in the history? the most memorable series of disasuu having occurred in the year 1850. this occasion the campaign under Harry Smith began in much the sann manner as the present one. corps was sent to capture p 1 chief Saudili, but being caught lD ‘ defile by a vast body of Kaffirs had retreat after suffering heavy J l --; Another body of troops was soon -> /■ out off to a man. The Kaffirs * these successes swarmed over the u tier, massacring settlers, burning 0 steads and villages, and £ na Harry Smith found himself S “ u j and cut off in Fort Cox. After ~ unsuccessful attempts had k een ' , to relieve him, the General manage cut his way out through aln a'? When once more at the head of an * he found himself in presence of ua tremely formidable Kaffir r^ slU |’ lU j which most of the tribes with which he was engaged ' v y till the end of his GovernorshipGeorge Cathcart, who succee c the spent rather more than a } u work of subjugation. ~ ~T e Toi' In this and the other walS ’ col tb the Zulus, inhabiting the cotm Jp# of Natal, the most warlike oi races, took no part agams

, they even I oxl onC , the British side. The reason I they were commanded by I ffa s that J cmarkab i o man who I the lU f , eare d in South Africa. I iad c like Bunjeet Singh m V Chata - Indiaj ba a founded a I 01 ' th '!ntive power; like him had S reat , ‘, liu l disciplined a large army, him irresistible to all hw * ihZs Of kindred race ; and like f animated bysentiments of prohim , ‘ for the British arms. It which in both leaders was Tided on a knowledge superior to that foU T- d fl>llow . But the time came I°s ‘fib/ power which Bunjeet left beTl bin/ became dangerous. The Sdsb after conquering alll that was B fWonoucat had shut m this power, "T illy 1 had to cope with it, and Iter a 'severe struggle succeeded in 3tu ‘.‘ a similar occasion f“ Ifisen ’in South Africa. A “f t Vvfewayo, rules the Zulus, who *» rostiaitiiid.ftatl Tilirs tbe chief is likewise turbulent. Proud of their numbers, organisation, ims and warlike spirit, they have long SSfcd at the progress of British con* t i n regions which they had marked I their own. The collision, so long inevitable. has at last taken place, and the British are now in South Africa as they were in in India, engaged in a struggle with the most formidable race ther hare yet met in the conquest of the country. In the opening of the campaign they cannot have seen very much of the enemy, but what they have Been has apparently convinced the commanders that the Zulus are too brave f efficient to be reduced with the forces at their disposal. This is, apparently, the only explanation of the large scale of preparation so suddenly entered upon by the War Office. If this surmise be correct, then it is plain that a very severe crisis has occurred in South Africa. The British Power has met what is for the time its match, and subject discontented races are watching the issue. The supreme question for the Colony of Natal, and perhaps South Africa generally, is whether the troops engaged will be able to hold out until the arrival of the reinforcements, now using every effort of steam to lessen their distance, enables them to turn the scale.