The Lyttelton Times. FRIDAY, JAN. 3, 1879.

Lyttelton Times, Volume LI, Issue 5574, 3 January 1879, Page 2

The Lyttelton Times. FRIDAY, JAN. 3, 1879.

The submission of Takoob Khan can* not be regarded as tbe end of the Afghan difllcnlty. The war was under* taken with a twofold object, riz., to punish the Ameer, Shere Ali, for bis insult to the British dag, and to keep British influence paramount at Cabal. A third object was also spoken of, as necessary to the other .two,' riz., the rectification of the Cabnlee frontier. Tbe submission, of Yakoob Klmu shows that only the first and simplest portion of ibis threefold design has bean accomplished- Nobody erer doubted that the resources ol the Anglo* Government were, under proper direction, quite sufficient to beat down tbe resistance of tbe Ameer.

=frw! 1 h %y_/ ■== ’After consid|rabl«||aclay tho AngloIndian trooiljbaMkd into the doilies of tho Khipir fimjtho Koorum, and stormAl the Afgl&l’a strong places. Routed and disorganised, tho troops of tho enemy refused to faco again tho terrible arms and superior tactics of tho invader. As usual in that distracted country, the defection of tho troops was tho signal for tho downfall of the ruler. Shcro Ali fled, like his'father before him,-to the Turkomans, and his son Tokoob, mounting tho throne, hastened to make peace with tho yic* torious enemy. Tho first object of the campaign being accomplished the others will in appearance bo equally oasily attained. Probably Yakoob will agree to anything and everything that may be demanded of him. The Russian envoy will perhaps bo sent back to tho headquarters of General Kaufmann, an English Resident will be scat to fill his place in the Ameer’s affection, and tho frontier may bo rectified by what willhe made to appear a# mutual agreement. All this can be done, but the question is bow long will the new order of things last P As long ns tho British troops remain in force in tho conquered positions there is a guarantee for the continuance of Afghan sincerity. As soon as the main ariny retires the opportunity will come for the deluge of revived Afghan lam. This la the real difficulty of dealing] with the Afghan question.

A glsnoe at the history of the losti Afghan way will do much to the peculiarity of the present situation. Jealousy of Russian influence caused the expedition of 1839; Sir Alexander Bnraes having been despatched, to Cabnl found a Russian envoy, a Captain Vioovich, installed at the capital of Dost Mahomed. His object was to induce the Ameer to make no alliance with any Power but Great Britain, but the terms authorised by Lord Auckland not suiting the Dost, Burnea returned to India without obtaining any result. The Indian Government shortly after made war upon Dost Mahomed in pursuance of the terms of what was known at the time as the Tripartite treaty. The parties were the tudiau Gavommcut, Btmjoet Singh, tho “old lion of tho Punjaub,” and Shah Shoo jab, who had been twice ousted from tho Cabulee throne. Tho object was the restoration of Shah Shodjah on certain conditions favourable to the designs of the other signatories. That of the Indian Government was as now to make “ British influence paramount at Cabul,” and Shah Shpojah was to be the obedient instrument for effecting that purpose. The army of the Indus was formed, a special Hindoostanee force raised for Shah Shoojah and the campaign commenced. Runjeet seems to have done very little after tbia point, and his name drops somewhat singolarly out of the record of events. Sir John Keane took the British army into Afghanistan, through the Bolan Pass. The difficulties of the march on Quettah were enormous, but no enemy appeared, and in a few weeks Oandahar was occupied, Ghuzuee was captured by storm, Cabul had fallen, Dost Mahomed was a fugitive, and Shah Shoojah was declared to be firmly seated on the throne of his ancestors. There was great rejoicing throughout the Indian Empire, rewards were distributed amongst the commanders, the Afghan difficulty was declared to be at an end, Dost Mahomed surrendered, and was sent a prisoner to India, and the main body or the troops was withdrawn from Afghanistan. Garrisons remained at Oandahar, Ghuzuee, and Cabul, and] several smaller places. Sir 'William M'Naghten pi*epared to cede the post of Resident to Sir Alexander Barnes, and Sir John Keane went off leaving the superannuated Elphinstone in command. It soon became apparent that the real difficulties had only began. The fierce Afghans rose against the new ruler, who they said bad defiled their country with his Feringhces and Hindostanees, and whose new Government was not properly checked by his bewildered allies. Gradually the British garrisons were reduced to the ground they occupied. The smaller ones were cut off, and at last came the great Oabnl disaster of 1842. Shah Shoojah was of course murdered, and General Noti, at Oandahar, and General Sale at Jellalabad both hard beset, were' the sole remaining representatives of British conquest. . Pollock soon advanced from Peshawur, and, relieving Sale, marched on, Cabal, and Nott, fighting his way orit ’bf Oandahar,: speedily joined him there. ' After setting- up another poppet king they left him to his own devices and marched out of the country. He was murdered in tfis turn, and the Afghan question returno& to its original position. Dost 1 Mahomed established himself tranquilly at Cabul, sent a force to join the Sikhs against ns in the second Sikh war, and died, full of honours and undisturbed by red-coats, in 1863, leaving the succession to Shere AH. The moral of this history is that vie-: tbty is nothing in the settlement of the Afghan difficulty. The problem to be. solved I lß * been hitherto to dominate the Ameer without annexing his . conn-! try. As the country is not worth annexing for its own sake, the question: is whether for strogetic purposes it is worth while to conquer it. The price to be paid for permanent conquest would bo enormous, for nothing short of a large .army, most expensive to feed fkriA maintain is military efficiency would bq fPpjflgftit to hold it. There has hot’ been hitherto any talk of conquest; on the contrary the purposed rectification of the frontier argtms a design to establish a chain'of strong garrisons within easy reach of a British Resifopt at Cabal, who, if* left without support of this kind, must necessarily bo powerless. Under these conditions the Afghan problem which the Anglo-Indian Government has to face, may be easier than the problem of 1839-42. It mhst be borne in mind at the same tune that the difficulties, though hot so great, are similar to those which caused the collapse of the former expedition. By a rectification of the frontier wo should not occupy so much of the coimtiy os. we. did then, but we should occupy some of it, and any occupation is galling to tbo Afghan mind. Wo have not placed anybofiyon the throne, bet Yakoob would never lave oVitaiiHMl it but for ibo Victoria** of the British ooxmon over bU father** troop*. These are fertile cause* of disquiet, and Bhcrc Ali. who roam* at largo, i« too bid u conspirator not to make capital out of them. There is beside* the unseen ghost of Russian influence, which will have a fine field in Cabul,

and ttjoA of Brite' quwroauwy all Oafcd. clear th« tttacr • tho most .fftvoijtiible condition# t|w:Afghan probUmj is diffli cult.''' Tho, Sftei and least Important not of tlio tffutua ends with the'submission of Yakoob. The Empire is anxious to know what is to bo played during tb« remainder of the piece.