The Lyttelton Times WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1872.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 3636, 11 September 1872, Page 2

The Lyttelton Times WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1872.

The various and varying reasons brought forward by those who advocate the formation of a Coalition Ministry, tftfcan in conjunction with some of the speeches made during the debate and the attitude assumed throughout by the leading men among the majority, are calculated both to puzzle and amuse those who watch the course of events at Wellington. In the first Slace, we are told that the result of the ivision clearly proves the existence of a wide-spread and well-founded dissatisfaction with the administration of the late Government. As a pendent to this, it is admitted, almost in the same breath, that neither side is so strong as to command a working majority in the House. Both statements cannot be true, and we submit that the first is clearly inadmissible, v Tho plain fact is—and it cannot be too often insisted upon—that Mr Stafford was enabled to carry his resolutions by the votes of the IT ul tra-Provinoialists, to whom he held out the bait of local administration. It was by coalescing with these men, and because the late Government bad refused to comply With the monstrous demands preferred by. the Superintendent of Wellington, that he obtained a majority so narrow and uncertain as virtually to make bis temporary success a defeat. We have already shown what are the component parts nf Mr Stafford’s following, and we have pointed out on what terms he is to be allowed to govern. In reality, it was the authors of the Superintendents’ resolution who ousted the Government, and the grounds of their opposition have been rally-explained. Mr Stafford is completely at their mercy, and, as the Superintendent of Wellington tersely •nd plainly put it, he wul share the late of his predecessors unless be gives them all they ask for. He is, so to apeaii, their nominee for the Prehaeeranip. aud he mil retain office just eo longa* he continues id be their very obedient servant. His bona fide supporters know this well enough, and as their views are fundamentally opposed to, those held by the Ultras; as, in Point of fact, they agrde with the late government and those who voted with them regarding the relations of the General and Provincial Governments ip (he administration of public works —4hey propose a coalition with the view of freeing their leader from the bonds in which he has bound himself. This means, when stripped of all -verbiage, that the minority of thirty•even consent to use their power in order that Mr Stafford may feign instead of Mr Pox. Mr Stafford is clearly in a false as ( |rell fa a weak position. If we are to take his past career as a guide in . deIfmjniTig his leading political, prin- ' espies, he has nothing in common with the men who have placed him inj ’ power. His aim has always been, to weaken the powers of Provincial Governments and reduce them to the . 'level of aunicipalities. But bis new allies aim at nothing, lea* than the c«opßolidation and extonaionof Provincial powers, and the perpetuation ef local institutions on their present Beale. Every speech made by the Ultra-Provinoialists during the debate proves this, and it follows that oppoafltg pnnciples such as we bare indigested cannot be brought into harmony. Either Mr Stafford most forswear his „ pojiticalereed and bolster up acrumb- . ling edifice, or be must go to the wall. The house over which he nominally , presides is divided against itself, and l lt canhot stand. A contemporary to whom he has been ah object of devout but frequently indiscreet admiration, admits this. Though, it observes, Mr pr otafford has a majority, “it by no u means follows that he will be ~" m able to form a Government acceptable both to the House and

** the country.” This significant adn? mission, which is of course a com•T|iifcl|ory one, is followed by the usual guggestions about a coalition with - Mr ■; Yogel and Mr M‘Lean. The former is bespattered with praise in a way ‘ ; which has been customary of late with those who* a fow months ago, were doing their utmost to blacken his ' character, socially as well as politically. They are now ready to receive him into the bosom of their small family, because he can bring with him the

strength and power they so much lack and covet. And, because they cannot help sharing the general apprehension of farther Native troubles, consequent upon Mr M‘Lean’s retirement from office, they hope that the StaffordYogel coalition so ardently longed for would be able to “ retain his services,” which is an exceedingly flattering way of putting it. With what consistency can men—like Mr Eolleston, for instance —who, while admitting the ability, zeal, and honesty of purpose of the late Treasurer, still declare that he

is the embodiment of all that is reckless and mischievous in finance, ask him to come over and help them? They may tell us, in reply, that when Mr Yogel allies himself with Mr Stafford the latter will keep him within bounds and supply the curb which his brilliant imagination and great powers of combination require in order to make them serviceable to the country. If Mr Vogel is as honest of purpose as his opponents now admit, and as we have all along believed, it follows that the principles both of policy and administration by which he has been guided are honestly held, and that he cannot recede from them without laying himself open to a charge of something like political dishonesty. A coalition necessarily implies concession, and Mr Yogel cannot safely, either by implication or actual fact, concede a jot of the position he has all along taken up. It has been repeatedly said, by Mr Stafford more than by any other person, that Mr Vogel’s was the dominant 'mind of the Cabinet, and this has been urged as a reason why the late Government did not deserve the confidence of the country. What is the inference? Why, that Mr Yogel, if he joined .Mr Stafford, must submit to be guided by a superior intelligence and a stronger mind. But, setting aside all such speculations as in themselves of comparatively little importance, the question remains—is a coalition desirable in the interests of the country ? We submit, as we have done before, that it is not, and that the minority who voted with the late Government represent the real opinions, wishes, and hopes of a majority of the people. It may ultimately turn out that a coalition is unavoidable, in order that the business of the country may be carried on, and the dangerous demands of the UltraFrovincialists decisively rejected, but it seems to us impossible that Mr Yogel can sacrifice both his self-respect and his principles by accepting the yoke of the Superintendents, and agreeing to hold office at the will and pleasure of Mr Fitzherbert and Mr Bunny. The only coalition that could be advantageous to the country—and the course of events may presdntly bring it round—would be a coalition of the Colonial party, as it is called, with the minority who now form the Opposition, on the distinct understanding that the Ultra-Provin-cialist programme is entirely and utterly inadmissible in any degree or shape. This would be a distinct, an intelligible, and a cohesive platform, and one from which good results might fairly be expected. But, looking at all the circumstances surrounding the political situation, without prejudice and only in its relation to the public welfare, we dp sot hesitate to say that a coalition would be dangerous until the conditions. we , have indicated . are frankly accepted. Collectively the new Ministry is essentially and inherently weak, though it is individually strong, and it will not command the confidence either of the House or the country. The Ultra-Provincial element is simply rampant in the ranks of Mr Stafford’s team, and the coach must speedily come to grief.