Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR THIS TEAR.

The Spectator is of opinion that the real danger of war in Europe, and it believes the danger very real, arises from the character, the history, and the position of M. Thiers, and not from any policy of the German leaders. There is, it is true, reason to believe that the military party in Berlin doubts whether France is yet sufficiently beaten, expects another war, and is more than half-inclined to embrace any pretext for making it a speedy one, and the Catholic party throughout Europe also expects, or possibly desires, an early renewal of the contest. Nevertheless, Germany is governed by statesmen, and it is nearly impossible to believe that statesmen should provoke another war, should wilfully encounter its enormous risks, should destroy at a blow the rising and splendid prosperity of their country. But (the Spectator says) our confidence in the preservation of peace diminishes as we study the policy of M. Thiers. That eminent personage, amidst many chahges of attitude, and some few changes of political conviction,

has throughout hit) career displayed one dominant quality, which may be described by nw friends is courage, and by his enemies as conceit, and is probably compounded of both, but which always tempts men to transmute opinion into action. He is known to believe that the result of the last war was due to mismanagement, that France under good guidance must necessarily be good. He has therefore directed hie efforts from the first to the reinvigoration of the army on such a system that success should come speedily, in time for him to employ the weapon he bad forged. And it must not be forgotten that M. Thiers, however much he may be distrusted by foreigners, must seem to himself and to his countrymen to have some ground for his self-confidence. When a man naturally buoyant has succeeded so well, it is natural that be should think greater success still possible. Add that M. Thiers is now, as ever, patriot, that Sedan probably i<ti pressed him with more humiliation than it impressed the Emperor, that the loss of the provinces is to him a personal grief, and the .decay in the position of France a personal wrong, we shall see a man not unlikely to be carried away by an enthusiasm for the revindication of his country.

The Saturday Review thinks that, however much France may wish to embark on a war of revenge, the time for it cannot be very near. No doubt M. Thiers may in twelve months have a very respectable army, and it is just possible, although it is not very likely, that he will in twelve mouths have got the Germans out of France. At the end of a year the Government would have to begin its serious preparations for war with Germany by fortifying itself on its eastern frontier. M. Thiers has always dwelt strongly on the necessity of this, and has sedulously discouraged the notion that France could venture to attack Germany while it Jay perfectly open to a counter attack. Ho has repeatedly spoken of the absolute necessity of making new fortifications at Paris, and of fortifying the frontier. He will also have to organise an army of reserve, and this costs much time and patience. Lastly, he will have to get a little money to go to war with. France, in short, cannot help having much time and occasion to reflect before she really commits herself to the war of revenge which it is so easy to talk of. No sensible Frenchman can fail to see that it will be difficult to make much out of a war of revenge, even if it is undertaken. Germany is taking every possible precaution. She will be made richer by ail the money France pays her, by the stimulus given to industry aud adventure, and by the influence of h liberal commercial policy; while France, during the interval of preparation, will be feeling the pressure of new and heavy taxation, and will be cramped by a policy of protection. The more it is looked into, the more it will be seen by the French that a war of revenge is not a thing to be quickly or lightly taken up ; and though this does not at all show that the French will not run the risk, it shows that they cannot act at once, and if time is gained, the wish for a war with Germany may possibly die away. The Economist admits that there is a dexterity in menacing France through the voice of the Daily Telegraph which would be quite worthy of Prince Bismark’s resource, but it does not think the war is about to be resumed. German commerce was never so active, and the people never so anxious to enjoy the full tide of prosperity as they are uow. Neither Metz nor Strasbourg is yet iu such a condition as Germany would choose them to be in before hurrying on a new war with France; and the landwehr are hardly yet recruited from] the toils and loss of their severe recent exertions. Finally, no one cares more for securing a strong moral position in Europe than Prince Bismark, and therefore he would be the last to give France any excuse for saying that he himself had been the real renewer of the struggle. We may be quite sure of one thing—that whatever Prince Bismark may do, if he really does detect France in the attempt to spring, he will be very careful indeed to publish the attempt to the whole world before he strikes in reply. The question therefore is, not whether Germany is prepared to make vainglorious words into an excuse for the renewal of the war; but whether in M. Thiers’ mouth these vainglorious words about the reconstruction of the army and its state of efficiency and discipline were meant to sound* the note of attack. We have, the Economist says, no reliance at all on M. Thiers’ pacific professions, or on his resignation to the sad destiny imposed on his country. But we do feel sure that the time is yet too soon for any hope of success; that it is even too soon to inspire M. Thiers with any such hope; and that if it had been otherwise he would not have proclaimed his purpose to friends and enemies alike just on the eve of a recess, but would have husbanded his resources, and attempted at least to strike without warning. The fright is premature. We shall not hear of any imprudence either at Versailles or Berlin at present.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT18720627.2.17

Bibliographic details

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 3570, 27 June 1872, Page 3

Word Count
1,108

THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR THIS TEAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 3570, 27 June 1872, Page 3

THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR THIS TEAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 3570, 27 June 1872, Page 3

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert