The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1868.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 2341, 24 June 1868, Page 2

The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1868.

The constitutional struggle in Victoria, which has lasted for upwards of two years, aud which, at the date of our latest advices, appeared to be as far from a satisfactory solution as ever, possesses many features of interest to New Zealand colonists. That a similar contest in this colony is not improbable will be apparent when the existing state of the law with regard to Parliamentary privileges is clearly stated. During last session of the General Assembly an attempt was made to amend the law, and to set the question at rest for ever. But the Bill by which it was proposed to effoct this very desirable object originated in the House of Eepresentatives, and the members of the Legislative Council, when it came before them in due course, availed themselves of this circumstance to shelve it for the time. It was clearly understood, however, that the whole question would be fully discussed, and, if possible, finally determined when the Assembly again met. In the seision ef 1866, the Legislative Council passed an amendment on the Goldfields Act, raising the price of miners rights from ten shillings to one pound. When the amendment was sent down to the House of Eepresentatives, it was at once objected to on the ground that all money Bills, or Bills involving new imposts, ought to originate with the lower branch of the Legislature. A conference between the Houses took place, and it was then discovered, to the great surprise of both, that the Legislative Council had absolutely been endowed with the same powers and privileges, in regard to money Bills, as the House of Representatives. The " Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865 " enacted that "the Legislative Council " or House of Eepresentatives of New " Zealand respectively shall hold enjoy " and exercise such and the likeimmu- " nitiea and powers as on the first day " of January one thousand eight hun- " dred and sixty-five were held enjoyed "and exercised by the Commons " House of Parliament of Great Britain " and Ireland and by the Committees " and members thereof so far as the " same are not inconsistent with or " repugnant to such and so many of " the sections and provisions of the " said Constitutiou Act as at the time " of the coming into operation of this " Act are unrepealed." This clause was drafted from a similar Act in force in Victoria, but the difference between the Constitution Acts of the two colonies was overlooked. The Victorian Constitution Act provides that" Bills for appropriating any part " of the revenue, and for imposing any " duty, rate, tax, rent, return, or irn- " post, shall originate in the Legis- " lative Assembly (or Lower House), " and may be rejected but not altered "by the Legislative Council (or " Upper House)." The New Zealand i Constitution Act contains no such restriction, and when the Upper House was endowed with the same privileges as the Lower, except such as were repugnant to the Constitution Act, a j very grave error was committed—an error which, if not rectified on a distinct basis, can hardly fail to be productive of great evil. The difference between the Constitution Acts of Victoria and New Zealand is accounted for by the fact that the Upper House of the former is an elective, while that of the latter is a nominee body. As the law stands, it is at least doubtful whether the Legislative Council has power to deal with money Bills in any shape or form, beyond assenting to or rejecting them. The fifty-fourth clause of the Constitution Act declares that the General Assembly has no power to make appropriations of revenue, or to pass Acts in which any provision for dealing with the revenue is contained, unless the Governor shall have first recommended such Acts to the House of Eepresentatives. Thus, it would appear that all money Bills must at least originate in the Lower House. But, by the Privileges Act, quoted above, the Upper House enjoys the same "powers" as the Lower, and this ambiguous phrase admits an interpretation which, to say the least, give rise to injurious conflict. When the subject was discussed in the House of Eepresentatives, the general opinion seemed to

be that the Privileges Act 1865, in so far as it created a doubt, ought to be amended. It was also evident, from the remarks made by the more promiuent members, that any attempt on the part of the Legislative Council to insist on the privilege of dealing with money Bilk would be stoutly resisted; And this is undoubtedly the only safe position in which the question can be placed. The framers of the Constitution Act, accustomed to the harmonious working of the British Legislature, in which the Lords never dream of trenching on the exclusive right of the Commons to deal with all money questions, could hardly have intended to confer such a privilege on the Upper branch of the New Zealand Parliament. They evidently recognised in it, so far as such resemblance is possible, an exact counterpart of the House of Lords, and when they enacted that money Bills should first be recommended by the Governor to the House of Eepresentatires, they clearly implied that the Legislative" Council had no power to originate, alter, or amend i such Bills. "Were the members of the Legislative Council elected, the case would be very different. As it is, the bare possibility of their possessing a right to interfere in matters affecting the revenue ought to be placed beyond a doubt. Judging from the discussion in the Legislative Council during last session, when the bill for amending the " Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865 " was brought up, the members are fully aware of the advantages they possess, and not at all inclined to yield them without an equivalent. Major Richardson, referring to the caße of the Goldfields Act as amended by the Upper House, expressed an opinion to the effect that the Legislative Council was clearly in the right when it insisted on being allowed to deal with a Bill imposing additional taxation. Colonel Kenny, appealing to the Constitution Act, asserted that the Legislative Council possesses certain restricted powers in reference to money Bills; and another member, relying on the analogy between the Legislative Council and the English House of Lords, pointed out that the latter had never surrendered or in any way yielded up their powers in the matter of money Bills, save only the power of originating them. Mr Mautell was even more emphatic in maintaining the position of the Upper House. Assuming that they possessed certain powers and privileges in regard to money Bills, he held it to be the distinct duty of the Council to retain this power, especially when the democratic tendency of the Colonial Legislature was considered. If the power were used, he added, it would undoubtedly produce a complete convulsion, and nothing but a very extreme case could justify its exercise. Still, the necesity might arise, and he considered it desirable to retain the power. Prom what has been said, there can be no doubt that the Houbb of Representatives, while denying the right of the Legislative Council to deal with money Bills, except to agree to or reject them, is fully aware of the doubtful position in which the law has left the ques-' tion. On the other hand, the Legislative Council, fully convinced that it possesses certain powers and privileges ia dealing with Bills of this nature, is evidently not inclined to give way without a struggle. The subject is of the gravest importance, and involves considerations which, for the welfare of the colony, it is necessary to handle with the utmost care. It would be well, with a view to an amicable aud distinct arrangement, to appoint a committee from members of both Houses. Such committee would ascertain clearly the position of the question, and collect the evidence by which it might be finally settled.