THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXI, Issue 1185, 19 January 1864, Page 2

THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

The ' Times' correspondent, writing f roi Now York on October Gth, upon the failure of the last _ draught to prod U( .,', soldiers, says that "it is not only the want 0 f soldiers, but of sailors that begins to em', barrass the Executive. _ Notwithstanding a |j the vaunts that are daily made of the i n . do mi table navy of the'North,which with it," resistless iron-clads and Monitors is, in of a war with Great Britain, to sweep the ocean of every ship that carries a hostil e flag, the Administration has tlie greatest difficulty in procuring seamen in sufficient numbers to send even a moderate fleet to sea. Perhaps, in case of actual war with any European power, and especially Great Britain, that which is now but a dilii. culty might grow into an impossibility, Ireland and Germany have offered immense numbers of volunteers and substitutes, ami some few conscripts, to the army; but these resources would fail the Federal Government in a naval war. Neither the Irish nor the Germans make good sailors, or take ho naturally to a maritime as to a military ]jf e and the naval force of the United States i* either composed of native-born Americans, or of Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Norwegians. In what proportion the foreign stands to the native element is not clearly known; though it is surmised by those who, from their position and opportunities, ought to know, that less than one-half of the ablebodied seamen on board American merchantmen or ships of war are natives and citizens of the country. As Englishmen and Scotch, men do not entertain that theological hatred against the British G-overnment which animates the Irish Roman Catholics, and have been mainly induced to enter the Federal service by the high wages offered, it ig probable that in case of a war with Great Britain the patriotism of these men would prove greater than their cupidity, and that the Americans would be left to fight their own sea-battles with such small aid as the Scandinavians might afford. However this may be, the present need of sailors to man the fleet is urgent; and the Federal Government is seriously incommoded in the efforts which it would gladly make, if it could, to capture the Floridas and Alabamas, which so disturb the equanimity of the mercantile community. It having been represented to the Naval Department that considerable numbers of willing recruits for the navy could be procured among the Cape cod fishermen if proper inducements were held out to them at the close of the fishing season, the frigate Sabine, under the command of Commodore

Einggold, was despatched to the coast, and

arrived at Provincetown, Massachusetts, on the Bth of September. The Commodore made known his mission to the seafaring population, and offered such terms of pay, bounty, and chance of prize-money as were thought sufficiently attractive. Vessels from the codfisheries arrived daily at Provincetown, but not a sailor volunteered to serve. The Commodore remained a fortnight on the station, with the same unsuccess ; and it is now reported that the Sabine will have to be laid up for the winter for want of men. No considerations of the unpopularity of the commander can be brought to explain the failure, for Commodore Einggold is not only a good seaman, but a gentleman in the highest sense of the word, and beloved alike by his officers

and his crew. The steam frigate Niagara, recently completed, and described as being one of the very finest ships in the world, is in the same predicament. She lies at Charlestown, near Boston, prepared to start in pursuit of the Alabama and the Florida, but unable to move for want of a crew. The sailing ship Saratoga, with a heavy battery, which would be useful before Charleston, Mobile, or "Wilmington, has been ready for sea for three months, but it has been found impossible to man her. There may be, and doubtless are, many other Federal war ships in a similar predicament, though as yet no publicity has been given to the facts. The Naval Department knows not what to do. One set of advisers, undismayed by the glaring failure of the conscription, boldly urges the Government to introduce into Congress in the first week of its sitting an act for the " impressment " of seamen, while another class insists that many thousands of volunteers could yet be procured if the bounty offered were increased, and, above all, if the ordinance were repealed which deprived the sailors of their " grog." It is asserted that the increase of pay. to the amount of sc. per diem, which has been granted to the sailor as a solatium for the loss of his usual stimulant, is not satisfactory, and that as long as this restriction upon the free will and upon the tastes and habits of the sea-going people is continued, so long will the Federal Government sutler for waut of seamen. Whatever remedy may be adopted, it is so uncertain in its operation, that the Government may well be excused if it do not see the expediency of a war either with Great Britain or Franco. An Impressment Act would be odious to the people, which might not signify much to a Government that seems determined to establish a despotism; but it might fail in its object, which is a contingency that no Government can afford to despise. As for the " grog," it is likely that the severity of the existing discipline will be relaxed, and that " Jack " will be allowed his coveted modicum of rum or whiskey; but whether in the event of war with Great Britain any considerable number of British sailors in the. present service of the Federal Government will consent to be traitors to the land of their birth admits of the gravest doubts. The fact seems to be that the United States, or what may remain of them, 011 the conclusion of peace, may be a great military, but never can become a great naval nation. Their territory by its very vnstness is inland, and must breed an inland, not a maritime population. It requires the sea to beget a love of the sea. The boy that is to be a sailor when he is a man must sport upon the shore when he is a child; and this can bo the destiny of but few Americans. If the coast line of the Federal States, leaving California out of the calculation, be measured from Norfolk in Virginia (somewhat more, perhaps, than will be allowed after a settlement between North and South) to tho boundary line in the Bay of Fundy, between the State of Maine and the British colony of New Brunswick—the one in latitude 32 deg., and the other in latitude 45 deg. 25 sec. N., —it will be found that the maritime population of the Federal States only exists upon a length of about 900 miles of coast. Compare this with the coast line of the British isles, and it may be estimated that the sailor-producing power of England and Scotland, to say nothing of Ireland, is at least twice as great as that of the Northern Union. Had it not been for British sailors,

the American navy, national or mercantile, could not have been what it is, and the Buncome " orators of vast inland regions, a thousand miles from the sea, would have had much less reason to boast of their ability to cope with the greatest maritime Power that the world has ever seen or is likely to

TIIE BATTLE OF CHICAMAIIGA,

The truth as to the last great battle in front of Chattanooga has had a long struggle to reach the light. It was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and through nearly three weeks the fragments of intelligence having been arriving by no less than five steamers —the Scotia, the Adriatic, the Damascus, the Hansa, and the Etna. It is only by the last vessel that full particulars of the engagement, and distinct admissions of the disaster the result has brought upon the Federal army of the West, have been received. Three "of these steamers left New York between the 24th and 26th, when the result must have been completely known to the Government, since on the latter date a lon* description of the battle, the positions occupied, the alternations of success during the two days of conflict, and the total confusion of the disorderly retreat that closes the story, was published. Most of the main incidents, and certainly the final catastrophe, we might have received several days ago, had they not been purposely kept back by the Northern Government, that prohibits the transmission of any news not acceptable to the official party from New York northward to Boston or Cape Race in time for the steamers bound to Europe. To delay the arrival of disastrous tidings on this side of the ocean, even for a single day, is considered a great point gained, and if the suppression is well-timed the supposed advantage of perplexing European opinion may be increased by a silence of three or four days longer. The telegraph thus becomes a very imperfect speaker that we are always asking to "tell us more." But it does not; its liberty of speech is suspended,along with the Habeas Corpus Act, and the few 'fitful utterances it makes always break oft', in a provoking manner, at the most interesting point of the narration. It is felt that there is much to come, but the thread is effectually snapped, and the end has to be inferred and deduced from the few very enigmatical sentences that are allowed to pass. The superiority of the modern telegraph system has thus been acquired in vain. The messages of the old post and board telegraph of our fathers were very liable to be "interrupted by a fog." But the puzzling mists that surround most of the American war news are wilfully raised by the wizards of the official departments at Washington.

Fortunately, their spells are soon broken by another power. The truth in a few days is revealed, more or less willingly, by the Press. And though in their comments on patent facts the official journals express very singular opinions, and draw conclusions opposed to all the premises, the reports of the correspondents are compelled to a general accuracy. A bias can be perceived, but it does not go so far as total perversion. They are not so bold in assertion as the first telegrams, that, by the official announcement of "substantial victory," prepare the Northern cities for intelligence' that turns it into a " crushing defeat." But it is from the earliest details, in which so much is suppressed altogether, while most of what is given has been " manipulated " by the Government, we are compelled to form our conclusions as the broken and perverted tale arrives. It is some satisfaction to find that the later and full accounts of a military operation quite confirm, even in points of detail, the interpretation made under such disadvantages. The small policy of concealing the truth from Europe is defeated when, by a constructive process, a very near approach to the actual history of affairs can be given from a serie3 of fragments intended to mislead.

The ample details of the battle of Cliicamauga that had reached New York on the 26th so fully confirm our previous conclusions from all we could deduce irora the official style, that we need not go over the whole story of the conflict again. The results are in 110 respect modified. The defeat was total, as Ave inferred, and the disorder of the retreat greater than we were prepared to expect from the character of the Western troops. But the causes of the disaster are now explained. The defeat of Rosencranz is ascribed to the better tactics of the Southern commanders rather than their superiority in numbers. By the manner in which the Southern attack was made Koseneranz was compelled to change the disposition of the greater part of his army after the battle had actually begun. He seems to have divined where the real assault was to be made, but not to have discovered it soon enough. The shifting of the divisions, moved to strengthen the weak points of his position, gave the Confederates an opportunity of throwing a<£ crushing" force on the points left imperfectly protected by the corps moved up to fill the vacancies. The result of the fighting on the 19th was not decisive. The federals held their ground, but part of their army had been " badly shattered," and the day " could hardly be claimed as a triumph of the Union arms." It was at this crisis the first telegrams stopped, with the alarming announcement of a " substantial victory." During th.) night of the 19th the Federal position had to be changed again, and on the 20th the Confederates repeated the tactics of the previous day. First attacking the left of the line and pushing it back, the Southerners threw all their force on the Federal centre, which had been " weakened to the extent of one-third." It could not sustain the shock. " The regiments began to spread out like a fan, wider and wider, till at last they were broken into fragments." The breaks caused by the shiftings of divisions from one point of the line to another " were so promptly perceived and turned to advantage by the Confederate Generals " that they proved fatal and caused the loss of the day." The Federal line, after being thus broken, could not again be formed, The army was, in fact, as we had previously stated, " cut in two." At this point of time tlie disorder began. Streams of demoralised uncontrollable troops flying to the rear, were all that remained of a large portion of the army. Four divisions were thus broken and dispersed, only one retiring in tolerable order. All afterwards was the confusion of a rout, " crowds of stragglers in mob-like disorder making good speed towards Chattanooga." A partial rally was made,' and Gen. Thomas was enabled so far to check the pursuit as to save the Northern army from total destruction. The whole incidents of the two days, it jnuat be admitted, are very candidly summed up by the American narrator: —" While the struggle of the first day ended in a drawn ■ battle that of the second resulted in a disas-

trous defeat." Bad formation of the line of battle, bad tactics on the field, and the absence ot' some commanders at the most critical period of the fight, are alleged as the causes of the disaster. Two seem to have disappeared, though nothing is said of their having been wounded.

liosencranz himself had also to quit the field before the battle was quite over. It is added that " while the army may be considered as safe enough, it is certain, if the enemy have the advantage of greater numbers, flanking movements will compel Rosencranz to retreat across the Tennessee, in case reinforcements should not promptly reach

him." This was also a contingency we ventured to anticipate, and, considering the position of Burnside, already threatened with an attack, it seems extremely probable. There is also a chance of the Federals hav ing their supplies cut off and being compelled to surrender. If this should occur it would be the first capitulation of the war. In the old War of Independence the surrender of two English Generals and their forces hastened the end of the contest. Nothing so decisive has yet occurred in the present American struggle, but the present situation of Rosencranz, liable to be surrounded, unable to advance, and with a difficult line of retreat, is in a peril not dissimilar to those of the English troops that could neither be moved nor supported. But the scene of this last great battle is so distant from the populous Northern cities that we doubt if it will very deeply affect public opinion or advance the prospect of peace. The Indian name of the battlefield means the " Stream of Death." The great losses on both sides give the name a new and terrible fitness. But the oft-re-peated tale of carnage makes small impression on the American mind, even though the difficulty of filling the thinned ranks is becoming every day more evident. —Times, Oct. 9.