THE PRESENT CRISIS.—PEACE OR WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XIX, Issue 1098, 20 May 1863, Page 3

THE PRESENT CRISIS.—PEACE OR WAR.

BY NA WHAKAAKO. Since my first paper on this subject was penned, an outrage has been committed and the first victims of what threatens to be a long and bloody struggle have fallen. I say " threatens," for on the future stops taken by our Governor, perhaps one single step, hangs the decision of the question. I speak advisedly when I say that, according to the usages of Maori warfare, when the Governor crossed the boundary of the Tatariamaka block, and when the first soldier of the Queen set his foot on the disputed land—at that very moment war was proclaimed between the Pakeha and the Maori. By this statement Ido not

mean to infer that " war to the knife," or a " war of extermination" was declared, but that between the Queen's troops and the claimants of that land and the hapu or tribe to which they belonged, the challenge had been given by the former. The gauntlet had been thrown down, and although the Maori might on the advance of the troops retire from the field doggedly and sullenly, without offering open opposition, their so doing was not the result of fear nor did they thereby admit the claim of the Pakeha. They had received the challenge, and in their own way and at the proper time, they would accept or refuse the same. Some short time passes, the soldiers construct redoubts, troops pass backwards and forwards, no Maori ambush is laid, no shot of defianec is fired, escorts guarding stores and material of war pass and repass unchallenged and unharmed, the Governor has gained his point, the Tataraimaka is his without a struggle; save and except some trifling annoyances and the removal of a sort of rude pathway of stones, constructed by the troops at a fording place, no opposition has been offered. All's well, and all seems likely to end well. Sir George Grey already congratulates himself that the Maori will let the matter rest. He has taken possession, and " there's an end on't" Things do not look so bad on the whole as they did a short time ago. The infatuated Maori have resisted all his pacific measures at Otauhao, Kohekohe, Taupo, and Qther places j but now, seeing he is in earnest—that he is angry with their folly—they have partly repented, and may yet atone for the past. The newspapers already congratulate the Governor and their respective editors, that now the result of the Governor's cautious and procrastinating policy is beginning to show itself in the absence of all opposition on the part of the Maori, and although old hands may withhold their congratulations as rather premature, it is as clear as daylight, that all is going on famously, and that as regards Tataraimaka, Waitara, and other places, " The Queen shall have her own again." Time still passes; no attempt to interrupt the work of the Pakeha soldiers is made. One little incident occurs however. On Monday, the 27th of April, a message (kupu) is sent to the Governor that the Maori intend "huaki" (to rush as in battle) on that day; the road party very sensibly leave their work, and go into town, and the Governor despatches the Assistant Native Secretary to Poutoko to dissuade travellers from proceeding beyond that place, and not without reason, for we learn that 45 Taranaki Maori were lying in ambush, but were recalled by Tamati Hone during the day. Still the matter is treated lightly, and carts drawn by bullocks (not very swift animals) with stores and provisions are passing and repassing along the beach road to Tataraimaka, the soldiers taking it easy—perhaps laughing and joking, to pass the time, as the bullocks crawled along. On the 4th of May—exactly a week after the message to the Governor—the news reaches town that a of Maori have attacked the escort of some bullocktransport carts, and have slain the escort, consisting of two officers and six men! General Cameron repairs instantly to the scene of the outrage; no Maori are seen; the bodies are brought into town; the General waits on the Governor and tenders his resignation, which of course is refused. The Governor, looking on the tragedy not as a declaration of war, or even an apology for reprisals, calls it a murderous outrage, and proceeds to issue warrants for the apprehension of the murderers.'

I have been thus minute, at the risk of being considered prolix, in order to set before the reader what, I think, may have been, and probably is now the Maori idea:—l. Prom the very presence of the Maori on the Tataraimaka block or its vicinity, and their retiring slowly on the advance of the military, I infer that they did so, satisfied that a challenge had been given them, and with the intention of accepting the challenge. 2. Their removal of the stones at the ford Tva? a significant, though tacit avowal of their intentions. 3. The " kupu," or message, sent was an acceptance of the challenge, full, clear, and distinct, intimating that now, having completed their preparations and arrangements, they did not mean to baulk the Pakeha in the wish for fighting, which the presence of the military (in their ideas at least) implied.

In the 12th century, their conduct would hava been deemed chivalry of the highest order; they were challenged, they accepted, openly and straightforwardly, and announced their intention. Afterwards, seeing the road party proceed to town, they would say, "Now, the Paheha know our intentions; they will act; they are warned and on their guard; we must look out; we have very little powder, let us wait and watch, and perhaps we may capture a load. I do not for a moment acquit them: blood has been spilt and valuable lives lost, and that blood cries aloud for vengeancc. But who are the so-called murderers? Certain Maori unknown. Will the warrants, if issued, be available ? and will the tribe give their brethren up ? I answer—the warrants are useless, and the tribe will not—dare not—give their brethren up. What then will be done ? Can the Governor not insist on the men being given up. He may insist and talk plenty, but if he back his demand by threats of vengeance on the hapu or tribe he will exceed his duty, and he dare not attempt to carry these threats out: for he knows that, according to Maori usage and custom, the natives are fighting now for what they maintain to be their rights; and more than this, the Governor well knows that if he had the prisoners secured, tried, and condemned to death, according to the law of the district at present, viz., martial law, or as the Governor's Maori proclamation has it " Ture whawhai" (the law of fighting), he dare not carry this law into execution.. Should such a thing happen as the capture of one of these men focused of murder, and his trial and condemnation by Court Martial, or even by the Supreme Court follow, the Governor dare not, I repeat, carry the sentence into effect, or allow it to be done. For even grant that it should be done—that one of them were to be hanged or shot-—that act would pro-

claim, far and wide throughout the island, a war ok hacks—of bitter and deadly extermination. With that extraordinary fatuity Avliich seems to follow every step in the Native difficulty, the Governor is in the wrong again. Through too much self-con-fidence, he has over-estimated his own prestige, and under-valued the Maori, lie has acted wrong, and why should the Maori be blamed or punished for his fault ? If the reports contained in the ' Advertiser of the 7th instant should prove to be true, then Sir George Grey has justly forfeited all claim on our belief and trust in his sagacity and profound knowledge. He is alone answerable for what has happened. Should he really proceed to extremities, and use troops to carry out the serving of warrants, tribe after tribe will join the alliance against him, and the war will become general; at present, it is not so, and is not likely to become so, unless through mismanagement. What will be done next ? I cannot tell ? But I know what ought to be done to avoid further bloodshed, in the opinion of the Maori; And here I would observe, that according to my idea of right and wrong, Sir George Grey ought to have held a meeting of the principal chiefs of all the tribes at Taranaki, unattended by military, to decide the Waitara question. This has always been the wish of the Maori themselves, and the arguments on both sides would doubtless have led to the final adjustment of that difference.

By Mr. M'Lean's clear and lucid speech on the 28th of May, 1858, much good was effected. Many of the natives were convinced, and would have willingly heard the matter argued out, but Te Heuheu and others prevented it. Three thousand men were present at the meeting, which -was held at Ngaruawaliia. In the same way a meeting ought to have been held at Taranaki, previous to the taking possession of the Tataraimaka. The natives have eagerly looked forward to the settlement of this question, and why should not their wish have been gratified? Much of the Maori confidence in the honesty of Sir George Grey's policy has been lost through this not having been done. And now, what can we do ? Two things remain, one of which must be done —either that the war must be carried on, and that vigorously and promptly, or a complete change of policy be at once effected. In mercy to the Maori, and in common justice to both Maori and pakeha, the former should, if possible, be avoided, and the latter adopted. The case stands thus : 100,000 pakehas in these islands, and 50,000 Maori under the control and direction of a Governor (whose line of policy was always a secret one, and never openly avowed), have been waiting for an adjustment of differences. Sir George Grey has failed in his well-meant conciliatory plans. Something must be done, for the interests of the pakeha are suffering severely, and heavy debts are being incurred daily, by the dilatory policy and futile military demonstrations of the Governor. The fact is, the Governor has now become too cheap in the estimation of the Maori. Before things grow any worse, then, let a Lieutenant-Governor be appointed solely for the management and adjustment of native affairs, to act in co-operation with our Ministry and Assembly. Let a nobler and franker line of policy be adopted—something in the spirit of what I have proposed in my first article of May 13th. Let a great meeting of all the principal chiefs be held at Taranaki, to settle the question, concerning Waitara. This would also be a good opportunity for the proposal of a scheme such as I have sketched, in which the Maori will be represented fully. Let the Lieu-tenant-Governor be a person thoroughly versed in Maori politics, wishes, habits and usages, and let him reside constantly in the North, to act with the Native Prince and Executive. Men filled for this office are to be found in the colony,— highly educated, talented, and well versed in Maori affairs, and whom the Maori will trust. Let such a man be Lieutenant Governor. He would ease the Governor's burden, and leave his Excellency time to remember and enquire into the affairs of the other provinces, to which his visits are, though none the less welcome, of necessity few and far between. Certainly as colonists all have an equal right to the privileges and advantages supposed to arise from the presence of a Governor, although lately we might have been better off had we been under the wing of an Australian Governor. Twelve years ago, before Christchurch existed, New Zealand had its Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Now, with double the population, and six times the wealth, the name of a governor for the Pakeha is enough, the Maori requiring all his attention. Healthy children thrive even in a father's absence, and when suffering from a father's neglect, but the thanks are due not to him, but their own robust constitutions. If a colonist wishes to see the Governor he must go to Auckland, or the Kawau. There is small chance of seeing him elsewhere. "Native affairs must be attended to, for if things were to go wrong, a rising might occur at any moment," so argue the northern anglo-maori politicians. And why should this state of things exist? With a nobler and more straightforward policy for the Maori; with a spirited and politic lieutenant governor to see it carried out, and be always ready for every emergency, our Governor would then have time to visit the other settlements, and see after their wants. In these days of steam and telegraph, the Governor should be aiding the efforts of each settlement to advance, and certainly he would soon see the favorable results that would follow such a

course of policy. By the scheme I have advanced, if vigorously and generously followed up, peace might be restored to the north, and the Pakeha and Maori meet and deal amicably together. Law is what is wanted, but not martial law, or " ture whawhai," literally the law of fighting, but a bold and generous code on our part, adapted to and intermingled with the " law of utu." A liberal minded lieutenantgovernoi (nothing less would do) to act in conjunction with " Matataera," the Maori prince, for the benefit of both races; and the Governor going to and fro among us from settlement to settlement, strengthening our hands in arts, sciences, and manufactures, and inaugurating the manly principle and practice of " volunteering " for self defence. A narrow-minded and close policy never did and never will succeed with a free and manly people, be they black or white. Both races, Pakeha and Maori (each for its own part), can with truth say, we have not been properly treated. Oh ! that this would only convince my fellow-colonists that they must at this crisis, think and act and remonstrate. I have spoken as I thought was right, and my views of Maori opinion on all matters are derived from my own personal experience. Our interests are at stake. Prepared for war and self-defence by voluntary preparation, we should enjoy lasting peace and | prosperity.