STATE OF THE ARMY, AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 314, 3 November 1855, Page 5

STATE OF THE ARMY, AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

(From the " Time's" Correspondent.)

Although the army has been disappointed by the result ofthe attack on the Redan and Aiaiakoff, it has not despaired—it does not despair of the result of this weary siege. I venture to say that the expectation of neatly every officer and soldier in the camp on the day of the 18ih of June was, that the assault would be renewed on that evening or on the following morning, but we are now, it is said, going to attack the Redan and Malakoff by sap ; we are about to undergo the tedious process of mines and countermines, globes of compression, etonnoir.% fougasses, and all the apparatus of scientific engineering, in winch the Russians are at least our equals. It is not too much to say that General Jones, our chief engineer, expects nothing of importance to be achieved for several, nv-my week- to come — that Sir George Brown is wiser and more discreet, and Lord Raglan more perturbed thau they have been for some, time past. Cries of " Murder" fruoi the lips of expiring officers have been echoed through ihe camp, but they have now died away in silence or iv the noise ot active argument and discussion. Oppressed by the news of death's doing amongst many dear friends, and by the intelligence of the loss of one who was valued by all who know how to appreciate rare scholarship, a ipiaint humour, a pure heart, and a lively fancy, 1 can scarcely be

surnosed competent to view our position in its iiauiral aspect, or to escape the influence of llie crhioniv atmosphere with which I am just now smrounded. Lord Raglan's amiable disposition is acutely touched by the loss of so many gallant men For myself, I admit that, knowing notions' "f war, and merely chronicling, as far as possible, ihe results of its operations, I do not see any possibility of our being able to abandon our present position on the south side of Sebastopol, or to make a general attack on the Russian armies which are encamped before us. Every ravine has been made another Sebastopol by their engineers. Our Land Transport Corps is so hardly pressed by the service of the siege A nine; y* lhat, as I am informed, tbe ration of fuel has been on several occasions recently not forthcoming to the troops for the full amount. It is to be presumed that the allied generals are acquainted with some facts respecting the strength and position of tbe Russian army, which induce them to think it would be unaiivisablc to break up our camp and try to force tbe passes of the Belbec. They may mistrust their own strength or the efficiency of their means of transport, or they may be deterred by tbe force and tbe attitude of the enemy. They vnav be influenced by considerations, and may act on information of which we are ijrnoraut, hut the belief of many officers of infeiior rank and of great intelligence is, that tbe proper way io attack Sebaslopoi is to put finger and thumb on its windpipe, no matter bow far the place may be removed from the great organ itself, and let it starve. We are not strong enough, it is said, to invest tbe place immediatelvoutside, for we are only 210,000 men, and it would require an.army, of 250,000 or 260.000 men to occupy the lines, which would enable ihem lo resist at all points the attempts of the enemy, whether from within or without the cordon of investment. The allied generals, perhaps, feel that their only chance of cohesion exists in their being together, and that it would be unsafe to divide and split up tb;s army of English, French, Sardinians, and Turks, not only on strategical grounds, hut on others affecting the morale of the force. It must be remembered this great army is no flying corps. It is encumbered with huge apparatus of war, with an immense amount of materiel, with siege ti.ains and heavy ordnance, and warlike stores which could not be left in the hands of the enemy, and which, having taxed the energy of two great nations iv their transport aud accumulation, cannot be carried away in a few weeks. We have converted the plateau into a great fortress commanding Kamiesch and Balaklava. If weabandoned it tomorrow tb?» Russians would he in it tbe same evening ; if we left a small force to occupy it, the enemy would soon discover our weakness, and either carry the plateau by a grand movement or weary out tbe troops and defeat them iv detail by constant sorties. In the extraordinary country in which we are waging war there is this condition—that the southern coast where water abounds, is so mountainous that it is impossible for artillery or cavalry to traverse it by any but tbe military road, which passes through tremendous defiles and ravines into which a general might well hesitate to bring bis men. On the north of the range, on the contrary, where the whole country is open, and the guncarria^e can find a road wherever it turns in this season, water is so scanty and so far apart that it would be hazardous indeed to march a large army through it, when a ruthless and active enemy, driven to desperation, might soon render it untenable by tampering' with the wells. In our march to Kalamita Bay each day's work was clearly indicated by the rivers. With a determined enemy we should bavo had to fight for our water every day—first at Bouljanak, then at the Alma, next al the Katseha, and afterwards at the Belbec; but northwards of Buuljanak we should have found no water to fight for. Peiekop is inacce«sible and poisonous, and the shores of the Siwasii are certain death—moie certain and quick than the marshes of the Dobrud.icha, at the recollection of which the bravest Frenchman trembles. We know nothing of tbe road or roads acros- the Siwash. When at Genilcbi the flying .squadron found they could barely approach the place, and it would have been extiemcly imprudent io go jiast the straits in light boats, -which might have been detroyed by a few field pieces directed by an unseen enemy along its banks. It will easily he seen, by these few remarks, that li.c army is not in that position in which we could wish to see it. Our generals are becoming ill again. General Pen-

nrfafheri* in orders to-day, and will have to j leave for England forthwith. Major General j Codringlon —one of our best brigadiers—is already <m his way from tbis to regain his shattered stremrib. We have lost the services of Brigadier Buller for some time past ; and we hear, with regret, that General Estcourt is very unwell. At this moment Colonel Shirley, of the SSth Regiment, virtually commands the Light Division, and the prospect of spending the next three months on this arid plateau is indeed depressing. Although water has not failed, it is scarce and bad. Guards are placed over the wells and streams, and each man and horse is supplied iv turn, and they have to form a queue at the troughs: and sometimes the thirsty man or beast has to remain for an hour ere his turn conies. Our sanitary commissioners are all departed. Dr. Sutherland If ft this week. Mr. Rawiinson is also gone. The latter gentleman has been unwell for some time, in consequence of the shock he sustained from too close contact with a 40-pound shot from tbe Ru-sian batteries. He had gone towards the front, but was just about to turn back, thinking he had gone too far, when a shot, which ricocheited over the high ground, close at hand, struck the pommel of his saddle and split it, and threw the rider to the groufld, with no. other injury than a scratch on the side from the steel binding of bis purse. They made some efforts to agitate tbe water question, but there was a misunderstanding between them and the authorities on tbe subject of employing officers of the Royal Engineers to assist them, and their services were not required.