SIR RICHARD ENGLAND, AND THE COMMAND OF THE CRIMEA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 273, 13 June 1855, Page 3

SIR RICHARD ENGLAND, AND THE COMMAND OF THE CRIMEA.

[From ihe^Home News."] The severe losses we have sustained In the Crimea, in*olying N tbe lives of many distinguished - officers, some of whom held high .positions in the army, have naturally, directed attention to ft contingency Which we all hope,may be remote, but which, under such circumstances, it"becoraes a necessary duty to provide .against. According to military seniority, Sir Richard England is second in' command in the Crimea: and should any .disaster deprive .the army of the services of Lo.^sp^glan, the command in chief would devolve*upon that officer. The Timesj recently, commenting upon this state of things, took occasion, to object to the adoption of a system of routine upon An occasion of such vjtal importance, and Btrongly urged upon,the .Government the imperative necessity of providing beforehand against sa, grave an emergeucy,.plajnlyindicatingithat the previous, career of Sir Richard England, disqualified him for so responsible a post. In reply .to these remarks, General Torrens volunteered a defence of the character of Sir Richard England, without, however, succeeding in obtaining from the Times even a .mitigation i of its former opinions.; and when the name of Sir John Burgoyne wa« introduced into the correspondence, coupled with strong eulogium upon his ability and courage, :the Times still maintained that neither he nor General England would satisfy.the people of this country at this momentous crisis. Younger and .more energetic men were required; and tha, interests of Europe demanded that the chief command should not hereafter be entrusted to a man who was upwards of 70 years of age. The risk was ' too serious. i The discussion had reached this point when Mr. Montagu, the Drother-Hi-law of Sir Rithard England, addressed a long and somewhat passionate letter to the Times, vindicating with considerable warmth the reputation of his absent ! relative. The main points on which he relied I were the facts that the Government had selected Sir Richard England as one of the four Generals i of Division in the Crimea ; and that at the close of the war in Afghanistan lie, in common with Nott, Pollock, and. others- had .received the thanks of Parliament and the East India house. Thus challenged on the subject of Sir Richard's , Indian antecedents, the Times published somelong extracts from Kaye's " History of tbe War I in Affghanistan," showing tlie inexplicable conduct of that officer at a critical moment in the Kojuck Pass. "These extracts were accompanied by the following commentary, in which the main historical points are re-stated :— *' We felt it our duty a few days ago to call attention to the fact that if disease or wounds were to incapacitate Lord Raglan for continuing hifc labours in the Crimea, the com mail d of our ■ army would devolve upon Sir Richard England, and we suggested that such a change ought by all means to be provided against, without waiting for the contingency of which we contemplated i the possibility. Feeling that England has no , possession more.precious than her noble army, > we did not hesitate to take this course. It is neither our wish noT in our power to ** dictate to Ministers " the manner in which their res- I sponsibjlity is to be exercised, but we claim the right conceded to every citizen in this country ' of publicly expressing an opinion of public men, and warning all concerned against what we believe to be a public danger. It seems to beuuiversally assumed that the feelings of an officer and of an officer's friends are to be spared and respected at<whatever-cost, and that it is better' to leave the most important affairs in the most incompetent hands than to be guilty of calling public attention to things notorious at every club and at every dining-table. We protest against this way of reasoning". Prom mere deference to the feelings of exalted personages and influential coteries, it was allowed to the Duke of York to squander our blood in Holland, and to General Elpliinstone to ruin'our army and tarnish our honour, in Afghanistan. That which before these events many thought, but no <one dared to write, has now become matter of ESstory. We propose that henceforth the notorious truth shall be told before, instead of after, the disaster, Such a step in advance is due to the increasing influence of the press, and to the favour with which we have been honored by the public, and no consideration for any individual, or for any number of individuals, shall prevent, our taking it whenever we see it necessary. " Mr. Montagu, the brother-in-law of General

England, has addressed to us a'letterin defence dfitbat which we 'think 'is extremely HHadvised, and :litt)e'Calculated to teive -the interests of feis.rotation. ThesubsUnoe raf our (observations was,-Sat<in .the' Crimean campaign, ofalmost, unexampled severity, when«ll general officers .have run such fearful risks .and encountered so many casualties, General England has never been under .fire. Sir George Cathcart has fallen, Sir George Browne 'been wounded and escaped almost by a miracle, the Dhite of Cambridge has 'been exposed to <the utmost danger, and Sir de 'Lacy Evans worn out by h«d service,; but the -other General of Division,. Sir R. England,,.has never had ,the fortune to be engaged. With .a spirit .of forbearance which those who Tcnow General England's .past career can well appreciate, we confined our observations to the -present campaign. "Mr: Montagu cannot deny their truth, 'but contents himself with sneering at .our assumption of the duties of the War Department, and "urging -that 'Sir Richard England has received tbelhanks of Parliament, and was appointed to ,his present situation by the Horse Guards. Thathe was so is the very cause' of our-complaint, and, our fear i lest an error sufficiently serious at first sliould become by hisunlooked-forpromotion.absolutely disastrous. As for " the thanks of Parliament," they were given to Sir Richard England in com- ' mon with the other generals -employed in the ! operations after the disaster at Cabul, .but. Mr. Montagu has done his relative .the-mortal injury,' of obliging us to - show how those- thanks were deserved, by calling attention anew to trausac- ' tions which, had the indiscreet zeal of this gentleman permitted, we were willing to pass over 1 in silence. *In the beginning of the year 1842 Sir Richard England commanded the Scinde h'eld foroe. It was extremely important to reinforce General Nott at£andabar, where he was in want of men, money, and ammunition. Near the village of Hykulzye, at the foot of the Bolan Pass, General England was encountered by some Asiatic troops, and repulsed with the loss of nearly 100 killed and wounded. It was of the last importance sthat he should advance, or, at , any rate, not retreat, for General „ Nott had written to him that either halting or retiring j would hare the v<ery worst .effect throughout 1 Affghanistan, and would be more injurious to his present position than 20,000 of the enemy in the field. But General England did retreat. His troops were eager to renew the attack; Colonel Sta«y, the Political Agent who accompanied him, undertook to storm the position with 100, or even 60 men—thrice he begged for-per-mission, and thrice he 'was refused.' General England retired to Quettah, and there began to intrench himself, leaving Nott, the honour of England, and the destinies of India to their fate. The defences before which he retreated were not formidable. They were thrown up in a few hours, and when afterwards taken, some of out officers rode -over them without knowing, where tliey were. General England wrote that the enemy were a hundred to one stronger than any one expected, though they were fewer than he was informed that they would be.' Finally, he strove to throw the blame on" the Sepoys, whom he would not allow to renew the attack. " The seeming unwillingness of England," says Mt. Kaye, '• to redeem his character by a vigo-rous-movement in advance irritated General I Nott more than the disaster itself." General ! England wrote to Nott a fortnight after the disaster, setting forth the dangers and difficulties of a forward movement, aud concluded by saying, " Whenever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direction, and that I am informed of it, lam sureUhat 1 shall be able to make a advantageous diversion in your favour." This, to a man who was meditating at that moment the conquest of the country and the re-capture of Cabul, and who has placed it on record that had he had one more regiment he would already have commenced the enter prize, was unendurable, and General Nott addressed to General England in reply a letter such as few men who have received, the thanks of Parliament have had the misfortune'to receive. We give a few extracts: — "* I have also heard of the affair you had with the enemy, and deeply regret the result. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss; but yet, perhaps, the British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without defeat, and I feel and know that British officers should never despair of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal

enemy. 1 feel obliged to you for pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you are aware that it is our first and only dutj to overcome difficulties when the national honor and military reputation 'are "so'deeply concerned. Nothing can fa accomplished without effort and perseverance. On the last paragraph -of- ycto'r letter I hare only to observe, that I'have not yet contemplated falling back.' "Under the pressure thus put upon him General England again advanced to Hykulzye, and his troops defeated With 'the utmost'ease the very same men in the -very same position from which he had retreated a month before, thus affording the most convincing proof of n'is own error. Still, though entreated by Colonel Stacy and Major Waddington, he would not advance into the pass, but waited'till detachments from Nott's army crowned the 'heights on each kide, and then, secure from the possibility of loss, he . contrived to reach Candahar. AH this, as General Nott truly said, Mis dreaii- , fulrethink of;" and though it might receive, can scarcely'be thought to iiave merited, "the thanks of Parliament, and might in another state of public feeling have been thought more suitable for the investigations of a court-mar-tini. After such great reverses, nowever, it was felt to "be no time for 'censure, and an officer of sneb rank, if not publicly censured, was'sure to be publicly thanked and rewarded. "We have now stated those antecedents of . General England which, unredeemed as they are by his condnct during the present campaign; do not; so we presume to think, recommend him for the command of our array in the Crimea. Such a leader as Mr. Kaye and General Nott describe would be, as at Hykulzye, equivalent to a reinforcement of 20,000 Russians; every check would become a defeat, every mouud an impregnable fortress, every difficulty an impefcsibility, every danger obstruction. The army of the Crimea is not the property of the War office, nor oF the families of its generals; it 'belongs to the nation, and the nation is bound to see that the bravest and noblest of mankind are not handed over to the timid or the incapable.; .It was by deferring to these considerations that we opened the last war so disastrously; it 'was by despising them that we terminated it so gloriously." ■■'■■- - - . To these statements and criticisms, Mr. Montagu replied in aletter showing more zeal than I discretion. Tie sum of his answer was that Sir Richard's conduct in India was an if error in judgment," that the reason why Sir Richard did not appear actively in the battle of the Alma was that he commanded the reserve; -and that at the battle of Inkerraann he was engaged with a. part'of his division. ■ Upon this last point, the Times contended in-Teply that LoTd Raglan's despatch did not,bear out Air. Montague's assertion. ■.- - , The whole subject has furnished a "topic of much commentary not only in the columns of the public journals, but in. private society ; and has brought out into full expression the feeling of surprise with which Sir Richard England's appointment even as a-General of Division was oiigiually regarded in some quarters. At such a moment a discussion of ibis kind is peculiarly. unfortunate ; but once " opened, no alternative was left, both as it affected the character of the individual and the security of the public ser-. vice, but to "investigate it with firmness and candour. If Sir Richard England's reputation be in any degree damaged by the investigationthe blame must fall exclusively on the hasty in, terference of his relative, who first touched upon his Indian antecedents, and provoked an inquiry into details whichj all persons, anxious to preserve the prestige of our. military glory, would have been willing to forget. The probability is, that the isolated case to which public attention has been thus forcibly drawn, will lead to further considerations involving more extensive results than any merely affecting the position or character of Sir Richard England. " The iuciden t," observes the Spectator, "is one, and a sufficiently signal one, to ! combine with many others in proving that the , whole system of military appointments, successions, and routines, should be overhauled and readjusted/ The change here hinted at is full of danger, and could not be carried out upon a comprehensive scale without much risk of injustice, and a total revolution of our established system. But we live in times that demand vigour and earnestness, and the sacrifice of "routine,'* in special circumstances, to great necessities and extraordinary "emergencies. An important novelty has been recently announced

in the Gazette, by the gift of commissions to one sergeant in each battalion of Lord Baglan's army after the battle of the Alma and Inkermann; and Lord Grey, in his speech upon the war a few nights ago, suggested that in all iuch , cases the commission conferred should be that of a captain, by which the sergeant would be at once placed in.a position commensurate with his experience, and with an income which would enable him to meet the expenses of his promotion, it being presumed that sergeants, unlike the class from wbich officers are usually drawn, hare nothing to lire upon beyond their pay. We may perceive from such suggestions as these, the difficulty of restraining innovation within reasonable limits, and the responsibility of .drawing a-strict line somewhere, which is cast upon those who contemplate what may be called organic, or structural, changes in the ranks of the ,army. v . There is a common agreement, however, upon this urgent truth—that^engaged as we are in a costly war, upon the issues of which the safety of this kingdom the peace of Europe are dependent, it is absolutely indispensable that great commands should be entrusted to qualified men ; and that we require, not experience only in the chiefs, but energy and vigilance. These qualities must be obtained, let them be obtained as they may ; and if the routine of the army list, or the present arrangements of the effective force engaged, do not supply them, they must bs procured by other means. That the army in India and elsewhere abounds in men of gallantry and skill, rigorous, brave, and trained both in camp and council, is well known; aud all that is required is to summon them to the posts in which their talents can be tendered most serviceable to their country, and honourable to themselves. We must not trust too much to Peninsular traditions, or the medals of Waterloo. Forty years of peace have intervened , since these glories were achieved, upon'the fame of which a few veterans still survive to wear the laurels won by their intrepidity in the field. It should be remembered that they were then young, in the prime of their strength and enthusiasm ; aud that, although age may not have quenched their patriotism, or impaired ,tbeir judgment, it has abated their physical powers, and, more or less, reduced their' capacity of ac tion. What is now wauted^in'tVe new war in which we are engaged, is a materiel equal in vigour and daring to what they-were ago;" men in their prime, as they^ were when they made their reputations; fresh' blood, fresh constitutions, and fresh laurels. Great occasions make great men; and an opportunity is now before us, from which we have a right to look for the development of a new race of distinguished soldiers.