CORRESPONDENCE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 266, 19 May 1855, Page 7

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the Lyttelton Times. Sik, —It sometimes happens that a phrase is common in the popular mouth, whilst the idea, or principle, of which it was originalK the expression, is forgotten, or indistinctly recognized. This seems to be the case with the term " Ministerial Responsibility," with which New Zealand has rung during the past year. Looking back on the debates in the first General Assembly, it would seem that the members of that body, not excluding the first advocate of the doctrine, were deficient in a distinct conception of the origin and meaning of that peculiar arrangement, —for it can be called by no other name, — which has crept into the working of the English Constitutional system under the name of " Ministerial Responsibility." The undue prominence appears to have been given to the outward form or mode, as though that of itself constituted the actual responsibility of the Executive to the Legislature, instead of being, as it really is, only a civilized, convenient, and, so to speak, polite method of asserting that real and positive responsibility, which is an inherent part of the Constitution of our mother country. To deal rightly with the question under active discussion throughout the colony at p rese ,,t—" How far is Responsible Government applicable to the Constitution and circumstances of this country, both in its General and Provincial Governments ?" — we must go to the root of the matter, and enquire, how that system has arisen in Eng-

land, and what task does it actually perform in the working of Constitutional Government ? The Constitution of England recognizes the existence of two distinct powers,—the Crown and the Commons, —the Governor and the Governed; independentl'the one of the other, deriving their existence and their authority from wholly different sources. I omit the House of Lords because its existence does not interfere with the points under discussion. The English Constitution supposes a permanent, self-exictent, irresponsible head of the State. It asserts this in the two imxims—" The king can do no wrong" and " The king never dies." It attaches to the king certain powers under the name of "Prerogative," which it forbids the other estates of the realm to invade ; which cannot be invaded without violating the Constitution —that is, without revolution. On the other hand, we find the Commons deriving their authority, not from the Crown, but from the people ; possessing peculiar rights, under the name of ' privileges," as much theirs of their own right as the prerogatives belong to the Crown, and equally incapable of invasion by the other estates of the realm. To such a constitution, a state of conflict would, at first, appear to be a probable, if not necessary, condition. And yet the harmonious working of the English Government is proverbial throughout o the world. This harmony is effected, this conflict is avoided, by that part of the Constitution which compels the Crown to perform all its acts through the agency of ministers ; and which attaches to the ministers the whole responsibility for all the acts of the Crown. But it must not be forgotten that th'-i responsibility of the ministers or councillors of the sovereign is a real and legal responsibility. To be compelled to resign office upon failing to command a majority of the Commons, is a very small part of the responsibility which attaches to the English ministers. They are directly responsible at law in the highest Criminal Courts of the country, not only for the performance of illegal acts, but even for advising the Crown to perform such acts. And the offence may be visited with fine, imprisonment, or even death, according to its magnitude and its heinousness. Sworn to advise the sovereign to govern according to the laws of the land, they cannot violate that oath without committing an offence which may possibly amount in the eye of the law to the crime of high treason. Upon this real direct legal responsibility of those in whose hands the government is placed, rests the whole institution of what is termed " ministerial responsibility ;" and without it, the latter, that for which the 'trugs'le occurred at Auckland, is an idle invention. To apply the case practically. Supposing the Treasurer of New Zealand to have issued monies out of the public chest, without the sanction of law, —simply on the warrant of the Governor ; —supposing the Secretary and the Attorney-General to have advised the issue of the warrant directing such illegal expenditure of the public funds:—ls it open to the representatives of the people to institute a prosecution against those gentlemen ? And are they liable to fine and imprisonment for their advice and their acts ? Ido not insinuate that such a thing has occurred. lam simply putting a case, for the purpose of drawing this conclusion ; that, if such punishment could net be awarded for such an act. we can never have any real Responsible Government. The interchange of offices between the 'ins' and the ' outs ' is a force ; Ministerial Responsibility is a sham, unless it be based on tins real'responsibility. For observe its operation. A nnd B cannot' carry their measures.' The country have ' no confidence ' in them. C and D head the opposition, and want

their places. But A and B will not ' resign.' The opposition betakes itself to the last constitutional resource, —the house refuses the supplies." That is, it refuses to pass a bill legalising the expenditure of the public monies. But suppose A and B can still remain in office, and, with no dread of ultimate consequences, can open and shut the public purse at pleasure,—would A and B ever resign at all, (supposing them to be of that sturdy stamp, which is sometimes found in men in high places;) —would they, I say, resign at all, were it not that the strong hand of the law is ready to clutch them, should they attempt an illegal act ? Thus it is that Ministerial Responsibility, the coming in of the leaders of the majority, and the going out of the leaders who cannot " carry on the Government," arises out of, and has grown up from, that direct responsibility by which the advisers of the Crown are made amenable to law for th eir acts. I doubt we must get the father in this colony before we can rear the child. With your permission, Sir, I will continue this subject on a future occasion. Your obedient servant, CoNNELii Counsellor. Falkland Farm, May 7th, 1855.