MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume IV, Issue 182, 1 July 1854, Page 9

MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.

Is the House of Lords on Feb. 24th, Lord Beaumont having brought forward several resolutions condemning the policy of the English Cabinet iv not repelling more vigorously the agressions of the Emperor of Russia, Lord Clarendon replied :— ..,,.,, , . « The only matter on which I feel bound to offer any explanation, or, indeed, concerning which any explanation either to your lordships or the country is necessary, is in respect to that part of my noble friend's speech which refers, jiot to past events, but to the condition in which we now stand, and to the prospects now before us. My noble friend has referred to our ready credence of what was stated to us by Russia, and has alluded to my having said that, up to the time of Prince Menschikoff's mission, we believed that it would have been impossible for any Government not to give credit to those frequent, solemn, and, on many occasions, unsolicited assurances which were given to us by Russia. I am sure he would have done the same. About two months after that began a change, and as soon as we found what was the comse of policy being pursued by Russia we never felt one moment's hesitation as to the course we should adopt. We declared our determination to maintain the independence of the empire of Turkey, and we advised the Sultan not to assent to anything contrary to his dignity or independence. We assured him, and we told him, that if terms consistent with his dignity and independence were refused to be accepted by Russia he might securely rely on our active support ; but at the same time, we strenuously and sincerely laboured in the cause of peace. If my noble friend would put himself in our place, as we were situated eight months ago, he would find that at that time it was our interest and the interest of our allies, and even of Turkey itself, not to rush into a war. The state of things at this period was this:—Turkey was wholly unprepared to defend herself; there was no Baltic fleet; our own fleet was cut off, and so was that of the French, while Austria and Prussia were entreating us not to result to hostile measures, notwithstanding the occupation of the principalities by Russia, as they hoped they could intercede with Russia, but that if their representations to the Emperor of Russia should be ineffectual, then they assured us they would act in concert with us. (Hear, hear.) No sooner had the Russian troops entered the principalities than the Emperor of Russia accepted the mediation of Austria, the object of which was to get him out of those provinces. Your lordships need not be told that at that time there was no desire for war, there was no one who would listen to war, and nobody believed in the possibility of war. But now my noble friend says that the use of strong language on our part would have controlled Russia and have prevented war. My lords, strong language means menace, and menace means war. (Hear, hear). I say, my lords, that you have no right—my noble friend lias no right—to say that the Emperor of Russia, or any man, would have feared a menace. When we are talking of Russia we are dealing with a very great nation, but we are also dealing with a sina-le man holding despotic power, and irresponsible for the exercise of it, over many millions of people; and I should like to know why he should yield to menace, even if the English and French fleets had occupied the Black Sea? If we had gone to war, what would have been the consequence? My noble friend has said that, on account of the great military preparations which Russia had made there was nothing to prevent her from crossing nic Danube and going to Constantinople. Now, I believe that Russia could not cross the •Danube. But what would have been the state of the Turks if that had taken place ? Turkey was unarmed; unprepared, and unable to resist a hostile Power, and the consequence must have °een, that Russia would have been able to extort from the fears and weakness of Turkey whatever she desired. Turkey might then have tan-ly said that we hud disregarded her interests, and the people of this country would have been highly indignant that no attempt had been made to save Turkey from those disastrous consequences. But, my lords, we acted otherwise ; We acted as any men of sense, conscious of what the laws of nation required, and of the weighty responsibility which attached to their °wn acts, would have acted. What has been tue consequence? Even my noble friend

admits that a powerful army has been raised in Jurkey with a rapidity perfectly wonderful—an army which has done great service, animated by a spirit wholly apart from any fanatical spirit, and which inspires the utmost confidence 111 ™c vigour and vitality of that country. Well, then, there is Austria and Prussia. Those two powers, grateful for the deference we have shown to their opinions, and as fully alive as we are to the aggressive and mischievous policy of Russia, are now with us. It is only this day that I have heard that 25,000 fresh troops have been ordered by Austria to the frontiers of its dominions. Then, we shall have prepared a fleet in the Downs more powerful than has ever left the shores of England. The French Government are in precisely the same state of preparation. All this is a sign of a conviction that war is inevitable. Every effort has been exhausted whereby the evil might be averted. (Hear, hear.) We have brought to bear against Russia an amount of moral and material power which no nation in Europe has ever done before. This, my lords, is the result of six months' forbearance and moderation. The facts are now before the people of England, who in their judgments are always just and reasonable, and to their judgment and sense of justice we appeal. (Hear, hear.) Accusations are brought against us of credulity and counivance, to the dishonouring of England ; but there is no echo of those accusations from the people of this country. (Cheers.) But I now come to that part of my noble • friend's speech in which he says that we are not yet in a state of war, because that declaration of war which is usually made by Government has not yet been made. My noble friend appears to labour under a feverish state of anxiety on this point, and to be apprehensive that deferring a declaration of war is an indication on the part of the Government to remain at peace. Now, I can relieve him to a certain extent on that subject, because, although I am just as desirous for peace as ever, and would be just as happy as ever if that peace were attainable upon just and honest grounds, yet I must say that I see no prospect of a just and honourable peace with Russia depending as it does u>ion the Emperor of that empire, who might, with honour to himself, have relieved Europe from the state of suspense and anxiety in which it has been placed, and have saved it from all the horrors and cruelties of war with which it is threatened. But he has rejected all overtures of a pacific nature, and has added to his original unreasonable demands requisitions that cannot for a moment be entertained: requisitions showing that his policy is incompatible with any terms of peace, and holding out, indeed, a challenge to the whole of Europe. My noble friend need not be under any apprehension that that challenge will not be taken up ; but your lordships must be well aware that we are not acting alone. It is not a quarrel between England and Russia alone. We are acting with allies and for allies, and it would be of the utmost importance, if we were not to take all the precautions which the circumstances of the case render necessary, or if we were to be induced by any sneer or reproach to declare war, or to do anything which we -did not consider the actual state of things to require (Hear, hear.) Sure I am that your lordships will not require any statement to be made by the Government which would he prejudicial to the country (hear, hear), and your h.-rdships will fully understand that Prussia and Austria have entitled themselves to our confidence, and that it is our duty to a certain extent, to consult their wishes, and that it is our interest to know what is their policy. (Hear.) . . We are also bound to consult, not only the wishes, but the dignity of the Sultan of Turkey, by informing him 'of the measures whudi we are about to take in order to guard the independence and integrity of his empire. We consequently have proposed to the Sultan a convention, and, until his assent has been given to it, it woidd neither be to consult his dignity nor his independence if we were to declare war. Therefore my noble friend need not. be under any alarm as to the declaration of war not having been announced to the two Houses of Parliament, because he must know that no time has been lost and no injury has been inflicted by the delay. In the meantime ouv preparations have been carried on, and the (leets and armies of England and of Fiance will be in that state of completeness calculated to carry out any war in which this country may be embarked. (Hear.) . . For my own part, I think we are on the threshold

of very momentous and important events, and it would ill become the gravity of the circumstances to adopt any resolution such as that suggested by the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) We are approaching, or we are already embarked in, that great 'question which has been long foreseen, and has been long postponed by all the able and clear sighted statesmen of Europe, on account of the great embarrassments and the political and commercial dislocation which it would produce. (Hear, hear.) But as we are forced into it, not by our own consent, I say unhesitatingly it ought to be settled once for all. (Cheers.) I again repeat that it is impossible for us at this moment to tell what the result will be ; but I can assure your lordships that it is the purpose of every man who, directly or indirectly, will take part in this war, and the purpose of Her .Majesty's Government, so far as the course of events will permit, to do that which is necessary ior the future security and tranquillity of Europe— namely, to check the aggressive and ambitious power of Russia ; to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire ; and to take solid guarantees in order that Europe may not again be deprived of the great blessings of peace. (Loud cheers.) But neither this country, nor other Christian Powers would properly fulfil the great duties now devolving on them, nor consult the interest of the Sultan himself, if they did not take this opportunity to secure equal rights and equal justice to the Christian population of Turkey, aud so pave the way for that progress and prosperity which Christian civilization will effect in that empire. (Loud cheers.) The resolutions were ultimately withdrawn.

The following correspondence between the Emperors of France and Russia, extracted from the London Times, will be read with interest: FROM THE EJIPEROK. NAPOLEON TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA. " Palace of the Tuileries, January 29th, 1854. Sire, —The difference which has arisen between your Majesty and the Ottoman Porte has arrived at such a point of gravity that I think it my duty to explain directly to your Majesty the part that France has taken in that question, and the means which I perceive of avoiding the dangers which threaten the repose of Europe. The note which your Majesty has lately sent to my Government and that of Queen Victoria, tends to establish that the system of pression • adopted from the beginning by the two maritime Powers has alone envenomed the question. On the contrary, it would, it appears to me, have remained a Cabinet question, if the occupation of the Principalities had not transported it all at once from the domain of discussion to that of facts. Nevertheless, your Majesty's troops once entered in Wallachia, we have not on that account the less recommended to the Porte not to consider that occupation as a case of war, thus testifying our extreme desire for conciliation. After having concerted with England, Austria, and Prussia, I proposed to your Majesty a note destined to give common satisfaction ; your Majesty has accepted it. But scarcely were we made aware of this good news when your Minister, by explicative commentaries, destroyed all the conciliatory effects of it, and thereby prevented us from insisting at Constantinople on its pure and simple adoption. On its side the Porte had proposed modifications on the project of a note which the Four Poweis represented at Vienna did not find unacceptable. They had not the approbation of your Majesty. Then the Porte, wounded in its dignity, threatened in its independence, involved by the efforts already made to oppose an army to that of your Majesty, preferred declaring war to remaining in that state of uncertainty and abasement. It had claimed our support; its cause appeared to us to be just; the English and French squadrons received the order to anchor in the Bosphorus. Our attitude with respect to Turkey was prospective, but passive. We did not encourage her to make war. We incessantly directed counsels of peace and moderation to be cairied to the ears of the Sultan, persuaded that it was the means of arriving at an understanding ; and the Four Powers came to a new understanding to submit other propositions to your Majesty. Your Majesty, on your side, showing the calmness which arises from consciousness of strength, limited yourself to repelling, on the left bank of the Danube, as well as'in Asia, the attacks

of the Turks, and with moderation] worthy of the chief of a great empire, you declared that you would remain on the defensive. Until that time, then, we were, I must say, interested spectators, but simple spectators of the struggle, when the affair of Sinope occurred and forced us to take a more defined position. France and England had not considered it necessary to send troops to be disembarked to the aid of Turkey. Their flag was, therefore, not engaged in the couflicts which took place on land. But on the sea it was very different. There were at the entrance of the Bosphorus 3000 guns, whose presence said very plainly to Turkey that the two first maritime Powers would not permit them to be attacked on sea. The affair of Sinope was to us equally offensive and unexpected, for it signifies little whether the Turks had ■wished or not to pass munitions of war into the Russian territory. In fact, the Russian ships came and attacked the Turkish ships in the waters of Turkey, and when tranquilly moored in a Turkish port, they destroyed them, notwithstanding tbe assurance given of not making an aggressive war, and notwithstanding the neighbourhood of the squadrons. It was 110 longer our policy that received a check in that affair : it was our military honour. The cannon shots of Sinope have echoed mournfully in the hearts of all those who in England and France have a strong sense of the national dignity. With one common accord, the cry was raised, " Wherever our cannon can reach, our allies ougkt to be respected." Hence the order given to o«r squadrons to enter the Black Sea, and to prevent by force, if necessary, the recurrence of a similar event. Hence the collective notification sent to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to announce to it that, if we should prevent the Turks from making an aggressive war on the cosbst belonging to Russia, who should protect the revictualliug of their troops on their own territory. As regards the Russian fleet, in interdicting to it the navigation of the Black Sea, we placed it hi different conditions, because it was important during the existence of the war that we should preserve a pledge which should be an equivalent for the parts occupied of the Turkish territory, and which should facilitate the conclusion of peace by becoming the title of a desirable exchange. That, Sire, is the real train and the series of the facts. It is clear that, arrived at that point, they must produce promptly either a definitive understanding or a decided rupture. Your Majesty has given so many proofs of your solicitude for the repose of Europe, you have so powerfully contributed to it by your beneficent influence against the spirit of disorder, that I cannot doubt your resolution in the alternative which presents itself to your choice. If your Majesty desires, as much as I do, a pacific conclusion, what can be more simple than to declare that an armistic shall be signed today, that things shall resume their diplomatic course, and that all the belligerent forces shall retire fiorn the places where motives of war have called them ? Thus the Russian troops would abandon the Principalities, and our squadrons the Black Sea. Your Majesty, preferring to treat directly with Turkey, would name an ambassador, who would negociate with a plenipotentiary of the Sultan a convention which would be submitted to the Conference of the Four Powers. Should your Majesty adopt this plan, on which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly agreed, tranquility will be re-established, and the world satisfied. There is nothing, in fact, in this plan which is not worthy of your Majesty, nothing that can wound your honour. But if, by a motive difficult to understand, your Majesty should oppose a refusal, then France, like England, would be obliged to leave to the fate of arms and to the hazards of war that which might be decided to-day by reason and by justice. Let your Majesty not think that the slightest animosity can enter my heart ; it feels no other sentiments but those expressed by your Majesty yourself in your letter of the 17th of January, 1853, when you wrote to me, "Our relations ought to be amicable, and to repose on the same intentions—the maintenance of order, love of peace, respect for treaties, and reciprocal benevolence." That programme is worthy of tbe Sovereign who traced it, and I do not hesitate to affirm that I have remained firm to it. ' I pray your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of my sentiments, and it is in these sentiments that I am, Sire, of your Majesty the o- 00 d friend, ' Napoleos."

THE EMPEROR OF BUSSIA's BEPLY. " St. Petersburg^ Jan. 28 (Feb: 9). Sire, —I cannot better reply to your Majesty than by repeating, as they belong to me, the words with which your letter terminates, " our relations ought to be sincerely amicable and should be based upon the same intentions — the maintenance of order, the love of peace, respect for treaties, and reciprocal good feeling." Your Majesty in accepting this programme, as I had traced it, says that you remain faithful to it. I dare believe, and my conscience tells me so, that I have not exceeded its limits; for iv the affair which lias excited division between us, the origin of which is not to be attributed to me, I have always sought to maintain friendly relations with France, and I have always endeavoured to avoid anything which might clash with the religion professed by your Majesty. I have made for the maintenance of peace all the concessions both of form and substance, compatible with my honour, and in claiming for my co-religionists in Turkey the confirmation of the rights and privileges which they have long acquired at the price of Russian blood, I claimed nothing which was not confirmed by treaties. If the Porte had been left to herself, the difference which has so long kept Europe in suspense would have been solved. A fatal influence has thrown everything into confusion. By provoking gratuitous suspicions, by exciting the fanaticism of the Turks, and by deceiving their Government as to my intentions and the real scope of my demands, it has so exaggerated the extent of the questions, that the probable result seems to be war. Your Majesty must allow me not to enler too much in detail into the circumstances as they present themselves to you in your letter, iv which those circumstances are marked out. Several acts on my part, appreciated with little accuracy, according to my opinion, and more than one fact perverted, would require, in order to be properly rectified, at least as I conceive, long developments, into which it would not be proper to enter in a correspondence between Sovereign and Sovereign. For instance, your Majesty attributes to the occupation of the Principalities the evil of having suddenly transported the question from the region of discussion to that of fact; but your Majesty leaves out of view the circumstance that this occupation, stilljpurely conditional, was preceded, and in great measure caused, by a very important previous fact—the appearance of the combined fleet in the vicinity of the Dardanelles, and besides this, much before that period, when England hesitated to assume a hostile attitude your Majesty took the initiative in sending your fleet as far as Salamis. This wounding demonstration certainly exhibited little confidence in me. It was calculated to encourage the Turks, and to paralyse beforehand the success of negociations by giving them the idea that France and England were ready to support their cause under all circumstances. In the same way your Majesty makes it appear that no explanatory commentaries of my Cabinet upon the Vienna note rendered it impossible for France and England to recommend its adoption by the Porte; but your Majesty may recollect that our commentaries followed, and did not precede, the pure and simple non-ac-ceptance of the Note, and I believe that the Powers were so little seriously desirous of peace, that they confined themselves to the claims of the pure and simple adoption of that Note, instead of allowing the Porte to modify what we had previous adopted without change. Besides, if any point of our commentaries had given rise to difficulties, I offered a satisfactory solution to them at Olmutz, and such was it considered by Austria and Prussia. Unfortunately, in the interval, a part of the Anglo-French fleet had already entered the Dardanelles, under the pretext of there protecting the lives and properties of English and French subjects; and in order to allow the whole to enter without violating the treaty of 1841, it was necessary that the Ottoman Government should declare war against us. My opinion is, that if France and England had desired peace as much as 1, they would at any cost have prevented that declaration of war, or, when war was once declared, have taken care that it should have been restrained within the narrow limits within which I wished to confine it on the Danube, so that I might not be compelled by force to abandon the purely defensive system which I wished to adopt. But from the moment when the Turks were allowed to attack our Asiatic territory, to

carry away one of our frontier posts (even before the term fixed for the commencement of hosti lities), to blockade Akhaltizik, and to ravage the* province of Armenia—from the moment when the Turkish fleet were allowed to transport troops, arms, munitions of war to our coasts could it be reasonably hoped that we should wait patiently the result of such an attempt? Was it not to be supposed that vvg should do all we could to prevent it? The affair of Sinone was the result of it.- That affair was the forced consequences of the attitude adopted by the two powers, and the result certainly could not have been unexpected. I had declared my wish to remain upon the defensive, but before war broke out, as far as my honour and my interests could permit me to do so, and so Ion"- as the war was restrained within certain limits. Has all been done which ought to have been done to prevent these limits being exceeded ? If the character of spectator, or even that of mediator, was not sufficient for your Majesty and if your Majesty wished to become the armed auxiliary of my enemies, then, Sire, it would have been more honourable and more worthy of you to have told me so frankly beforehand by declaring war against me. Each of us would then have known the part he had to play. But is it an equitable proceeding for those to make a crime of that event after it has happened which they did nothing to prevent ? If the cannon shot of Sinope reverberated painfully on the hearts of all those who in France and England appreciate the national dignity, does your Majesty think that the menacing presence at the entrance of the Bosphorus of the three thousand pieces of cannon of which you speak, and the report of their entry into the Black Sea, remain without echo in the hearts of the nation whose honour I have to defend ? I learn from your Majesty, for the first time (for the verbal declarations made to me up to this period have made no such allusion), that while protecting the reinforcement of Turkish troops upon their own territory, the two Powers have resolved to prohibit to us the navigation of the Black Sea—that is to say, apparently, to take from us the right of strengthening our own coasts. I leave it to your Majesty to consider if that be, as you say, the way to facilitate the conclusion of peace, and if in the alternative which is placed before me I am permitted to discuss, or even to examine for a moment, your proposals for an armistice, the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, and the negotiation with the Porte of a convention to be submitted to a conference of the Four Powers 1 Would you youvself, Sire, if you were in my place, accept such a position ? Would your national feeling. allow you to do so? I boldly answev, No. Allow me, then, in my turn, the right of thinking as you would think yourself. Whatever your Majesty may decide, menaces will not induce me to recede. My confidence is in God and in my right, and Russia, as I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812. If, however, your Majesty, less indifferent to my honour, should frankly return to our programme—if you should proffer^me a cordial hand, as I now offer it to you at this last moment, I will willingly forget whatever has wounded my feelings in the past. Then, Sire, but then only, we may discuss, and perhaps we may come to an understanding. Let your fleet limit itself to preventing the Turks from sending additional forces to the theatre of war. I willingly promise that they shall have nothing to fear from my attempts. Let them send a negotiator. I will receive him in a suitable manner. My conditions are known at Vienna. That is the basis upon which I can allow discussion. I beg your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments with which I am, Sue, your Majesty's good friend, n Nicholas.

American Travel.—the celebrated Mr. Clay once lold tbe following anecdote to amend of ours :—Travelling in early manhood, and m a public conveyance in a Sonth-Eastern Mate, he found himself in the company of three otiei persons, consisting of a young lady and gent - man, her husband, and of a person muffled " in a cloak, whose countenance was conceaie and who appeared to be indulging in a tetetete with Morpheus. Suddenly a big, bruw«». Kentuckian, got into the coach smoking a.cifc. < and frowned fiercely around, as much as to s■ .. " I'm half horse, half alligator: the yaiw flower of the forest, all brimstone but tiie v -

and ears, and that's aquafortis." In fact, he i ked as savage as a meat-axe, and puffed f th huge volumes of smoke, without reference In the company within, especially of the lady, Ibo manifested certain timid symptons of anoyance. Presently, after some whispering, tip gentlemen with her, in the politest accents, requested the stranger not to smoke, as it annoyed his companion. The fellow answered, „ f reC kon I've paid my place. I'll smoke as much as I darn please, and all h—l sha'nt stop en o how." With that he looked dangerous, nd rolled his eyes round as fiercely as a rattle-a-j. ae> It was evident he had no objection to a quarrel, and that, if it occurred, it was likely to lead to a deadly struggle. The young man who had spoken to him shrank back and was silent. Clay felt his gallantry aroused. He considered for a moment whether he should interfere but experienced a natural reluctance to draw upon himself the brutal violence of his gin-antic adversary. In that lawless company, he°knew that his life might be sacrificed unavenged. He knew himself physically unequal to the contest, and he thought, after all, it was not his business Quixoticall, to take up another man's quarrel.' Feeling pity for the insulted, and disgust towards the iusulter, he determined to take no notice ; when, very quietly indeed, ihe cloaked figure in the corner assumed an upright position, and the mantle was suffered to fall from it without effort or excitement. The small but sinewy frame of a man, plainly dressed in a tight-buttoned frock-coat with nothing remarkable about his appearance, was seen, and a pair of bright grey eyes sought the fierce optics of the ferocious Kentuckian. Without a word, this " lay figure " passed his hand under his collar at the back of his neck, and slowly and deliberately pulled forth a long, extremely long, and glittering knife, from its sheath in that singular place. "Stranger" he said, "my name is Colonel James Bowie, well known in Arkansas and Lousiana, and if you' don't put that cigar out of the window in a quarter of a minute, I'll put this knife through your bowels, as sure as death." Clay said he never forgot in after life the expression of the Colonel's eyes at that moment. The predominant impression made upon him was the certainty of* the threat being fulfilled,' and apparently the same conviction impressed itself ere long upon the offender. During two or three seconds his eye met that of Bowie, his was the weaker, and he quailed. With a curse he tore the cigar from between his teeth, and flung it scowling, but downcast, out of the coach window. Upon this, Colonel James Bowie as deliberately replaced his long knife in its eccentric hiding-place, and without saying a word to any one else, or even vouchsafing a glance at any .one, refolded his cloak around him, and did not utter another syllable to the end of the journey— New Quarterly Review;